This blog is intended to showcase some of the works that I wrote during my Master's work at Hebrew University.
All of these posts are composed of various written materials I produced as either individual papers for course work or as short essays written in response to questions posed by professors. None of these works have been published in any other forum or form.
All of these works are the sole property of me, the author, and should be treated as such. They are not to be reproduced in any manner without my written authorization. Plagiarism is both illegal and unethical.
Media and the State
Short Essay:
Please elaborate on the relationship between the media and the state.
Political Communication in Israel
The relationship between the media and state in the Western world has becomes increasingly more complex because of the process of “medialization.” [1] This process describes how the media has changed by gaining both greater independence from and greater influence upon the political system of the time, moving from periods of greater governmental control over media to freer privatized media following their own agenda as well as shifting within theoretical research frameworks and paradigms. [2] This process has arisen because of the assumed role of the media as sole (or most important) intermediary between the state (i.e., the government, politicians, etc) and the public at large, and as the key for keeping the state under public accountability. [3] This has allowed for new tools, resources and powers for the media to wield to have greater impact on the world of politics and vice versa. It has also opened the door for some new processes that have colored both the media and politics.
The tools and resources that the media has to pull from are varied; however theoretically, they each can produce a measurable affect on the community and public at large. One of these tools is the use of framing- the process whereby the media outlet determines what will be covered as well as how it will be covered. How the media chooses to portray an event can have large influence on how it is received and perceived by the audience. [4] This brings up many concerns, such as what general frame to choose (thematic or hard vs episodic or soft with general news stories, as well as issue frames vs game frames within the political system framework). [5] This framing can be seen as a function of political bias within the media organizations. The media can use their control of media access and the valence (degree of positive and negative coverage) to in part determine how a specific event or person is considered. An example of the effect of framing can be seen in the various frames employed by differing news agencies during Operation Cast Lead: portraying Israel as an aggressor, focusing on the plight of the Gaza’s inhabitants, etc. Different frames emphasized different aspects of the conflict leading the audiences of the respective media to differing conclusions.
Another theoretical tool of the media in the political system is the use of agenda setting (“The media influence public opinion by emphasizing certain issues over others.” [6]) and priming. “The priming hypothesis states that the media agenda affects the criteria people use to evaluate the performance of political actors.” [7] This allows the media to in some ways directly affect the electoral and other political processes by introducing a saliency effect to the public [8]- by having both easily accessed media and “by emphasizing certain issues and not others, the media may thus influence electoral results, because it appears that people tend to vote for parties that ‘own’ the issues primed by the media.” [9] [10] The use of affective attributes in the coverage can add another element of influence for the media. [11] This is seen effectively by observing the compelling arguments principle (“the media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone…to objects or issues.” [12]) and/or by negativity bias in which people pay more attention to negative news items than to positive. [13][14] These effects again can be illustrated by political and media reactions during Operation Cast Lead. As public opinion was manipulated by the stories regarding the operation, one could witness changes in political action towards the issue (e.g. international calls for the denouncing of Israel, the Goldstone report, etc).
While the media’s tools and resources for interacting with and influencing the workings of the state are powerful, the state is not left without its own means of influencing the media and using the media’s tools as its own. The politicians and the state can easily take advantage of the biases and tools of the media if they understand those tools. By understanding the ideas of personal political bias and newsworthiness bias, a politician can theoretically craft their personal appeal and character to the desires of the public. As well, once a politician has reached office, he or she gains an advantage because of their position that will guarantee them greater news coverage than any opponents who are not already in the public’s eye. In election periods, those in the front of the polls can count on receiving more coverage as well because of the “horse-race bias” (the fact that the poll leaders automatically receive greater access to media). This was attempted during Operation Cast Lead, as it would seem that political leaders (e.g. Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni, etc.) during the operation strove to use their status as leaders of the “successful” operation to enhance their political appeal in the upcoming election.
Politicians and government officials can also be aware of the Index Hypothesis and the strength that its theoretical model can lend to their political atmosphere. The index hypothesis states “mass media news professionals…tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic.” [15] Thus, governments that can tightly control the internal amount of discussion and debate about policies and actions can control the media’s influence and narrow its index. This was observed well in the Israeli media during Operation Cast Lead. With the government standing nearly unanimously in agreement about the scope and manner of the operation, there was hardly any divergence of opinion within the Israeli media and public at large.
Most of this discussion has emphasized the differing tools that the media and the state use to determine and shift their relationship. However one effect has been seen and theoretically projected to grow within both spheres: personalization. [16] Generally, this trend has been seen in three different areas: Institutional, Media and Politician Behavior. [17] Institutionally, personalization has been seen in that new modes, norms and formal institutions have emerged that emphasize the individual within the political system. Within the media, it has emerged that (according to some analysis) the media has begun to focus more on individuals. This of course follows after the decline in party politics. But as well, the media’s focus on politics as a game or “horse race” [18] with attendant game frames tends towards personalization. Similarly, other media actions, such as use of episodic/soft frames and particularly types of “infotainment,” [19] tend to push towards the personalization of politics. As well, politician behavior has tended away from party politics and toward personal activities in some countries.
[1] Stromback &Kaid, (2008), “A Framework for Comparing Election News Coverage Around the World,” in Stromback &Kaid (Eds.) Handbook of Election Coverage Around the World.
[2] See Sheufele, D. A. (1999), “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49, (1), 103-122 for an overview of the last century within communication paradigm research.
[3] Bennett, W. (1990) “Toward a Theory of Press-state Relations in the United States,” Journal of Communication, 40, 103-125.
[4] See Sheufele, D. A. (1999), “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49, (1), 103-122 for a broader theoretical discussion of differing types of frames and their effects.
[5] Sheafer, T., Weimann, G., and Tsfati, Y. (2008), “Campaigns in the Holy Land: the Content and Effects of Election News Coverage in Israel,” In Stromback, J. & L. L. Kaid (Eds.) Handbook of Election Coverage around the World. (pp. 209-225).
[6] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 217.
[7] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 218.
[8] Shamir, J. & Shamir, M. (2000) The Anatomy of Public Opinion. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). 87.
[9] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 218
[10] For info concerning this affect in election processes, see Holbrook, (1996) Do Campaigns Matter? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).
[11] See Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: The Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of Communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[12] Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[13] It should be added that theoretically, this type of influence should be observed mainly among people lower in political information, while those with higher political information and knowledge should be less affected. See Franz & Ridout, (2007), “Does Political Advertising Persuade?” Political Behavior, 29(4), 465-492.
[14] Another interesting aspect to this is that voters can effectively be discouraged from voting by highly negative media during an election process. Se Ansolabehere, et al. (1997), “Does Attack Advertizing Demobilize the Electorate?” In Iyengar & Reeves (Eds.), Do the Media Govern? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Chap. 25, pp. 195-207.
[15] Bennet, “Press-state Relations,” 106.
[16] Although it is debatable about how well this is truly borne out by statistics in an international scale, personalization has still been observed in many nations under many differing situations. See Rahat & Sheafer (2007) “The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003,” Political Communication, 24 (1), 65-80. And Karvonen, (2007) “The Personalization of Politics: What does Research Tell us so far, and what further research is in order?” Paper for the 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa 6-8 Sept 2007.
[17] Rahat & Sheafer, “Personalization(s),” 68-69.
[18] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 209.
[19] See Baumgartner & Morris, (2006), “The Daily Show Effect,” American Political Research, 34, 341-367.
Please elaborate on the relationship between the media and the state.
Political Communication in Israel
The relationship between the media and state in the Western world has becomes increasingly more complex because of the process of “medialization.” [1] This process describes how the media has changed by gaining both greater independence from and greater influence upon the political system of the time, moving from periods of greater governmental control over media to freer privatized media following their own agenda as well as shifting within theoretical research frameworks and paradigms. [2] This process has arisen because of the assumed role of the media as sole (or most important) intermediary between the state (i.e., the government, politicians, etc) and the public at large, and as the key for keeping the state under public accountability. [3] This has allowed for new tools, resources and powers for the media to wield to have greater impact on the world of politics and vice versa. It has also opened the door for some new processes that have colored both the media and politics.
The tools and resources that the media has to pull from are varied; however theoretically, they each can produce a measurable affect on the community and public at large. One of these tools is the use of framing- the process whereby the media outlet determines what will be covered as well as how it will be covered. How the media chooses to portray an event can have large influence on how it is received and perceived by the audience. [4] This brings up many concerns, such as what general frame to choose (thematic or hard vs episodic or soft with general news stories, as well as issue frames vs game frames within the political system framework). [5] This framing can be seen as a function of political bias within the media organizations. The media can use their control of media access and the valence (degree of positive and negative coverage) to in part determine how a specific event or person is considered. An example of the effect of framing can be seen in the various frames employed by differing news agencies during Operation Cast Lead: portraying Israel as an aggressor, focusing on the plight of the Gaza’s inhabitants, etc. Different frames emphasized different aspects of the conflict leading the audiences of the respective media to differing conclusions.
Another theoretical tool of the media in the political system is the use of agenda setting (“The media influence public opinion by emphasizing certain issues over others.” [6]) and priming. “The priming hypothesis states that the media agenda affects the criteria people use to evaluate the performance of political actors.” [7] This allows the media to in some ways directly affect the electoral and other political processes by introducing a saliency effect to the public [8]- by having both easily accessed media and “by emphasizing certain issues and not others, the media may thus influence electoral results, because it appears that people tend to vote for parties that ‘own’ the issues primed by the media.” [9] [10] The use of affective attributes in the coverage can add another element of influence for the media. [11] This is seen effectively by observing the compelling arguments principle (“the media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone…to objects or issues.” [12]) and/or by negativity bias in which people pay more attention to negative news items than to positive. [13][14] These effects again can be illustrated by political and media reactions during Operation Cast Lead. As public opinion was manipulated by the stories regarding the operation, one could witness changes in political action towards the issue (e.g. international calls for the denouncing of Israel, the Goldstone report, etc).
While the media’s tools and resources for interacting with and influencing the workings of the state are powerful, the state is not left without its own means of influencing the media and using the media’s tools as its own. The politicians and the state can easily take advantage of the biases and tools of the media if they understand those tools. By understanding the ideas of personal political bias and newsworthiness bias, a politician can theoretically craft their personal appeal and character to the desires of the public. As well, once a politician has reached office, he or she gains an advantage because of their position that will guarantee them greater news coverage than any opponents who are not already in the public’s eye. In election periods, those in the front of the polls can count on receiving more coverage as well because of the “horse-race bias” (the fact that the poll leaders automatically receive greater access to media). This was attempted during Operation Cast Lead, as it would seem that political leaders (e.g. Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni, etc.) during the operation strove to use their status as leaders of the “successful” operation to enhance their political appeal in the upcoming election.
Politicians and government officials can also be aware of the Index Hypothesis and the strength that its theoretical model can lend to their political atmosphere. The index hypothesis states “mass media news professionals…tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic.” [15] Thus, governments that can tightly control the internal amount of discussion and debate about policies and actions can control the media’s influence and narrow its index. This was observed well in the Israeli media during Operation Cast Lead. With the government standing nearly unanimously in agreement about the scope and manner of the operation, there was hardly any divergence of opinion within the Israeli media and public at large.
Most of this discussion has emphasized the differing tools that the media and the state use to determine and shift their relationship. However one effect has been seen and theoretically projected to grow within both spheres: personalization. [16] Generally, this trend has been seen in three different areas: Institutional, Media and Politician Behavior. [17] Institutionally, personalization has been seen in that new modes, norms and formal institutions have emerged that emphasize the individual within the political system. Within the media, it has emerged that (according to some analysis) the media has begun to focus more on individuals. This of course follows after the decline in party politics. But as well, the media’s focus on politics as a game or “horse race” [18] with attendant game frames tends towards personalization. Similarly, other media actions, such as use of episodic/soft frames and particularly types of “infotainment,” [19] tend to push towards the personalization of politics. As well, politician behavior has tended away from party politics and toward personal activities in some countries.
[1] Stromback &Kaid, (2008), “A Framework for Comparing Election News Coverage Around the World,” in Stromback &Kaid (Eds.) Handbook of Election Coverage Around the World.
[2] See Sheufele, D. A. (1999), “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49, (1), 103-122 for an overview of the last century within communication paradigm research.
[3] Bennett, W. (1990) “Toward a Theory of Press-state Relations in the United States,” Journal of Communication, 40, 103-125.
[4] See Sheufele, D. A. (1999), “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49, (1), 103-122 for a broader theoretical discussion of differing types of frames and their effects.
[5] Sheafer, T., Weimann, G., and Tsfati, Y. (2008), “Campaigns in the Holy Land: the Content and Effects of Election News Coverage in Israel,” In Stromback, J. & L. L. Kaid (Eds.) Handbook of Election Coverage around the World. (pp. 209-225).
[6] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 217.
[7] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 218.
[8] Shamir, J. & Shamir, M. (2000) The Anatomy of Public Opinion. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). 87.
[9] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 218
[10] For info concerning this affect in election processes, see Holbrook, (1996) Do Campaigns Matter? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).
[11] See Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: The Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of Communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[12] Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[13] It should be added that theoretically, this type of influence should be observed mainly among people lower in political information, while those with higher political information and knowledge should be less affected. See Franz & Ridout, (2007), “Does Political Advertising Persuade?” Political Behavior, 29(4), 465-492.
[14] Another interesting aspect to this is that voters can effectively be discouraged from voting by highly negative media during an election process. Se Ansolabehere, et al. (1997), “Does Attack Advertizing Demobilize the Electorate?” In Iyengar & Reeves (Eds.), Do the Media Govern? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Chap. 25, pp. 195-207.
[15] Bennet, “Press-state Relations,” 106.
[16] Although it is debatable about how well this is truly borne out by statistics in an international scale, personalization has still been observed in many nations under many differing situations. See Rahat & Sheafer (2007) “The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003,” Political Communication, 24 (1), 65-80. And Karvonen, (2007) “The Personalization of Politics: What does Research Tell us so far, and what further research is in order?” Paper for the 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa 6-8 Sept 2007.
[17] Rahat & Sheafer, “Personalization(s),” 68-69.
[18] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 209.
[19] See Baumgartner & Morris, (2006), “The Daily Show Effect,” American Political Research, 34, 341-367.
Affective Priming
Short Essay:
Please explain the idea of affective priming. What is its possible role in elections? Compare this concept with the framing effect.
Political Communication in Israel
Affective priming deals with the way people make judgments of their political leaders (and others) based on the issues that get prominent news coverage. Price and Tewksbury note that originally priming effects were studied in the realm of agenda setting. However, they also note that whereas agenda setting can affect what the audience find important, priming studies can “also affects public evaluations of political leaders. For example, at any particular point in time people may tend to evaluate the performance of the president based on those issues (e.g., the economy or foreign affairs) recently featured most prominently in the media.” [1] It seems that the reason this works is because people tend “to be miserly in expending cognitive effort when processing political information. Most use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics.” [2] People base their overall opinion of a political leader’s success simply on their actions/policies/activities in one area.
Sheafer takes it a little bit further by noting that once issues or events have been primed, people place an “affective attribute” on it. This is an evaluation of the issue at hand, which cannot be separated from the initial priming, thus rendering it affective priming. He says, “The media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone (i.e., positive, negative or neutral) to objects or issues. In other words, the media help people in assigning attribute to these issues.” [3] This seems to give the media a powerful tool midway between the framing effect and simple priming.
The framing effect refers to the way that the media can determine how the object or issue is to be presented. Framing presents a way that journalists and the audience alike can respectively represent and comprehend the issues at hand. [4] The way journalists frame an issue is essentially assigning to it an affective attribution, be that negative, positive or neutral. “Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented, on the ways public problems are formulated for the media audience.” [5]
Affective priming can thus be a formidable tool to be used by the media to affect politics, especially in the context of elections. By recognizing which party “owns” which issue and affectively priming accordingly, a media outlet can perhaps influence the electoral process because “such affective attributes have political consequences, probably mainly through the process of voters’ attribution of responsibility to the incumbent party.” [6] Similarly, the theory “behind agenda setting and priming is the idea that story selection affects audience evaluations by influencing the likelihood that some issues rather than others will come to mind, thus affecting audience judgments of issue importance or approval of public actors.” [7] Thus, a media outlet can attempt to sway public opinion and judgment of a public figure or party. This could be fairly (or possibly even extremely) effective during a close election.
[1]Price, V. & Tewksbury, D. (1997). “New Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical account of media priming and framing.” In Barnett, G. A. & Boster, F. J. (Eds.), Progress in Communication Sciences: Advances in Persuasion, Vol. 13. Connecticut and London: Abelx Publishing Corp. 181.
[2]IBID
[3]Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: the Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[4]See Scheufele, D. A. (1999). “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49(1), 103-122.
[5]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
[6]Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[7]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
Please explain the idea of affective priming. What is its possible role in elections? Compare this concept with the framing effect.
Political Communication in Israel
Affective priming deals with the way people make judgments of their political leaders (and others) based on the issues that get prominent news coverage. Price and Tewksbury note that originally priming effects were studied in the realm of agenda setting. However, they also note that whereas agenda setting can affect what the audience find important, priming studies can “also affects public evaluations of political leaders. For example, at any particular point in time people may tend to evaluate the performance of the president based on those issues (e.g., the economy or foreign affairs) recently featured most prominently in the media.” [1] It seems that the reason this works is because people tend “to be miserly in expending cognitive effort when processing political information. Most use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics.” [2] People base their overall opinion of a political leader’s success simply on their actions/policies/activities in one area.
Sheafer takes it a little bit further by noting that once issues or events have been primed, people place an “affective attribute” on it. This is an evaluation of the issue at hand, which cannot be separated from the initial priming, thus rendering it affective priming. He says, “The media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone (i.e., positive, negative or neutral) to objects or issues. In other words, the media help people in assigning attribute to these issues.” [3] This seems to give the media a powerful tool midway between the framing effect and simple priming.
The framing effect refers to the way that the media can determine how the object or issue is to be presented. Framing presents a way that journalists and the audience alike can respectively represent and comprehend the issues at hand. [4] The way journalists frame an issue is essentially assigning to it an affective attribution, be that negative, positive or neutral. “Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented, on the ways public problems are formulated for the media audience.” [5]
Affective priming can thus be a formidable tool to be used by the media to affect politics, especially in the context of elections. By recognizing which party “owns” which issue and affectively priming accordingly, a media outlet can perhaps influence the electoral process because “such affective attributes have political consequences, probably mainly through the process of voters’ attribution of responsibility to the incumbent party.” [6] Similarly, the theory “behind agenda setting and priming is the idea that story selection affects audience evaluations by influencing the likelihood that some issues rather than others will come to mind, thus affecting audience judgments of issue importance or approval of public actors.” [7] Thus, a media outlet can attempt to sway public opinion and judgment of a public figure or party. This could be fairly (or possibly even extremely) effective during a close election.
[1]Price, V. & Tewksbury, D. (1997). “New Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical account of media priming and framing.” In Barnett, G. A. & Boster, F. J. (Eds.), Progress in Communication Sciences: Advances in Persuasion, Vol. 13. Connecticut and London: Abelx Publishing Corp. 181.
[2]IBID
[3]Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: the Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[4]See Scheufele, D. A. (1999). “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49(1), 103-122.
[5]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
[6]Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[7]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
Casual Argument Verification
Short Essay:
How do you know your causal argument is true? What are the main formal properties by which your argument might be tested?
There are many criteria which can be used to assess the validity of an argument of causality. Some of these criteria are, of course, of much greater importance than the others. Here I will discuss four of the main criteria necessary for determining whether or not a causal argument is in fact valid or not. These four criteria are: plenitude, representativeness, transparency, and replicability.
Plenitude
The plenitude of an argument is a description of the number of cases and examples of the relationship of causality that one is wishing to prove. Because there is no way to determine whether something is caused by something else in the absence of a comparison with an example of when it did not happen, there is a definite need for at least one case of causation. Without one example there is absolutely no empirical support for a supposed assertion of causation, rendering the argument moot. Thus, at least one example is necessary. Plenitude follows from this same logic. If I can prove once that some stimulus has caused a change in a given system, then that argument of causality has some validity. Following from that, the more times that it can be proven that X impacts a situation and causes Y, the more validity is lent to the hypothesis.
Thus a large sample size is imperative to proving a causal argument true. After all, an event occurring once or twice only can possibly be brushed aside as a fluke or the result of some random occurrence either previously unknown or unaccounted for. But, if a causal relationship can be established in many differing instances, the argument will be given much greater credence as the opposite of the previous statement comes into effect: the abnormalities and counter-instances being of a much smaller number will be written off as the result of a fluke or unaccounted for variable. This large sample size can also have the effects of clarifying what is being looked for or explained, as well as providing a basis for determining what (within the confines of the observations) is normal and what is abnormal. Thus, plenitude (or a large number of cases or examples) is a necessity for confirming an argument of causality.
Representativeness
Representativeness is a measure of how well the sample groups can be used to generalize to the general population. This is incredibly important within the context of establishing a causal argument as relationships at a close, distinctly local level are hard to approximate within the greater context of entire population. For example, determining that certain actions on the part of members of a local PTA (Parent Teacher Association) will create distinct repercussions among the schools would be very hard to generalize and apply within the confines of the US capital among the Senators and Representatives of Congress working for educational reform, to say the least of their general application to legislative branches of government the world over. Despite the fact that all of these bodies are made up of citizens of countries trying their best to accomplish their civic duties and work for the betterment of the education of their children, the relationship between them is sufficiently different as to figure that the local PTA’s causal effects are hardly representative of Congress in general.
Representativeness lies in the use of a causal argument being discovered in one case that can be applied to as yet unstudied cases to predict the likely outcome. Determining the level of validity of a causal argument in the broader sense than simply that referenced in the distinct cases studied is necessary in determining the validity of the causal argument in general. In order for a causal argument to be useful to the intellectual community it is necessary to establish the level of its relative representativeness and applicability to a broader range of problems and comparisons. Without this representativeness, there can be no assurance that the causal argument being made will apply anywhere outside of the specific cases in which it was observed.
Transparency
The criterion of transparency refers to the ability to trace a clear and distinct path of causality from cause X to result Y. This can be a multistep or single step path. The point is that the path of causality can be traced directly from occurrence X through all intervening steps to occurrence Y. Determining this causal path removes any and all doubts about the exact relationship between X and Y. If this path cannot be distinctly proven and followed, then the results of the relationship can still be questioned as it is not exactly known if X in reality causes Y or if there is some other unseen factor coming into play. Determining this path of causality lends a great deal of credence to any argument of causality as it can be used to both prove a relationship between X and Y as well as show the way they are connected chronologically.
Replicability
The replicability of a research design or experiment is very important to the final resulting determination of a causal argument. This decisive factor has to do with the ability of others to replicate and achieve the same (or extremely similar) results of a given experiment or research set. An experiment designed to show a causal argument must be replicable and yield the same results each time, no matter who does the experiment or where (giving due diligence to factors and variables that might change depending on conditions necessary to the experiment). This is extremely important in the process of verifying and determining a causal relationship because it allows for a significant amount of cases to be studied to give greater credence to the relationship (related closely to plenitude as discussed above) as well as overcoming problems such as measurement error and possible falsification of findings. Again, as with plenitude, something that only happens once is suspect because there could be any number of mitigating factors affecting the results of the experiment and the determination of the causal relationship. Thus, without a good sense of replicability, any experiment or research design that is intended to validate a causal argument can effectively be disregarded.
How do you know your causal argument is true? What are the main formal properties by which your argument might be tested?
There are many criteria which can be used to assess the validity of an argument of causality. Some of these criteria are, of course, of much greater importance than the others. Here I will discuss four of the main criteria necessary for determining whether or not a causal argument is in fact valid or not. These four criteria are: plenitude, representativeness, transparency, and replicability.
Plenitude
The plenitude of an argument is a description of the number of cases and examples of the relationship of causality that one is wishing to prove. Because there is no way to determine whether something is caused by something else in the absence of a comparison with an example of when it did not happen, there is a definite need for at least one case of causation. Without one example there is absolutely no empirical support for a supposed assertion of causation, rendering the argument moot. Thus, at least one example is necessary. Plenitude follows from this same logic. If I can prove once that some stimulus has caused a change in a given system, then that argument of causality has some validity. Following from that, the more times that it can be proven that X impacts a situation and causes Y, the more validity is lent to the hypothesis.
Thus a large sample size is imperative to proving a causal argument true. After all, an event occurring once or twice only can possibly be brushed aside as a fluke or the result of some random occurrence either previously unknown or unaccounted for. But, if a causal relationship can be established in many differing instances, the argument will be given much greater credence as the opposite of the previous statement comes into effect: the abnormalities and counter-instances being of a much smaller number will be written off as the result of a fluke or unaccounted for variable. This large sample size can also have the effects of clarifying what is being looked for or explained, as well as providing a basis for determining what (within the confines of the observations) is normal and what is abnormal. Thus, plenitude (or a large number of cases or examples) is a necessity for confirming an argument of causality.
Representativeness
Representativeness is a measure of how well the sample groups can be used to generalize to the general population. This is incredibly important within the context of establishing a causal argument as relationships at a close, distinctly local level are hard to approximate within the greater context of entire population. For example, determining that certain actions on the part of members of a local PTA (Parent Teacher Association) will create distinct repercussions among the schools would be very hard to generalize and apply within the confines of the US capital among the Senators and Representatives of Congress working for educational reform, to say the least of their general application to legislative branches of government the world over. Despite the fact that all of these bodies are made up of citizens of countries trying their best to accomplish their civic duties and work for the betterment of the education of their children, the relationship between them is sufficiently different as to figure that the local PTA’s causal effects are hardly representative of Congress in general.
Representativeness lies in the use of a causal argument being discovered in one case that can be applied to as yet unstudied cases to predict the likely outcome. Determining the level of validity of a causal argument in the broader sense than simply that referenced in the distinct cases studied is necessary in determining the validity of the causal argument in general. In order for a causal argument to be useful to the intellectual community it is necessary to establish the level of its relative representativeness and applicability to a broader range of problems and comparisons. Without this representativeness, there can be no assurance that the causal argument being made will apply anywhere outside of the specific cases in which it was observed.
Transparency
The criterion of transparency refers to the ability to trace a clear and distinct path of causality from cause X to result Y. This can be a multistep or single step path. The point is that the path of causality can be traced directly from occurrence X through all intervening steps to occurrence Y. Determining this causal path removes any and all doubts about the exact relationship between X and Y. If this path cannot be distinctly proven and followed, then the results of the relationship can still be questioned as it is not exactly known if X in reality causes Y or if there is some other unseen factor coming into play. Determining this path of causality lends a great deal of credence to any argument of causality as it can be used to both prove a relationship between X and Y as well as show the way they are connected chronologically.
Replicability
The replicability of a research design or experiment is very important to the final resulting determination of a causal argument. This decisive factor has to do with the ability of others to replicate and achieve the same (or extremely similar) results of a given experiment or research set. An experiment designed to show a causal argument must be replicable and yield the same results each time, no matter who does the experiment or where (giving due diligence to factors and variables that might change depending on conditions necessary to the experiment). This is extremely important in the process of verifying and determining a causal relationship because it allows for a significant amount of cases to be studied to give greater credence to the relationship (related closely to plenitude as discussed above) as well as overcoming problems such as measurement error and possible falsification of findings. Again, as with plenitude, something that only happens once is suspect because there could be any number of mitigating factors affecting the results of the experiment and the determination of the causal relationship. Thus, without a good sense of replicability, any experiment or research design that is intended to validate a causal argument can effectively be disregarded.
New Institutionalism
Short Essay:
What is the main criticism directed at the New Institutionalism approach?
Political Theory
The main criticism directed at New Institutionalism is an amalgamation of problems derived from the treatment and definition of institutions in general. With the expansion of study within the overall approach of Institutionalism from formal to informal institutions comes the problem of defining exactly what an institution is. This most formative and necessary component of the Institutionalist approach has remained amorphous and undefined as it has been stretched to include all manner of different aspects, forms and characteristics. Because the “institution” is so integral to the approach at hand it is seen as a large critique that the approach has not come to define and determine what qualifies as worthy of study and what is in or out with reference to a viable institution.
This problem has created a few dilemmas within the New Institutionalism approach. The first is simply that of definition. Expanding the definition of an institution from the rigid and formal definition of the old Institutionalists to the more fluid and informal definition used by the New creates a dilution problem. The new definition of an institution as a ‘stable, recurring pattern of behavior’ risks expanding the definition to include almost anything possible. This, of course, also expands the possibilities of diluting the meaning of institutions themselves and rendering their relevance to nothing, exactly the opposite of the goal of the Institutionalist approach. The vague definition of an institution also affects the types of research that is possible as well as decreasing the quality of research. With a more vague definition, new possibilities of research are opened, like researching what types of morning rituals are more effective than others with regard to presidents or prime ministers. Yet, because of this vagueness, the research becomes irrelevant and the measurement and interpretation of what is important becomes completely subjective and (frankly) non-scientific.
With a lack of full definition of what exactly an institution is, the community of New Institutionalists also comes to another conundrum: determining and describing exactly where institutions come from and how they are formed, as well as how they change over time. There is a distinct lack of consensus within the corpus of new Institutionalist data as to how these phenomena are accomplished. In fact, the whole of the community is divided in many respects along lines related to these questions (as well as others related to how the institutions should be examined and how they interrelate with human behavior). The community is divided into roughly seven strains of thought concerning these issues: the Normative institutionalists, the Rational Choice institutionalists, the Historical institutionalists, the Empirical institutionalists, the International institutionalists, the Sociological institutionalists, and the Network institutionalists. Each of these groups adds something to the understanding of the how institutions are either formed or how they change over time. Yet, neither alone nor as a whole can they come together to give a proper and precise definition or description of what these processes should look like, or how they can be researched or observed.
So, why is this important? Why can’t they all have their own take on what they want to see and study without having an existential enigma facing them in the face collectively? Well, the problem is that they are all interconnected within a framework of New Institutionalism (a way of doing research, observing phenomena and looking at reality) and to have differing definitions and descriptions using the same terminology, yet stemming from completely different points of view would be confusing to say the least. As well, it would cause a lack of confidence in the system or approach in general, lending it a general aura of pseudo-scientific gobbledygook. With a lack of confidence in the tools of the approach and a lack of scientific appeal, the approach would quickly become a haven of non-scientific mysticism, having roughly the same relationship to the other political science approaches and frameworks as astrology has to modern astronomy. Both measure the movements of the heavens and the stars, yet one is based in solid mathematical fact and sound scientific approaches, while the other uses the information to extrapolate wildly unscientific and irrelevant pseudo-scientific drivel which is unfounded and superstitious at best.
So, not only will a lack of contiguous definition and description of what an institution is and how it develops and changes over time lead to a degradation of the new Institutionalist approach, it will also lend a lack of credibility to the approach in general. This lack of credibility reaches across all the sub-discipline strains of thought and raises questions about all of them. Furthermore, it is compounded by the actions of all of these factions, contributing more to the fractionalization within the discipline. Thus the main critique against New Institutionalism has both intra-cooperative effects between the differing strands of Institutionalist thought as well as a larger existential effect looming over the entire framework. All this, because they have not been able to adequately describe and define what an institution is exactly.
What is the main criticism directed at the New Institutionalism approach?
Political Theory
The main criticism directed at New Institutionalism is an amalgamation of problems derived from the treatment and definition of institutions in general. With the expansion of study within the overall approach of Institutionalism from formal to informal institutions comes the problem of defining exactly what an institution is. This most formative and necessary component of the Institutionalist approach has remained amorphous and undefined as it has been stretched to include all manner of different aspects, forms and characteristics. Because the “institution” is so integral to the approach at hand it is seen as a large critique that the approach has not come to define and determine what qualifies as worthy of study and what is in or out with reference to a viable institution.
This problem has created a few dilemmas within the New Institutionalism approach. The first is simply that of definition. Expanding the definition of an institution from the rigid and formal definition of the old Institutionalists to the more fluid and informal definition used by the New creates a dilution problem. The new definition of an institution as a ‘stable, recurring pattern of behavior’ risks expanding the definition to include almost anything possible. This, of course, also expands the possibilities of diluting the meaning of institutions themselves and rendering their relevance to nothing, exactly the opposite of the goal of the Institutionalist approach. The vague definition of an institution also affects the types of research that is possible as well as decreasing the quality of research. With a more vague definition, new possibilities of research are opened, like researching what types of morning rituals are more effective than others with regard to presidents or prime ministers. Yet, because of this vagueness, the research becomes irrelevant and the measurement and interpretation of what is important becomes completely subjective and (frankly) non-scientific.
With a lack of full definition of what exactly an institution is, the community of New Institutionalists also comes to another conundrum: determining and describing exactly where institutions come from and how they are formed, as well as how they change over time. There is a distinct lack of consensus within the corpus of new Institutionalist data as to how these phenomena are accomplished. In fact, the whole of the community is divided in many respects along lines related to these questions (as well as others related to how the institutions should be examined and how they interrelate with human behavior). The community is divided into roughly seven strains of thought concerning these issues: the Normative institutionalists, the Rational Choice institutionalists, the Historical institutionalists, the Empirical institutionalists, the International institutionalists, the Sociological institutionalists, and the Network institutionalists. Each of these groups adds something to the understanding of the how institutions are either formed or how they change over time. Yet, neither alone nor as a whole can they come together to give a proper and precise definition or description of what these processes should look like, or how they can be researched or observed.
So, why is this important? Why can’t they all have their own take on what they want to see and study without having an existential enigma facing them in the face collectively? Well, the problem is that they are all interconnected within a framework of New Institutionalism (a way of doing research, observing phenomena and looking at reality) and to have differing definitions and descriptions using the same terminology, yet stemming from completely different points of view would be confusing to say the least. As well, it would cause a lack of confidence in the system or approach in general, lending it a general aura of pseudo-scientific gobbledygook. With a lack of confidence in the tools of the approach and a lack of scientific appeal, the approach would quickly become a haven of non-scientific mysticism, having roughly the same relationship to the other political science approaches and frameworks as astrology has to modern astronomy. Both measure the movements of the heavens and the stars, yet one is based in solid mathematical fact and sound scientific approaches, while the other uses the information to extrapolate wildly unscientific and irrelevant pseudo-scientific drivel which is unfounded and superstitious at best.
So, not only will a lack of contiguous definition and description of what an institution is and how it develops and changes over time lead to a degradation of the new Institutionalist approach, it will also lend a lack of credibility to the approach in general. This lack of credibility reaches across all the sub-discipline strains of thought and raises questions about all of them. Furthermore, it is compounded by the actions of all of these factions, contributing more to the fractionalization within the discipline. Thus the main critique against New Institutionalism has both intra-cooperative effects between the differing strands of Institutionalist thought as well as a larger existential effect looming over the entire framework. All this, because they have not been able to adequately describe and define what an institution is exactly.
Rational Choice Model
Short Essay:
What is the main criticism directed at the rational choice approach?
Political Theory
The main criticism directed at the rational choice approach, or the criticism that is the most serious in its scope and impact with regard to the near denunciation of the rational choice model, is the attack on the basic assumptions of rationality and autonomy ascribed to the individual player-actors in each situation or game presented in reality. Within the confines of the theory, the rational choice approach assumes that all players are rational, meaning that they all have full information about their choices, strategies and outcomes of these choices. They are also endowed with a full knowledge of all of the choices, strategies and outcomes of any choices made by any other players in the game at hand. Yet in the real world, this level of rationality is never achieved. People are never intelligent enough, or informed enough to make statistically and mathematically sound choices based on what is in their best interest. The best that people can do is estimate what they think is in their best interest while taking the chance that the unintended consequences of their actions will either be so minimal as to cause no real change to their situation or will be serendipitous in causing some unforeseen good in their future. This lack of rationality on the part of all of the players in essence destroys the theoretical basis of the model. Taking this into account, theorists have taken the rational choice model further by adding a dimension of bounded rationality, i.e. removing the infinite amount of choices from the table and letting a player either scan the few that he/she can easily comprehend and chose the maximum payoff from among them or choose the first that satisfies the most of their basic priorities. This approach still fails to take into account that the player is still acting irrationally from the standpoint of a full information assumption. Basically, introducing a concept such as bounded rationality is a simple way for the theorists to decide that, while rational choice as a whole is untenable, because they have put so much stock into it as a theory they cannot just scrap it. Thus they feel that they need to hang onto it at all costs and hence, they introduce a way in which they can cover themselves from the accusation that they are dealing solely in a theoretic framework without regard to reality. In reality, despite this addition, actors still are forced to act even more irrationally because of a lack of seeing every option. Without a distinct idea what all of the options are, there is no way that a player can be expected to know what is in his or her best interest, let alone what will maximize their outcomes and gains. Thus, players are left with the choice of using all the tools at their disposal to determine the best approximation of what is in their best interest and choosing it without ever knowing what the full implication of their decision will be.
In reality, all players in almost all games (excepting those of course which are simplified down to one or two elements simply for theoretical descriptions) are limited in information, are limited in time and are limited in cognitive ability to make the decisions in a fully rational and subjective manner. This is further complicated when one comes to consider multiple points of equilibrium within the construct of the game. When an individual is confronted with multiple equilibrium how can one rationally determine which of the equilibrium is rationally the best outcome for the player? Especially when, as has been discussed, the player lacks full information not only about his/her own choices and outcomes, but also about the outcomes of any and all strategies adopted by the other players in the game. It would be virtually impossible for the player to in any sense be able to adopt a strategy that would be the most beneficial for him/her individually.
The second part of this assumption then comes in to play. The rational choice theory assumes that each individual player is completely autonomous and independent in their choice of strategies. This cannot in any way be assumed in reality. No man is ever completely free from the social structures and institutions from within which he is playing the game. If sociology has taught us anything, it is that we are, to at least one degree or another, the product of our own experience. A person cannot face a problem or decision without relying on the previous experience that he or she has accrued with regard to the options. That is part of the way that we approximate the best possible outcomes for ourselves. This is especially true when we are faced with a decision which is either the same or similar to a decision we have already made. The outcome of that experience will definitely color the choices that we make.
This causes an internal inconsistency with the rational choice theory. It expects all players to not only be autonomous and independent from all outside forces and structures while at the same time making all decisions with their own best interests at hand. Sadly, none of the decisions that any of us face in life are ever as simple as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In reality, all of us are faced with the fact that the other prisoner is our brother, our sister or our spouse and while we all want to be free there are mitigating factors which mean we must in some cases force us to make different decisions, i.e. confessing and hoping our spouse stays mum so they can get out and care for the kids at home.
All people are affected by the social structures, norms and institutions that they take part in. These institutions, groups, structures or norms will affect the way that the individual views the world around him/her and the way that they interact with regard to the choices that he or she must make. This is not to say that the choices an individual will make are completely determined by the social groupings, norms and institutions to which the individual belongs. Rather, that it is normal for the individual to have their choices influenced by the social structures around them. This fact accounts for some of the more questionable actions that rational choice models have tended to have problems accounting for. These include actions based in such emotions as envy or greed or motivations such as altruism. All of these factors are heavily tied into the overall social structures that exist around an individual.
Agreeably, the rational choice theorists will take all of this in turn saying that all this still plays into the general overall sense of us choosing what options we prefer over others. This brings us though to another criticism of rational choice: the theorists have expanded the definitions and delineations to attempt to encompass all experience rendering their position unfalsifiable.
What is the main criticism directed at the rational choice approach?
Political Theory
The main criticism directed at the rational choice approach, or the criticism that is the most serious in its scope and impact with regard to the near denunciation of the rational choice model, is the attack on the basic assumptions of rationality and autonomy ascribed to the individual player-actors in each situation or game presented in reality. Within the confines of the theory, the rational choice approach assumes that all players are rational, meaning that they all have full information about their choices, strategies and outcomes of these choices. They are also endowed with a full knowledge of all of the choices, strategies and outcomes of any choices made by any other players in the game at hand. Yet in the real world, this level of rationality is never achieved. People are never intelligent enough, or informed enough to make statistically and mathematically sound choices based on what is in their best interest. The best that people can do is estimate what they think is in their best interest while taking the chance that the unintended consequences of their actions will either be so minimal as to cause no real change to their situation or will be serendipitous in causing some unforeseen good in their future. This lack of rationality on the part of all of the players in essence destroys the theoretical basis of the model. Taking this into account, theorists have taken the rational choice model further by adding a dimension of bounded rationality, i.e. removing the infinite amount of choices from the table and letting a player either scan the few that he/she can easily comprehend and chose the maximum payoff from among them or choose the first that satisfies the most of their basic priorities. This approach still fails to take into account that the player is still acting irrationally from the standpoint of a full information assumption. Basically, introducing a concept such as bounded rationality is a simple way for the theorists to decide that, while rational choice as a whole is untenable, because they have put so much stock into it as a theory they cannot just scrap it. Thus they feel that they need to hang onto it at all costs and hence, they introduce a way in which they can cover themselves from the accusation that they are dealing solely in a theoretic framework without regard to reality. In reality, despite this addition, actors still are forced to act even more irrationally because of a lack of seeing every option. Without a distinct idea what all of the options are, there is no way that a player can be expected to know what is in his or her best interest, let alone what will maximize their outcomes and gains. Thus, players are left with the choice of using all the tools at their disposal to determine the best approximation of what is in their best interest and choosing it without ever knowing what the full implication of their decision will be.
In reality, all players in almost all games (excepting those of course which are simplified down to one or two elements simply for theoretical descriptions) are limited in information, are limited in time and are limited in cognitive ability to make the decisions in a fully rational and subjective manner. This is further complicated when one comes to consider multiple points of equilibrium within the construct of the game. When an individual is confronted with multiple equilibrium how can one rationally determine which of the equilibrium is rationally the best outcome for the player? Especially when, as has been discussed, the player lacks full information not only about his/her own choices and outcomes, but also about the outcomes of any and all strategies adopted by the other players in the game. It would be virtually impossible for the player to in any sense be able to adopt a strategy that would be the most beneficial for him/her individually.
The second part of this assumption then comes in to play. The rational choice theory assumes that each individual player is completely autonomous and independent in their choice of strategies. This cannot in any way be assumed in reality. No man is ever completely free from the social structures and institutions from within which he is playing the game. If sociology has taught us anything, it is that we are, to at least one degree or another, the product of our own experience. A person cannot face a problem or decision without relying on the previous experience that he or she has accrued with regard to the options. That is part of the way that we approximate the best possible outcomes for ourselves. This is especially true when we are faced with a decision which is either the same or similar to a decision we have already made. The outcome of that experience will definitely color the choices that we make.
This causes an internal inconsistency with the rational choice theory. It expects all players to not only be autonomous and independent from all outside forces and structures while at the same time making all decisions with their own best interests at hand. Sadly, none of the decisions that any of us face in life are ever as simple as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In reality, all of us are faced with the fact that the other prisoner is our brother, our sister or our spouse and while we all want to be free there are mitigating factors which mean we must in some cases force us to make different decisions, i.e. confessing and hoping our spouse stays mum so they can get out and care for the kids at home.
All people are affected by the social structures, norms and institutions that they take part in. These institutions, groups, structures or norms will affect the way that the individual views the world around him/her and the way that they interact with regard to the choices that he or she must make. This is not to say that the choices an individual will make are completely determined by the social groupings, norms and institutions to which the individual belongs. Rather, that it is normal for the individual to have their choices influenced by the social structures around them. This fact accounts for some of the more questionable actions that rational choice models have tended to have problems accounting for. These include actions based in such emotions as envy or greed or motivations such as altruism. All of these factors are heavily tied into the overall social structures that exist around an individual.
Agreeably, the rational choice theorists will take all of this in turn saying that all this still plays into the general overall sense of us choosing what options we prefer over others. This brings us though to another criticism of rational choice: the theorists have expanded the definitions and delineations to attempt to encompass all experience rendering their position unfalsifiable.
New Public Management and Israel
Short Essay
What are the main principles of New Public Management reforms and to what extent were they implemented in Israel?
Comparative Politics and Israel
New Public Management (NPM) emerged in the early 1980s as an answer to growing concerns over governmental financing problems with respect to many programs for social growth. As part of the initial argument for change in public and political affairs, politicians made the points that the blame for the problems rested upon the mid-level public bureaucracy and its supposed ineptitude, inefficiencies, and even corruption. In contrast to this inefficiency, the politicians held up the strengths and efficiencies reached in the private sector. The NPM answer was to actively pursue private sector type change within the public sector to reduce inefficiency and waste.
This answer was pursued in reforms that were essentially aimed at rearranging the public model of bureaucracy along lines similar to that of the private sector. This was based firmly in the assumption that to bring the best results possible the public sector, or government bureaucracy, should be managed in the same manner and following the same guidelines of private businesses. The private sector was seen as being very effective because of successful competition and strict adherence to profits as the “bottom line” and most important goal. The challenge was to simply adapt private business practices to the policy sector.
The heart of the NPM reforms lay in the restructuring of governmental bureaucratic offices along these lines. Instead of profit being the bottom line, each governmental office or ministry was required to develop strict definitions of the “core activity” of that ministry and to overhaul their current activities by determining how each action, expenditure or task was related to the core directing principle of their activity. Activities directly relating to the stated mission of the ministry were to be separated from indirectly related activities, which were relegated to a secondary status. Tertiary activities, or activities completely outside the stated area of the core activity were effectively terminated (or sold and privatized) in the name of efficiency or budgetary saving.
The principle behind this restructuring was a distinct divide or separation between policy formation and policy implementation. The intent was to keep policy formation, the core activity of the ministry, within the ministry itself. This was meant to insure that the formation of policy was still influenced and controlled by political processes, meaning that the people who were in charge of the policy were directly accountable to the voters. On the other hand, policy implementation was shifted outside of this political arena. It was to be decentralized and removed from possible intervention for political purposes (i.e. corruption, etc) and shifted to apolitical organizations or agencies that were under contract solely to fulfill obligations of policy implementation while still being under government oversight.
Thus, any secondary responsibilities of ministries would be contracted out to executive agencies or not-for-profit organizations via private business like contracts. These contracts became the basis for governmental control over policy implementation and exemplify how the public sector came to be so heavily influenced by all aspects of private sector business interaction. Contracts would be officially signed and entered into between all parties of the system- the ministry, the executive agencies, private sector business, and even individual employees.
NPM reforms generally fall into or overlap between three different dimensions. The first is disaggregation. This refers to the separating and delineation of priority activities of the ministry from more secondary activities and how these differing levels of priority are to be handled. Disaggregation is the process by which the directly and indirectly related activities of the ministry were separated and how they were to be addressed. First level activities would be directly contracted from the government to executive agencies or organizations while secondary indirectly related activities would be shifted to those agencies to further contract to other organizations or parties. This turned the management of policy implementation over to private companies to be overseen and monitored by the ministry. However, the key point was to retain a certain managerial flexibility on the part of the executive agencies to accomplish whatever was deemed necessary to complete their assigned and contracted tasks.
The second dimension is competition. The intent of this dimension was to separate demand from supply. The government would reward a given contract to the organization that could provide the goods or services at the cheapest via a system of bidding. This competition between companies would help drive prices down. To ensure quality, regulators would be put in place to ensure that companies adhered to certain standards across the sector.
The third dimension of the reform is that of incentivization, or the adding of incentives as a major element in bureaucracy. This made its appearance mainly through the introduction of contracts for employment with individual employees. Vis-à-vis these contracts, the principle of performance related pay was introduced to the public sector, meaning that advancement and pay increases, benefits, etc would be related to job performance. Incentives were introduced to prompt greater employee efforts in their jobs. Employees were thus no longer guaranteed careers once they found a position within the public sphere.
The NPM reforms resulted in many new aspects and avenues of interaction between the public and private sectors. One of the most prevalent of these is the use of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to build off of the strengths of both the private and public sectors to accomplish a goal or building project. Another large contribution was the emergence of citizen charters or government declarations of public expectations from bureaucratic services to guide the procedure and operation of their contracted agencies and organizations.
In Israel, NPM has not been implemented on as large a scale as in other western democracies. In most western nations, the Prime Minister or other executive placed large amounts of support behind the measures to ensure high approval ratings and good public reactions. In Israel, the PM was more focused on other social concerns, notably security issues, which were considered of higher priority than lower-level bureaucratic organization and services. Thus, NPM reform was not implemented in a general sense among all governmental organizations. However, individual organizations in some cases have undertaken to introduce NPM reforms within their own spheres of influence. Most notable among them is the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) with its use of civilian employees of the IDF who have a much different system of remuneration and benefits than that of full IDF employees. The police organizations within Israel have followed suit. Similarly, within Israel, many PPPs can be observed, such as the construction of the new Route 6 highway.
What are the main principles of New Public Management reforms and to what extent were they implemented in Israel?
Comparative Politics and Israel
New Public Management (NPM) emerged in the early 1980s as an answer to growing concerns over governmental financing problems with respect to many programs for social growth. As part of the initial argument for change in public and political affairs, politicians made the points that the blame for the problems rested upon the mid-level public bureaucracy and its supposed ineptitude, inefficiencies, and even corruption. In contrast to this inefficiency, the politicians held up the strengths and efficiencies reached in the private sector. The NPM answer was to actively pursue private sector type change within the public sector to reduce inefficiency and waste.
This answer was pursued in reforms that were essentially aimed at rearranging the public model of bureaucracy along lines similar to that of the private sector. This was based firmly in the assumption that to bring the best results possible the public sector, or government bureaucracy, should be managed in the same manner and following the same guidelines of private businesses. The private sector was seen as being very effective because of successful competition and strict adherence to profits as the “bottom line” and most important goal. The challenge was to simply adapt private business practices to the policy sector.
The heart of the NPM reforms lay in the restructuring of governmental bureaucratic offices along these lines. Instead of profit being the bottom line, each governmental office or ministry was required to develop strict definitions of the “core activity” of that ministry and to overhaul their current activities by determining how each action, expenditure or task was related to the core directing principle of their activity. Activities directly relating to the stated mission of the ministry were to be separated from indirectly related activities, which were relegated to a secondary status. Tertiary activities, or activities completely outside the stated area of the core activity were effectively terminated (or sold and privatized) in the name of efficiency or budgetary saving.
The principle behind this restructuring was a distinct divide or separation between policy formation and policy implementation. The intent was to keep policy formation, the core activity of the ministry, within the ministry itself. This was meant to insure that the formation of policy was still influenced and controlled by political processes, meaning that the people who were in charge of the policy were directly accountable to the voters. On the other hand, policy implementation was shifted outside of this political arena. It was to be decentralized and removed from possible intervention for political purposes (i.e. corruption, etc) and shifted to apolitical organizations or agencies that were under contract solely to fulfill obligations of policy implementation while still being under government oversight.
Thus, any secondary responsibilities of ministries would be contracted out to executive agencies or not-for-profit organizations via private business like contracts. These contracts became the basis for governmental control over policy implementation and exemplify how the public sector came to be so heavily influenced by all aspects of private sector business interaction. Contracts would be officially signed and entered into between all parties of the system- the ministry, the executive agencies, private sector business, and even individual employees.
NPM reforms generally fall into or overlap between three different dimensions. The first is disaggregation. This refers to the separating and delineation of priority activities of the ministry from more secondary activities and how these differing levels of priority are to be handled. Disaggregation is the process by which the directly and indirectly related activities of the ministry were separated and how they were to be addressed. First level activities would be directly contracted from the government to executive agencies or organizations while secondary indirectly related activities would be shifted to those agencies to further contract to other organizations or parties. This turned the management of policy implementation over to private companies to be overseen and monitored by the ministry. However, the key point was to retain a certain managerial flexibility on the part of the executive agencies to accomplish whatever was deemed necessary to complete their assigned and contracted tasks.
The second dimension is competition. The intent of this dimension was to separate demand from supply. The government would reward a given contract to the organization that could provide the goods or services at the cheapest via a system of bidding. This competition between companies would help drive prices down. To ensure quality, regulators would be put in place to ensure that companies adhered to certain standards across the sector.
The third dimension of the reform is that of incentivization, or the adding of incentives as a major element in bureaucracy. This made its appearance mainly through the introduction of contracts for employment with individual employees. Vis-à-vis these contracts, the principle of performance related pay was introduced to the public sector, meaning that advancement and pay increases, benefits, etc would be related to job performance. Incentives were introduced to prompt greater employee efforts in their jobs. Employees were thus no longer guaranteed careers once they found a position within the public sphere.
The NPM reforms resulted in many new aspects and avenues of interaction between the public and private sectors. One of the most prevalent of these is the use of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to build off of the strengths of both the private and public sectors to accomplish a goal or building project. Another large contribution was the emergence of citizen charters or government declarations of public expectations from bureaucratic services to guide the procedure and operation of their contracted agencies and organizations.
In Israel, NPM has not been implemented on as large a scale as in other western democracies. In most western nations, the Prime Minister or other executive placed large amounts of support behind the measures to ensure high approval ratings and good public reactions. In Israel, the PM was more focused on other social concerns, notably security issues, which were considered of higher priority than lower-level bureaucratic organization and services. Thus, NPM reform was not implemented in a general sense among all governmental organizations. However, individual organizations in some cases have undertaken to introduce NPM reforms within their own spheres of influence. Most notable among them is the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) with its use of civilian employees of the IDF who have a much different system of remuneration and benefits than that of full IDF employees. The police organizations within Israel have followed suit. Similarly, within Israel, many PPPs can be observed, such as the construction of the new Route 6 highway.
Values of the State of Israel
Short Essay to answer:
How would you characterize the main values of the State of Israel?
Comparative Politics and Israel
The main values of Israeli society can most aptly be characterized as both Jewish and democratic. However, the definition of these two terms and their relation to one another is somewhat problematic, even for Israelis. These terms were enshrined early on as the main descriptors for the new state appearing in the original declaration of statehood read by Ben Gurion in 1948. Since that time they have also been more fully enshrined within the national ethos by their being incorporated into the two Basic Laws which were passed by the Knesset as part of the “Constitutional Revolution,” namely Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
As for the first—Jewish—the State of Israel was intended from the beginning to be a home for the Jewish people who had experienced dispersal throughout the world. It was intended as a homeland that all Jewish people, no matter what other “homeland” they were coming from, would be able to relate to and to associate with. Thus, the one common bond that these peoples would have was their Jewish heritage and culture. For this reason, many of the secular pioneers of the country and those secular Israelis alive today would see this as meaning that the country was built upon clearly Jewish principles, ideals and morals, similar to the many nations throughout the world that define themselves as built upon “Christian” morals, beliefs and ideals. These Jewish ideals would be broad enough to encompass the basic rights to life and liberty for all minorities within the state and be completely in line with the modern Enlightenment ideals that have been set up as the basis for the modern nation-state.
In contrast to this, many feel that Israel must be solely built upon the religious aspects of Judaism, particularly with Halakhic law and the Torah forming the backbone of the social fabric, transforming the nation from a state for those of Jewish heritage, religion and ethnicity to one of solely Jewish religiosity. This stance though is almost universally accepted as a position diametrically opposed to democracy because attaining this extreme definition of the character of Israel would reduce it solely to a Jewish state, with no place for minority rights and/or democratic process.
On the other hand, the other characteristic—democratic—portrays Israel as a member of the elite modern nation-states throughout the world that are striving to ensure the rights and privileges of all their citizens, not just those of the majority persuasion. To attain this characteristic, the state must see itself as open to all forms of dissent and argumentation as well as determined to advance the equality of all her citizens. This would require certain reliance upon ideals of equality and liberty as espoused by many of the Enlightenment thinkers and their successors in political theory.
The main dilemma in the characterization of the State of Israel then is a comparison between these two terms, how they are matched and of course, when push comes to shove, which is more important and will take precedence. I personally am of the opinion that these two ideals are not mutually exclusive; they can both be obtained and maintained concurrently. However, to do so, the Jewish term must, as Aharon Barak has stated, be defined broadly enough or with enough abstraction to allow for a combination with the democratic processes that allow for minorities to not only feel comfortable and secure within the state but to also flourish because of their equality, liberty and freedoms. To define the Jewish character of the state in any other way will certainly place limits on the state’s character as democratic and will allow for the definition and relegation of any within the state who do not fall into the category of “Jewish” to second-class citizenry. As to deciding which characteristic will take precedence, I would venture as well that if there is any dispute about which must be followed, the democratic values must win out. This would allow for all the free exercise of individual will and religiosity as well as ensure that all parties are treated equally.
How would you characterize the main values of the State of Israel?
Comparative Politics and Israel
The main values of Israeli society can most aptly be characterized as both Jewish and democratic. However, the definition of these two terms and their relation to one another is somewhat problematic, even for Israelis. These terms were enshrined early on as the main descriptors for the new state appearing in the original declaration of statehood read by Ben Gurion in 1948. Since that time they have also been more fully enshrined within the national ethos by their being incorporated into the two Basic Laws which were passed by the Knesset as part of the “Constitutional Revolution,” namely Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
As for the first—Jewish—the State of Israel was intended from the beginning to be a home for the Jewish people who had experienced dispersal throughout the world. It was intended as a homeland that all Jewish people, no matter what other “homeland” they were coming from, would be able to relate to and to associate with. Thus, the one common bond that these peoples would have was their Jewish heritage and culture. For this reason, many of the secular pioneers of the country and those secular Israelis alive today would see this as meaning that the country was built upon clearly Jewish principles, ideals and morals, similar to the many nations throughout the world that define themselves as built upon “Christian” morals, beliefs and ideals. These Jewish ideals would be broad enough to encompass the basic rights to life and liberty for all minorities within the state and be completely in line with the modern Enlightenment ideals that have been set up as the basis for the modern nation-state.
In contrast to this, many feel that Israel must be solely built upon the religious aspects of Judaism, particularly with Halakhic law and the Torah forming the backbone of the social fabric, transforming the nation from a state for those of Jewish heritage, religion and ethnicity to one of solely Jewish religiosity. This stance though is almost universally accepted as a position diametrically opposed to democracy because attaining this extreme definition of the character of Israel would reduce it solely to a Jewish state, with no place for minority rights and/or democratic process.
On the other hand, the other characteristic—democratic—portrays Israel as a member of the elite modern nation-states throughout the world that are striving to ensure the rights and privileges of all their citizens, not just those of the majority persuasion. To attain this characteristic, the state must see itself as open to all forms of dissent and argumentation as well as determined to advance the equality of all her citizens. This would require certain reliance upon ideals of equality and liberty as espoused by many of the Enlightenment thinkers and their successors in political theory.
The main dilemma in the characterization of the State of Israel then is a comparison between these two terms, how they are matched and of course, when push comes to shove, which is more important and will take precedence. I personally am of the opinion that these two ideals are not mutually exclusive; they can both be obtained and maintained concurrently. However, to do so, the Jewish term must, as Aharon Barak has stated, be defined broadly enough or with enough abstraction to allow for a combination with the democratic processes that allow for minorities to not only feel comfortable and secure within the state but to also flourish because of their equality, liberty and freedoms. To define the Jewish character of the state in any other way will certainly place limits on the state’s character as democratic and will allow for the definition and relegation of any within the state who do not fall into the category of “Jewish” to second-class citizenry. As to deciding which characteristic will take precedence, I would venture as well that if there is any dispute about which must be followed, the democratic values must win out. This would allow for all the free exercise of individual will and religiosity as well as ensure that all parties are treated equally.
Consociational Democracy and Israel
Short Essay on this topic:
To what extent are the mechanisms of consociational democracy implemented in Israel? Does it enhance the stability and effectiveness of Israeli democracy?
Comparative Politics and Israel
Consociational democracy consists of a cooperative effort between elites of various pillars or communal groupings (usually delineated by religion, ideology or even ethnicity) within a society to create a plural and fair social atmosphere in order to establish stable democratic governance despite deep social cleavages.
Theoretically, this sort of democracy involves four different mechanisms which the elites of the communities agree to in order that the state have better capacity and respect for each of the distinct social groupings.
The four mechanisms of elite accommodation are:
• Executive power sharing (usually in the form of grand coalitions)
• Segmented autonomy (giving each minority group full self-rule within their community)
• Mutual veto (giving each minority power of veto over the government’s decisions)
• Proportionality (the distribution of resources reflects the population size of each group)
In Israel, only 2 of these 4 mechanisms are implemented by any means: executive power sharing and segmented autonomy.
Executive power sharing is exemplified in the Israeli polity by the extensive coalition building processes necessary to build a working and governable coalition within the Knesset. Almost any type of party (excluding racist and blatantly anti-state parties) can run in Knesset elections, which are proportionally representative by design in order to ensure that social groupings have representation through their preferred political party (religious, ethnic, right, left or any combination). These political parties, as elected officials and members of the Knesset, negotiate to form governmental coalitions to share executive power. These governing coalitions generally have their basis in the political bloc rather than by party, however it is not unprecedented for parties of opposing political blocs to form a working unity government. The unity governments of the 1980s provide very unique examples of executive power sharing based in political elite accommodation, however a more common example of executive power sharing is the plethora of middle parties, be they religious or otherwise, that represent differing segments of the population but actively take part in the countries governance by making coalition deals with either of the two major political blocs.
Segmented autonomy is seen within Israel most clearly along religious lines. In some regard, Israel has co-opted and adapted the Ottoman millet system of governance with regard to minorities. The Israeli system entitles religious minorities autonomy over their individual community’s affairs by granting them complete legal authority over personal and family status issues. This means that for each religious community within Israel there is an individualized legal system for issues such as marriage, inheritance, etc: the Jews decide for the Jews how these will work, the Christians decide for the Christians and the Muslims decide for the Muslims. Similarly, within the framework of education Israel has allowed for a degree of segmented autonomy as three distinct (possibly four, if private schools are counted as their own category) categories of education. There is a national education track, catering to secular, western ideals of education, a national religious track, which mixes secular learning with religious study, and a completely autonomous fully religious track which sets its own curriculum based on religious concerns to the exclusion of secular learning. This division of the education sphere allows for the Israeli minorities (in this case particularly Jewish orthodox and ultra-orthodox communities) to have complete control over their educational curricula.
An example of a mixture of both the executive power sharing the segmented autonomy is the Status Quo agreement. Informally established at the founding of the state, the agreement represents an accommodating compromise between religious and secular elites (particularly leaders of the religious establishment and Ben Gurion respectively). The agreement details the setting of certain standards and norms for the governing of religious and secular clashes within the public sphere. Specifically, it delineated issues such as where public transport would be allowed on the Sabbath, a promise of all government institutions adhering to Kashrut laws, and the Rabbinate’s jurisdiction over conversion and personal status issues within the state.
Mutual veto and proportional distribution of resources are not fully implemented within Israel. In no case are ethnic minorities, such as the Arab or religious minorities for example, given a powerful veto over government activities. They have recourse to the Supreme Court to call in question specific governmental actions, however no ability to veto policy or decisions. Resources within Israel are not distributed proportionally to the population size of the minority groups. Again, as only one example, Arab constituencies, which constitute nearly 20% of the country, do not receive a proportional amount of resources. They also do not have full representation in the Knesset according to their population size. Whereas this is probably due to voting patterns among Arabs, it still disqualifies Israel from attaining a fully proportional distribution of resources.
The full implementation of 2 of these 4 mechanisms does contribute to the stability and effectiveness of the Israeli democracy. The executive power sharing and segmented autonomy each provide a method of compromise in the governance of an extremely divided and fragmented society. The coalition governing allows different voices to be heard and compromises to be made which allow for stable democracy to be present ensuring the continuity of the state. The segmented autonomy allows for compromise and give-and-take on issues that otherwise would cause intractable conflict and possible governmental paralysis.
To what extent are the mechanisms of consociational democracy implemented in Israel? Does it enhance the stability and effectiveness of Israeli democracy?
Comparative Politics and Israel
Consociational democracy consists of a cooperative effort between elites of various pillars or communal groupings (usually delineated by religion, ideology or even ethnicity) within a society to create a plural and fair social atmosphere in order to establish stable democratic governance despite deep social cleavages.
Theoretically, this sort of democracy involves four different mechanisms which the elites of the communities agree to in order that the state have better capacity and respect for each of the distinct social groupings.
The four mechanisms of elite accommodation are:
• Executive power sharing (usually in the form of grand coalitions)
• Segmented autonomy (giving each minority group full self-rule within their community)
• Mutual veto (giving each minority power of veto over the government’s decisions)
• Proportionality (the distribution of resources reflects the population size of each group)
In Israel, only 2 of these 4 mechanisms are implemented by any means: executive power sharing and segmented autonomy.
Executive power sharing is exemplified in the Israeli polity by the extensive coalition building processes necessary to build a working and governable coalition within the Knesset. Almost any type of party (excluding racist and blatantly anti-state parties) can run in Knesset elections, which are proportionally representative by design in order to ensure that social groupings have representation through their preferred political party (religious, ethnic, right, left or any combination). These political parties, as elected officials and members of the Knesset, negotiate to form governmental coalitions to share executive power. These governing coalitions generally have their basis in the political bloc rather than by party, however it is not unprecedented for parties of opposing political blocs to form a working unity government. The unity governments of the 1980s provide very unique examples of executive power sharing based in political elite accommodation, however a more common example of executive power sharing is the plethora of middle parties, be they religious or otherwise, that represent differing segments of the population but actively take part in the countries governance by making coalition deals with either of the two major political blocs.
Segmented autonomy is seen within Israel most clearly along religious lines. In some regard, Israel has co-opted and adapted the Ottoman millet system of governance with regard to minorities. The Israeli system entitles religious minorities autonomy over their individual community’s affairs by granting them complete legal authority over personal and family status issues. This means that for each religious community within Israel there is an individualized legal system for issues such as marriage, inheritance, etc: the Jews decide for the Jews how these will work, the Christians decide for the Christians and the Muslims decide for the Muslims. Similarly, within the framework of education Israel has allowed for a degree of segmented autonomy as three distinct (possibly four, if private schools are counted as their own category) categories of education. There is a national education track, catering to secular, western ideals of education, a national religious track, which mixes secular learning with religious study, and a completely autonomous fully religious track which sets its own curriculum based on religious concerns to the exclusion of secular learning. This division of the education sphere allows for the Israeli minorities (in this case particularly Jewish orthodox and ultra-orthodox communities) to have complete control over their educational curricula.
An example of a mixture of both the executive power sharing the segmented autonomy is the Status Quo agreement. Informally established at the founding of the state, the agreement represents an accommodating compromise between religious and secular elites (particularly leaders of the religious establishment and Ben Gurion respectively). The agreement details the setting of certain standards and norms for the governing of religious and secular clashes within the public sphere. Specifically, it delineated issues such as where public transport would be allowed on the Sabbath, a promise of all government institutions adhering to Kashrut laws, and the Rabbinate’s jurisdiction over conversion and personal status issues within the state.
Mutual veto and proportional distribution of resources are not fully implemented within Israel. In no case are ethnic minorities, such as the Arab or religious minorities for example, given a powerful veto over government activities. They have recourse to the Supreme Court to call in question specific governmental actions, however no ability to veto policy or decisions. Resources within Israel are not distributed proportionally to the population size of the minority groups. Again, as only one example, Arab constituencies, which constitute nearly 20% of the country, do not receive a proportional amount of resources. They also do not have full representation in the Knesset according to their population size. Whereas this is probably due to voting patterns among Arabs, it still disqualifies Israel from attaining a fully proportional distribution of resources.
The full implementation of 2 of these 4 mechanisms does contribute to the stability and effectiveness of the Israeli democracy. The executive power sharing and segmented autonomy each provide a method of compromise in the governance of an extremely divided and fragmented society. The coalition governing allows different voices to be heard and compromises to be made which allow for stable democracy to be present ensuring the continuity of the state. The segmented autonomy allows for compromise and give-and-take on issues that otherwise would cause intractable conflict and possible governmental paralysis.
Israel's PR system
Short Essay on the topic:
What are the problems of Proportional Representation as manifested by the Israeli experience?
Comparative Politics and Israel
The Israeli electoral system consists of one nation-wide constituency with a Proportional Representation (PR) election while maintaining a threshold of 2% of the vote for parties to earn representation in the Knesset. While each democratic electoral system inherently presents certain pros and cons, the Israeli case has been plagued with a number of worrisome problems that bring into question the effectiveness of the system as it is currently laid out.
The Israeli case is defined as a consensus democracy in which PR elections should theoretically produce a system of bargaining and compromise because it allows a multiplication of parties and increased diversity within the legislature. This is seen as a boon because it more faithfully represents the realities of the population as a whole and allows no one to gain a significant numerical advantage within the Knesset while dispersing the policy and decision-making processes.
However, the system has its drawbacks as well. With such a low threshold the PR system turns from allowing a healthy multi-party political structure to creating a system flooded with a multitude of small parties. This extreme fragmentation of the political system creates a number of problems. Because so many differing players are involved in governance, the process slows down significantly as each party must weigh in and decide on their own about each matter. This initially seems like a positive factor as it can be construed to contribute to greater stability by decreasing the chances of quick changes and possible disaster because of unintended consequences from badly thought out legislation. However, the danger exists for complete paralysis of the process and may also contribute to faster regime changes because of party disagreements within the ruling coalition.
The unity governments of the 1980s provide an example of this type of interaction. In the late 1970s the Israeli political system shifted from being solely dominated by one party to a bipolar system dominated by two blocs. As the two blocs faced off and were of near equal strength, the option of a full majority emerging in one of the blocs disappeared. This necessitated extreme compromise between all the parties that led to such a slowdown in political governance and at some times governmental paralysis that the perception emerged that the system itself was broken. Having such a low electoral threshold, which allowed many small parties to emerge that could become “kingmakers” by siding with the bloc of their choice, exacerbated this situation.
The PR system in Israel also allows for ineffective governance because the major party fragmentation impairs the ability of the Prime Minister to both form and maintain a stable coalition. Having to tempt more smaller parties into joining a coalition by offering large incentives makes coalition building harder and reduces his ability to lead the coalition as he must give away many of the prime positions and influential posts in exchange for support. This can also have disastrous effect on the maintenance of the coalition as, if one of those parties feels slighted in any way, he might find someone withdrawing suddenly. Effectively, the PM must spend more of his time politicking rather than governing.
The PR system also results in a general lack of accountability within the political system. Because so much of the governance process is made up of compromise and negotiation, parties can easily foist the blame for failures onto other parties, individuals or situations rather than being held responsible. This lack of accountability translates into a lack of effectiveness- no party can be significantly punished at the ballot box and formally lose the mandate of their constituency, resulting in a stagnation of party activity and political process.
What are the problems of Proportional Representation as manifested by the Israeli experience?
Comparative Politics and Israel
The Israeli electoral system consists of one nation-wide constituency with a Proportional Representation (PR) election while maintaining a threshold of 2% of the vote for parties to earn representation in the Knesset. While each democratic electoral system inherently presents certain pros and cons, the Israeli case has been plagued with a number of worrisome problems that bring into question the effectiveness of the system as it is currently laid out.
The Israeli case is defined as a consensus democracy in which PR elections should theoretically produce a system of bargaining and compromise because it allows a multiplication of parties and increased diversity within the legislature. This is seen as a boon because it more faithfully represents the realities of the population as a whole and allows no one to gain a significant numerical advantage within the Knesset while dispersing the policy and decision-making processes.
However, the system has its drawbacks as well. With such a low threshold the PR system turns from allowing a healthy multi-party political structure to creating a system flooded with a multitude of small parties. This extreme fragmentation of the political system creates a number of problems. Because so many differing players are involved in governance, the process slows down significantly as each party must weigh in and decide on their own about each matter. This initially seems like a positive factor as it can be construed to contribute to greater stability by decreasing the chances of quick changes and possible disaster because of unintended consequences from badly thought out legislation. However, the danger exists for complete paralysis of the process and may also contribute to faster regime changes because of party disagreements within the ruling coalition.
The unity governments of the 1980s provide an example of this type of interaction. In the late 1970s the Israeli political system shifted from being solely dominated by one party to a bipolar system dominated by two blocs. As the two blocs faced off and were of near equal strength, the option of a full majority emerging in one of the blocs disappeared. This necessitated extreme compromise between all the parties that led to such a slowdown in political governance and at some times governmental paralysis that the perception emerged that the system itself was broken. Having such a low electoral threshold, which allowed many small parties to emerge that could become “kingmakers” by siding with the bloc of their choice, exacerbated this situation.
The PR system in Israel also allows for ineffective governance because the major party fragmentation impairs the ability of the Prime Minister to both form and maintain a stable coalition. Having to tempt more smaller parties into joining a coalition by offering large incentives makes coalition building harder and reduces his ability to lead the coalition as he must give away many of the prime positions and influential posts in exchange for support. This can also have disastrous effect on the maintenance of the coalition as, if one of those parties feels slighted in any way, he might find someone withdrawing suddenly. Effectively, the PM must spend more of his time politicking rather than governing.
The PR system also results in a general lack of accountability within the political system. Because so much of the governance process is made up of compromise and negotiation, parties can easily foist the blame for failures onto other parties, individuals or situations rather than being held responsible. This lack of accountability translates into a lack of effectiveness- no party can be significantly punished at the ballot box and formally lose the mandate of their constituency, resulting in a stagnation of party activity and political process.
The Israeli Political Spectrum Shift
In the last few years, particularly in the last election, Israeli voters have seen a large shift of the entire political spectrum towards the left. As well, the political parties of the Left bloc have seen a large decline in the numbers and support of their traditional voters. This is largely because of a confluence of a number of trends in political behavior and can be explained by an analysis of different models of political action. Similarly, these models can be used to explain and predict future events and political tactics.
The shift of the political spectrum towards the left has occurred because of a number of factors. The worldwide trend of decrease in levels of turnout for political participation documented by Dalton (2002) is one explanation for the decrease in the voting for the left. While this decrease has not been as drastic in Israel as it has been in other countries, it can still be seen in the volatility of election results and voters shifting from party to party, as well as in public opinion polls of declining trust in public institutions. Because of this (or perhaps causing it) is the appearance and rise of numerous other types of political participation- from political interest groups to NGOs and lobbyists- people are looking for and finding new ways of participating in society.
While the trend of declining public trust is potentially harmful in the long run for national political systems (Shamir & Arian, 2002), it also accounts for the shift in the Israeli political spectrum. Anger over government performance and politics leads some to abstention, but it can also generally lead to questioning long held political beliefs. Hetherington (2005) for example attributes the ascendency and domination of the American Right in the last 30 years to this declining political trust (which in the States resulted in an increase of conservative public policy). The emerging of “new” politics mixes in with this declining political trust with volatile results.
Yishay (1999) describes the five simultaneous elements of change to “new” politics (generally described as a moving public focus away from economic and welfare security to ideals of rights accomplished by well-educated, economically secure, self-motivated citizens) as an affluent socio-economic environment, shift in values and attitudes, changes in partisan alignment, shifts in political behavior and a slide in political agendas towards “politics of identity.” These elements are all seen in Israel and have increased focus on the rights of people and less on the socio-economic needs and security (this is not to say that security isn’t a top priority still in the Israeli state). Combined with the declining public trust, this has shifted the political spectrum to the left (opposite of what occurred in the US according to Hetheringon, 2005) as people become more interested in equality, justice and rights of all(even for Palestinians) than they are in economic security. An intriguing example of this change in political discourse is the acceptance of major parties on the political right, particularly the Likud, of the need for a two-state solution and recognition of Palestinian need of a state.
This shifting of the electorate to the left was further influenced by the individualization of politics which accounts for changes on an individual level as well. Shamir and Arian (1999) describe how issue voting has increased in importance in the last years and social cleavages have decreased in ability to explain certain electoral behaviors. Their theory of collective identity binds together other models of voter behavior, such as the sociological, psychological and the economic approach. While these models are instructive, it can be shown that the sociological model isn’t as applicable today than it has been in the past (Wattenberg, 1995). It can also be argued that the psychological model, built as it is upon psychological affiliation with one party, is becoming less influential as party alignment is declining. It still contains many other elements, such as corollary theories such as the Funnel theory, that can be shown to still be large in effect. The economic perspective and economic voting (via the responsibility hypothesis, Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000) though, as an extension of rational choice, is becoming more and more important, especially in the wake of increasingly candidate centered (or personalized) politics in political institutions, the media and politician behavior (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). Israeli voters, while slowly coming to choose candidates over parties (this was especially pertinent during the time of the direct election of the Prime Minister), have come to rely to a greater extent on specific issues, usually choosing one or two basic issues to extrapolate whether or not a candidate is a good choice. Because the main issues of importance within Israel generally revolve around security, the political left has been hampered as events such as the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, and the Gaza War have convinced large portions of the public that they are in need of strong security oriented leadership- typically not found on the left. This has caused many on the left to shift their votes to the right a bit.
Others have shifted their votes away from their first parties of choice on the left to more centrist parties such as Kadima because of a desire to have more influence in the shaping of the ruling coalition. Within the Rational choice model, there are two accepted types of voters: expressive/sincere voters and instrumental/strategic voters. The first will always choose to vote for their first choice party as an expression of their desires. The second, however, will vote strategically keeping in mind that they can influence the formation and policy of the government more if they unite with a larger consensus to prevent the opposite bloc from gaining power in the coalition bargaining. For instance, many on the left would choose to vote for Kadima because they felt that that party had a good chance of defeating the Likud numerically and thus be asked to form the coalition (which would then probably include their party of first choice). Within the PR multiparty coalition governance system of Israel, this is not a negligible possibility (Aldrich, et al, 2005). However, in the last election it seems that this possibility backfired, as Kadima did manage to garner more votes and MKs than the Likud, but failed to have the backing from enough other parties to form a workable coalition.
Other models for political behavior can be useful in discussing how the Israeli voters are moving away from the perceived left (I say perceived, because it is likely that many of the voters have stayed in the same place ideologically, but because of the spectrum shift, they now find themselves more centrist than leftist) and can assist in the prediction of what will occur in the future. For example, the median model, which describes the candidate need to maximize their potential voters by placing themselves centrally, is related to the proximity model, wherein voters, unable to find an exact ideological fit in the parties, will choose that party which is in closest proximity to them on certain issues. The candidates though must take into account in addition to simple spatial proximity, also directional aspects and characteristics of intensity among voters (Merrill & Grofman, 1999). This will play out in the next elections, as the parties, specifically those on the left, will be forced to reinvent themselves in light of the changed political spectrum and place themselves strategically with new platforms and policies to attract the largest amount of voters. It can already be seen how this has played into Kadima’s hands, as they received so many votes from the left side, despite being a centrist party.
Perhaps the best way for the Left to revive itself though is to pay attention to the principles of the Affective Intelligence model and the Prospect theory. The affective intelligence theory (Marcus, et al, 2000) posits that people, in order to make sense of the various domains and demands of life, operate via two distinct emotional systems: a dispositional and a surveillance system. The first monitors every day interactions assessing successes and failures, while the second looks for novelty or threats in the environment. People will only act out when by means of this system they feel anxious or threatened by new information- in the political behavior arena, they will only act (vote) to change the status quo when they feel that there is a threat or problem with it. For example, in or after periods of high terror, the public shifts to support the right wing’s strict policies on security, as they feel anxious about new developments (Berrebi & Klor, 2006).
Prospect theory is a reaction to certain limitations on rational choice. Put forward by Quatrone & Tversky (1988), the theory predicts that people will exhibit risk aversion in domains of possible gains, but risk seeking behavior in domains of possible losses. Thus, combining these facts with the Affective Intelligence model, the Left must work to convince the public that the risk of shifting to Leftist parties and leadership is less than that of staying with a rightist coalition by raising public anxiety on issues, such as economics, candidate performance, or even security. They can effectively do this by playing on peoples’ emotions with regard to decreasing levels of terror or using recent events (such as the Flotilla attack) to discredit the Right’s near “ownership” of the issue of security. Worrying the public that the right cannot bring full security nor peace and publishing their failures could revive the efforts of the left and the peace camp by increasing voting behavior in their favor.
Bibliography:
Aldrich, J. H., Blais, A., Ideridason, I. H., & Levine, R. (2005). Coalition Consideration and the Vote. In Arain, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel, 2003.
Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2006). On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 899-925.
Dalton, R.J. (2002). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies (Third Edition). New York: Chatham House Publishers.
Hetherington, M.J. (2005). Why Trust Matters” Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic Voting: An Introduction. Electoral Studies, 19 (2&3), 113-121.
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Merrill, S. III, & Grofman, B. (1999). A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quatrone, G. A. & Tversky, A. (1988). Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. American Political Science Review, 82(3), 719-736.
Rahat, G. & Sheafer, T. (2007). The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003. Political Communication, 24, 65-80.
Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (1999). Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in Israel. American Political Science Review, 93(2), 265-277.
Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (2002). Abstaining and Voting in 2001. In Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel 2001. Jerusalem: The Democracy Library.
Yishay, Y. (1999). “Old” versus “New” Politics in the 1996 Elections. In Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel, 1996. SUNY Press and the Israel Democracy Institute.
The shift of the political spectrum towards the left has occurred because of a number of factors. The worldwide trend of decrease in levels of turnout for political participation documented by Dalton (2002) is one explanation for the decrease in the voting for the left. While this decrease has not been as drastic in Israel as it has been in other countries, it can still be seen in the volatility of election results and voters shifting from party to party, as well as in public opinion polls of declining trust in public institutions. Because of this (or perhaps causing it) is the appearance and rise of numerous other types of political participation- from political interest groups to NGOs and lobbyists- people are looking for and finding new ways of participating in society.
While the trend of declining public trust is potentially harmful in the long run for national political systems (Shamir & Arian, 2002), it also accounts for the shift in the Israeli political spectrum. Anger over government performance and politics leads some to abstention, but it can also generally lead to questioning long held political beliefs. Hetherington (2005) for example attributes the ascendency and domination of the American Right in the last 30 years to this declining political trust (which in the States resulted in an increase of conservative public policy). The emerging of “new” politics mixes in with this declining political trust with volatile results.
Yishay (1999) describes the five simultaneous elements of change to “new” politics (generally described as a moving public focus away from economic and welfare security to ideals of rights accomplished by well-educated, economically secure, self-motivated citizens) as an affluent socio-economic environment, shift in values and attitudes, changes in partisan alignment, shifts in political behavior and a slide in political agendas towards “politics of identity.” These elements are all seen in Israel and have increased focus on the rights of people and less on the socio-economic needs and security (this is not to say that security isn’t a top priority still in the Israeli state). Combined with the declining public trust, this has shifted the political spectrum to the left (opposite of what occurred in the US according to Hetheringon, 2005) as people become more interested in equality, justice and rights of all(even for Palestinians) than they are in economic security. An intriguing example of this change in political discourse is the acceptance of major parties on the political right, particularly the Likud, of the need for a two-state solution and recognition of Palestinian need of a state.
This shifting of the electorate to the left was further influenced by the individualization of politics which accounts for changes on an individual level as well. Shamir and Arian (1999) describe how issue voting has increased in importance in the last years and social cleavages have decreased in ability to explain certain electoral behaviors. Their theory of collective identity binds together other models of voter behavior, such as the sociological, psychological and the economic approach. While these models are instructive, it can be shown that the sociological model isn’t as applicable today than it has been in the past (Wattenberg, 1995). It can also be argued that the psychological model, built as it is upon psychological affiliation with one party, is becoming less influential as party alignment is declining. It still contains many other elements, such as corollary theories such as the Funnel theory, that can be shown to still be large in effect. The economic perspective and economic voting (via the responsibility hypothesis, Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000) though, as an extension of rational choice, is becoming more and more important, especially in the wake of increasingly candidate centered (or personalized) politics in political institutions, the media and politician behavior (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). Israeli voters, while slowly coming to choose candidates over parties (this was especially pertinent during the time of the direct election of the Prime Minister), have come to rely to a greater extent on specific issues, usually choosing one or two basic issues to extrapolate whether or not a candidate is a good choice. Because the main issues of importance within Israel generally revolve around security, the political left has been hampered as events such as the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, and the Gaza War have convinced large portions of the public that they are in need of strong security oriented leadership- typically not found on the left. This has caused many on the left to shift their votes to the right a bit.
Others have shifted their votes away from their first parties of choice on the left to more centrist parties such as Kadima because of a desire to have more influence in the shaping of the ruling coalition. Within the Rational choice model, there are two accepted types of voters: expressive/sincere voters and instrumental/strategic voters. The first will always choose to vote for their first choice party as an expression of their desires. The second, however, will vote strategically keeping in mind that they can influence the formation and policy of the government more if they unite with a larger consensus to prevent the opposite bloc from gaining power in the coalition bargaining. For instance, many on the left would choose to vote for Kadima because they felt that that party had a good chance of defeating the Likud numerically and thus be asked to form the coalition (which would then probably include their party of first choice). Within the PR multiparty coalition governance system of Israel, this is not a negligible possibility (Aldrich, et al, 2005). However, in the last election it seems that this possibility backfired, as Kadima did manage to garner more votes and MKs than the Likud, but failed to have the backing from enough other parties to form a workable coalition.
Other models for political behavior can be useful in discussing how the Israeli voters are moving away from the perceived left (I say perceived, because it is likely that many of the voters have stayed in the same place ideologically, but because of the spectrum shift, they now find themselves more centrist than leftist) and can assist in the prediction of what will occur in the future. For example, the median model, which describes the candidate need to maximize their potential voters by placing themselves centrally, is related to the proximity model, wherein voters, unable to find an exact ideological fit in the parties, will choose that party which is in closest proximity to them on certain issues. The candidates though must take into account in addition to simple spatial proximity, also directional aspects and characteristics of intensity among voters (Merrill & Grofman, 1999). This will play out in the next elections, as the parties, specifically those on the left, will be forced to reinvent themselves in light of the changed political spectrum and place themselves strategically with new platforms and policies to attract the largest amount of voters. It can already be seen how this has played into Kadima’s hands, as they received so many votes from the left side, despite being a centrist party.
Perhaps the best way for the Left to revive itself though is to pay attention to the principles of the Affective Intelligence model and the Prospect theory. The affective intelligence theory (Marcus, et al, 2000) posits that people, in order to make sense of the various domains and demands of life, operate via two distinct emotional systems: a dispositional and a surveillance system. The first monitors every day interactions assessing successes and failures, while the second looks for novelty or threats in the environment. People will only act out when by means of this system they feel anxious or threatened by new information- in the political behavior arena, they will only act (vote) to change the status quo when they feel that there is a threat or problem with it. For example, in or after periods of high terror, the public shifts to support the right wing’s strict policies on security, as they feel anxious about new developments (Berrebi & Klor, 2006).
Prospect theory is a reaction to certain limitations on rational choice. Put forward by Quatrone & Tversky (1988), the theory predicts that people will exhibit risk aversion in domains of possible gains, but risk seeking behavior in domains of possible losses. Thus, combining these facts with the Affective Intelligence model, the Left must work to convince the public that the risk of shifting to Leftist parties and leadership is less than that of staying with a rightist coalition by raising public anxiety on issues, such as economics, candidate performance, or even security. They can effectively do this by playing on peoples’ emotions with regard to decreasing levels of terror or using recent events (such as the Flotilla attack) to discredit the Right’s near “ownership” of the issue of security. Worrying the public that the right cannot bring full security nor peace and publishing their failures could revive the efforts of the left and the peace camp by increasing voting behavior in their favor.
Bibliography:
Aldrich, J. H., Blais, A., Ideridason, I. H., & Levine, R. (2005). Coalition Consideration and the Vote. In Arain, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel, 2003.
Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2006). On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 899-925.
Dalton, R.J. (2002). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies (Third Edition). New York: Chatham House Publishers.
Hetherington, M.J. (2005). Why Trust Matters” Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic Voting: An Introduction. Electoral Studies, 19 (2&3), 113-121.
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Merrill, S. III, & Grofman, B. (1999). A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quatrone, G. A. & Tversky, A. (1988). Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. American Political Science Review, 82(3), 719-736.
Rahat, G. & Sheafer, T. (2007). The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003. Political Communication, 24, 65-80.
Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (1999). Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in Israel. American Political Science Review, 93(2), 265-277.
Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (2002). Abstaining and Voting in 2001. In Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel 2001. Jerusalem: The Democracy Library.
Yishay, Y. (1999). “Old” versus “New” Politics in the 1996 Elections. In Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel, 1996. SUNY Press and the Israel Democracy Institute.
Islam and Development
This short essay answers the question:
To what extent is the argument that “the Muslim belief is the major cause for hampering development in the Middle East” justified?
From a class on Political Economy in the Middle East.
This statement is only partly justified, because while there are aspects of the Muslim belief system that have a negative effect upon development, there are also aspects of belief that are beneficial for economic development and many other non-faith related traits within the region that further hamper the regions ability to further development.
The idea of Islamic economics that began arising in the mid 1900s didn’t arise as a theory of economics; instead it was meant as a socio-political construct to help restore Islamic self-respect and communal cohesion. Thus, the idea was not advanced as a means to further economic growth and development and in fact seemed more or less unconcerned about the potential hampering of economic development that would occur because it brought with it some growth-hampering characteristics. The goals of the system were not economic, but social, which meant that it was never held to the scientific standards of economics (coherence, precision and realism).
One of the major hampering effects of this system was the effective binding of Islam to the state apparatus. Effectively, this hampered the growth potential of the populace and the state by proclaiming that any economic endeavor not sanctioned by Islam was either prohibited or publically discouraged and relegated to the underground.
Besides this merging of religion and state, the system advocated a number of other culturally appreciated (but perhaps economically dubious) institutional requirements: the rejection of riba (interest or increase without risk), a zakat system of religious donations, and the establishment of an Islamic moral filter for all economic decisions. Similarly, the system also promoted the preeminence of a number of cultural-religious mores and norms that would further impede economic growth: the rejection and discouragement of Bid’ah (innovation), the advancement of waqf, and a tradition of oppression of women.
While riba was probably initially banned by Muhammad as a means of combating exorbitant lending practices that nearly always ended in debt defaulting leading to slavery, the continued rejection thereof stands only to deflate possible economic growth. Interest is important as an incentive for both payment and loaning in general; it can help cover the risks and expenses of investment, and it can help to deal with inflation. In some time periods, the Prophet’s injunction against riba has been reinterpreted to be a rather low set interest rate, indicating that they felt that interest was important to economic growth and allowed by Islamic law. The indiscriminate banning of interest discourages investment and loans, and requires banking institutions to development round about ways to deal with the lack. This generally leads to either dubious banking practices and underhanded dealings or a stagnant and stifled economy.
The zakat system stands as minor form of wealth redistribution. A small percentage of a person or business’ income is donated to a religious fund for caring for the poor. However, as the cases where Islamic economics have been officially introduced and accepted on a national level, it is apparent that as an attempted reduction of inequality and poverty, the zakat system has failed. Because of loopholes in the system and evasion of payment by businesses, the funds have not been forthcoming, and that which has been collected has, in many cases, been diverted to other causes. At the same time the high administrative and bureaucratic costs of the system have offset any gains that have been garnered. In addition, large-scale corruption within these systems has been rife. In these cases then, it is certain that the zakat system has been more of a drain on the economy rather than a significant redistribution and check on economic gaps. Thus, it can be said that if mismanaged, this system hampers economic growth, but there is not an opposite case of well-managed zakat that can prove if it would be effective otherwise.
The promotion of an Islamic moral filter within the economic sector could be effective in promotion of economic growth if it was undertaken in the correct manner. If it was established as a sort of ethics oversight committee or an equivalent to something like the Better Business Bureau, it could be very effective in promoting fair business practices and ethical actions. On the other hand, if the filter was established solely as a rejection committee for anything deemed “inappropriate” by its own interpretation of Islam the moral filter could then significantly hamper economic activity by both rejecting new business ideas as well as filling the economic sector with large amounts of red tape that would hamper business transactions and stifle growth.
Whether or not the Islamic moral filter would be a growth or hampering factor could depend upon the extent to which the filter establishes the rejection and disapproval of bid’ah. Depending on the extent to which this is emphasized the lack of innovation could be relegated solely to religious innovation, being ignored with regard to other areas of societal growth, allowing any number of innovations that could bring economic growth. However, it could also be applied in all areas of society. If this was the case, it would lead to stagnation and limitation on the economy as new inventions, products and services could potentially be rejected and their economic potential ignored.
The advancement and protection of religious waqfs also could serve as a potential economic hampering. As a religious endowment, waqf can serve to tie up funds that could otherwise serve to fill-out and promote economic growth. They can also serve to help stifle economic growth by tying up land and other resources that are then unable to be used in growing sectors of the economy. In response to this, many Arab countries started in the 1960s to pass legislation allowing the break-up of waqfs so that their fund could be reused. However, within more traditional areas, such as Palestine, these moves have not only been resisted, but an increase in waqf dedications have been seen as an attempt to stymie Israeli expansion (as religious endowments have some protection under Israeli law). This could serve to hamper the areas economy in the long run.
The Islamic culture also brings with it a recognized oppression or suppression of women. This large segment of society could be very influential in economic growth. As it stands today though, illiteracy is twice as large among women than among men. Women have little access to ownership of business, land or other productive assets. And while the number of women in the workforce is increasing they are largely relegated to lesser levels of employment (mostly in the agrarian and service sectors). Muslim cultural beliefs with regard to keeping women from education and the workforce do stymie economic growth.
As has been shown, many Muslim beliefs and/or associated institutional arrangements in some ways can decrease economic growth. However, this does not mean that Muslim beliefs in general will hamper economics. It has been shown that in general religious belief correlates with increased productivity. (The same study also showed that increased church attendance correlated to decrease economic growth. It would be interesting to see if this was the same with Muslim prayer practices and mosque attendance).
Despite all this though, it is hardly justified to call Muslim belief the “major” cause for decreased development in the Middle East as there are other major causes of economic hampering. Some of these which stand out are: poor economic governance, low small-industry growth, democratic lag or deficit, political upheavals, bad business environment (caused by corruption, and overwrought rules and regulations), low quality of human capital, and lack of regional cooperation.
To what extent is the argument that “the Muslim belief is the major cause for hampering development in the Middle East” justified?
From a class on Political Economy in the Middle East.
This statement is only partly justified, because while there are aspects of the Muslim belief system that have a negative effect upon development, there are also aspects of belief that are beneficial for economic development and many other non-faith related traits within the region that further hamper the regions ability to further development.
The idea of Islamic economics that began arising in the mid 1900s didn’t arise as a theory of economics; instead it was meant as a socio-political construct to help restore Islamic self-respect and communal cohesion. Thus, the idea was not advanced as a means to further economic growth and development and in fact seemed more or less unconcerned about the potential hampering of economic development that would occur because it brought with it some growth-hampering characteristics. The goals of the system were not economic, but social, which meant that it was never held to the scientific standards of economics (coherence, precision and realism).
One of the major hampering effects of this system was the effective binding of Islam to the state apparatus. Effectively, this hampered the growth potential of the populace and the state by proclaiming that any economic endeavor not sanctioned by Islam was either prohibited or publically discouraged and relegated to the underground.
Besides this merging of religion and state, the system advocated a number of other culturally appreciated (but perhaps economically dubious) institutional requirements: the rejection of riba (interest or increase without risk), a zakat system of religious donations, and the establishment of an Islamic moral filter for all economic decisions. Similarly, the system also promoted the preeminence of a number of cultural-religious mores and norms that would further impede economic growth: the rejection and discouragement of Bid’ah (innovation), the advancement of waqf, and a tradition of oppression of women.
While riba was probably initially banned by Muhammad as a means of combating exorbitant lending practices that nearly always ended in debt defaulting leading to slavery, the continued rejection thereof stands only to deflate possible economic growth. Interest is important as an incentive for both payment and loaning in general; it can help cover the risks and expenses of investment, and it can help to deal with inflation. In some time periods, the Prophet’s injunction against riba has been reinterpreted to be a rather low set interest rate, indicating that they felt that interest was important to economic growth and allowed by Islamic law. The indiscriminate banning of interest discourages investment and loans, and requires banking institutions to development round about ways to deal with the lack. This generally leads to either dubious banking practices and underhanded dealings or a stagnant and stifled economy.
The zakat system stands as minor form of wealth redistribution. A small percentage of a person or business’ income is donated to a religious fund for caring for the poor. However, as the cases where Islamic economics have been officially introduced and accepted on a national level, it is apparent that as an attempted reduction of inequality and poverty, the zakat system has failed. Because of loopholes in the system and evasion of payment by businesses, the funds have not been forthcoming, and that which has been collected has, in many cases, been diverted to other causes. At the same time the high administrative and bureaucratic costs of the system have offset any gains that have been garnered. In addition, large-scale corruption within these systems has been rife. In these cases then, it is certain that the zakat system has been more of a drain on the economy rather than a significant redistribution and check on economic gaps. Thus, it can be said that if mismanaged, this system hampers economic growth, but there is not an opposite case of well-managed zakat that can prove if it would be effective otherwise.
The promotion of an Islamic moral filter within the economic sector could be effective in promotion of economic growth if it was undertaken in the correct manner. If it was established as a sort of ethics oversight committee or an equivalent to something like the Better Business Bureau, it could be very effective in promoting fair business practices and ethical actions. On the other hand, if the filter was established solely as a rejection committee for anything deemed “inappropriate” by its own interpretation of Islam the moral filter could then significantly hamper economic activity by both rejecting new business ideas as well as filling the economic sector with large amounts of red tape that would hamper business transactions and stifle growth.
Whether or not the Islamic moral filter would be a growth or hampering factor could depend upon the extent to which the filter establishes the rejection and disapproval of bid’ah. Depending on the extent to which this is emphasized the lack of innovation could be relegated solely to religious innovation, being ignored with regard to other areas of societal growth, allowing any number of innovations that could bring economic growth. However, it could also be applied in all areas of society. If this was the case, it would lead to stagnation and limitation on the economy as new inventions, products and services could potentially be rejected and their economic potential ignored.
The advancement and protection of religious waqfs also could serve as a potential economic hampering. As a religious endowment, waqf can serve to tie up funds that could otherwise serve to fill-out and promote economic growth. They can also serve to help stifle economic growth by tying up land and other resources that are then unable to be used in growing sectors of the economy. In response to this, many Arab countries started in the 1960s to pass legislation allowing the break-up of waqfs so that their fund could be reused. However, within more traditional areas, such as Palestine, these moves have not only been resisted, but an increase in waqf dedications have been seen as an attempt to stymie Israeli expansion (as religious endowments have some protection under Israeli law). This could serve to hamper the areas economy in the long run.
The Islamic culture also brings with it a recognized oppression or suppression of women. This large segment of society could be very influential in economic growth. As it stands today though, illiteracy is twice as large among women than among men. Women have little access to ownership of business, land or other productive assets. And while the number of women in the workforce is increasing they are largely relegated to lesser levels of employment (mostly in the agrarian and service sectors). Muslim cultural beliefs with regard to keeping women from education and the workforce do stymie economic growth.
As has been shown, many Muslim beliefs and/or associated institutional arrangements in some ways can decrease economic growth. However, this does not mean that Muslim beliefs in general will hamper economics. It has been shown that in general religious belief correlates with increased productivity. (The same study also showed that increased church attendance correlated to decrease economic growth. It would be interesting to see if this was the same with Muslim prayer practices and mosque attendance).
Despite all this though, it is hardly justified to call Muslim belief the “major” cause for decreased development in the Middle East as there are other major causes of economic hampering. Some of these which stand out are: poor economic governance, low small-industry growth, democratic lag or deficit, political upheavals, bad business environment (caused by corruption, and overwrought rules and regulations), low quality of human capital, and lack of regional cooperation.
Terror Financing
This essay is to answer this question:
How are terror organizations being financed and to what extent is sound information about budgets of terror organizations available for academic research? From a Political Economy of the Middle East course.
Traditionally, terror organizations have been largely funded by states. With the continued globalization and integration of the world economy, this influence has decreased. Whereas some few states, such as Iran and Syria, continue to fund acknowledged terror groups, most terror groups have turned to different forms of financing, essentially funding themselves and their operations by various means.
One of the most common means of financing comes from private donors. Wealthy individuals who either agree with the ideology or cause of the terror groups, or who perhaps actively take part in their cause, donate of their personal fortunes to fund the groups. These types of individuals or others can also act as middlemen or instigators themselves, traveling and gathering money and donations from other donors from around the world to increase the funds that are at the disposal of the terror organization.
Terror groups can use these moneys within regular financing and banking institutions to garner greater funds through means of investment or interest. Interestingly, some such groups actually go to the point of opening accounts in their own names or through the means of front organizations to spread their finances. The use of these accounts has led to nominally honest, non-terror banking organizations being highly involved in the movement of terror finances. Banks, and other financial networks and organizations, for example the Arab Bank, al-Taqwa, and al-Barakat, have been used to transfer these funds extensively around not only the Arab Middle East, but also throughout many other international areas. The system is simple enough with local operatives of the terror group opening bank accounts in their local cities, which then receive funds via transfer from the general terror fund. However, sometimes this legal transfer system can be too easily tracked.
To combat this, many times terror groups, especially in the Middle East, turn to using the traditional Hawala system of money transfer. This is an informal, anonymous money transfer system that is based solely upon trust built up between brokers over generations. In many cases, because it can run slightly cheaper than normal and official channels, migrant workers sending remittances home use this system. But, its anonymous and informal (i.e. non-traceable) nature makes it ideal for terror organizations wishing to transfer money. No records are kept (any of necessity are destroyed when the transaction is finished) and no official money transfer occurs- a broker simple contacts a fellow broker asking him to release so much money to someone who shows up with the correct code, keyword, etc.
But this still leaves the major question, where does the money come from, largely unanswered. Besides personal donations, many terror organizations also rely on legitimate business operations to garner finances. Operatives either gain employment or businesses are created, either as legitimate and workable businesses or simply as fronts, who donate a part of their income or profits to the terror group. In this manner, terror groups can access funds in the form of salaries, government subsidies or other business profits which can be sent via wire or cash transfers into the central account for the group. This type of situation provides for local cover and livelihoods for operatives as well as a means of creating contacts and drumming up support for the group.
Besides legitimate business opportunities, many terror organizations also take part in criminal activities. Authorities have tracked terror money through all kinds of black market operations: mafia-style shakedowns, kidnappings, pirated multimedia sales, drug and arms trafficking, prostitution, fraud, extortion, import-export scams, even diamond smuggling. These types of “fund raisers” are very lucrative and would add much to the terror coffers.
On the other hand, many terror groups have turned to garnering money from sources that are much less criminal and much more humanitarian. Many humanitarian and charitable organizations, which raise money for causes meant to ease human suffering throughout the world, have come under fire for their connections to terror groups. In some cases, they are legitimate, raising funds to for real need but diverting large portions of the money that was raised to financing terror. In other cases, the charity organizations unknowingly contribute to projects that are terror related. Others have acted simply as fronts, hiding behind a façade of charity, while really acting as facilitators for training, arms making and smuggling or other terror related activities.
Sound information about these finances is not largely available for academic purposes. Because the finances themselves are secret, most of the information that is accumulated is known after the fact from investigations. Thus, it is hard for academics (and investigators) to accurately judge the amount of money that is flowing through these channels or to make accurate assessments about where or how it is gained. That being said, it can be assured that there is a large amount of information out there about that money that has been tracked.
How are terror organizations being financed and to what extent is sound information about budgets of terror organizations available for academic research? From a Political Economy of the Middle East course.
Traditionally, terror organizations have been largely funded by states. With the continued globalization and integration of the world economy, this influence has decreased. Whereas some few states, such as Iran and Syria, continue to fund acknowledged terror groups, most terror groups have turned to different forms of financing, essentially funding themselves and their operations by various means.
One of the most common means of financing comes from private donors. Wealthy individuals who either agree with the ideology or cause of the terror groups, or who perhaps actively take part in their cause, donate of their personal fortunes to fund the groups. These types of individuals or others can also act as middlemen or instigators themselves, traveling and gathering money and donations from other donors from around the world to increase the funds that are at the disposal of the terror organization.
Terror groups can use these moneys within regular financing and banking institutions to garner greater funds through means of investment or interest. Interestingly, some such groups actually go to the point of opening accounts in their own names or through the means of front organizations to spread their finances. The use of these accounts has led to nominally honest, non-terror banking organizations being highly involved in the movement of terror finances. Banks, and other financial networks and organizations, for example the Arab Bank, al-Taqwa, and al-Barakat, have been used to transfer these funds extensively around not only the Arab Middle East, but also throughout many other international areas. The system is simple enough with local operatives of the terror group opening bank accounts in their local cities, which then receive funds via transfer from the general terror fund. However, sometimes this legal transfer system can be too easily tracked.
To combat this, many times terror groups, especially in the Middle East, turn to using the traditional Hawala system of money transfer. This is an informal, anonymous money transfer system that is based solely upon trust built up between brokers over generations. In many cases, because it can run slightly cheaper than normal and official channels, migrant workers sending remittances home use this system. But, its anonymous and informal (i.e. non-traceable) nature makes it ideal for terror organizations wishing to transfer money. No records are kept (any of necessity are destroyed when the transaction is finished) and no official money transfer occurs- a broker simple contacts a fellow broker asking him to release so much money to someone who shows up with the correct code, keyword, etc.
But this still leaves the major question, where does the money come from, largely unanswered. Besides personal donations, many terror organizations also rely on legitimate business operations to garner finances. Operatives either gain employment or businesses are created, either as legitimate and workable businesses or simply as fronts, who donate a part of their income or profits to the terror group. In this manner, terror groups can access funds in the form of salaries, government subsidies or other business profits which can be sent via wire or cash transfers into the central account for the group. This type of situation provides for local cover and livelihoods for operatives as well as a means of creating contacts and drumming up support for the group.
Besides legitimate business opportunities, many terror organizations also take part in criminal activities. Authorities have tracked terror money through all kinds of black market operations: mafia-style shakedowns, kidnappings, pirated multimedia sales, drug and arms trafficking, prostitution, fraud, extortion, import-export scams, even diamond smuggling. These types of “fund raisers” are very lucrative and would add much to the terror coffers.
On the other hand, many terror groups have turned to garnering money from sources that are much less criminal and much more humanitarian. Many humanitarian and charitable organizations, which raise money for causes meant to ease human suffering throughout the world, have come under fire for their connections to terror groups. In some cases, they are legitimate, raising funds to for real need but diverting large portions of the money that was raised to financing terror. In other cases, the charity organizations unknowingly contribute to projects that are terror related. Others have acted simply as fronts, hiding behind a façade of charity, while really acting as facilitators for training, arms making and smuggling or other terror related activities.
Sound information about these finances is not largely available for academic purposes. Because the finances themselves are secret, most of the information that is accumulated is known after the fact from investigations. Thus, it is hard for academics (and investigators) to accurately judge the amount of money that is flowing through these channels or to make accurate assessments about where or how it is gained. That being said, it can be assured that there is a large amount of information out there about that money that has been tracked.
Population transfer, Bi-nationalism and Partition
This short essay answers this query:
Explain the following policy proposals and evaluate their relative importance in the history of Zionism in relation to the conflict with the Arabs:
(a) Transfer of population
(b) Bi-nationalism
(c) Partition
The first policy proposal, transfer of population (specifically the Arabs out of Israel, however sometimes coupled with exchanging Jewish groups from Arab countries), has its roots within the Radical Revisionists. Although some scholars have suggested that Jabotinsky himself had some leanings toward or perhaps even fully accepted the idea of voluntary transfer or exchange (all are in agreement that he fully objected to forced evacuation), it is absolutely sure that initially it was only the very fringe groups of Zionism that accepted or advocated population transfer.
This policy has its base in the general ideology of the radical Revisionists whose movement was characterized by authoritarian tendencies and quasi-religious messianic rhetoric that sought to replace the regular Zionist idea of a national home for the Jews with that of malkhut Israel (“the Kingdom of Israel”), an allusion to the establishment of a Jewish imperialism. This, combined with their attempts to regain a regesh ha-adnut or sense of mastery over the land, resulted in their classification of both the British and the Arabs in Palestine as alien occupants in the land that must either accept Jewish majority rule or be forced out.
The LEHI movement under Avraham Stern expounded on this further. They claimed that the right to the land was delineated by might or conquest. As well, they relied on the argument that the Arabs in Palestine constituted only a part of the larger Arab nation. They denied that they had any sort of national character and thus allowed that it would be easy for the Arabs to accept removal to another Arab land. This paved the way for these radicals to actively pursue transfer of the Arab population out of Israel as a reasonable and long-lasting solution since they agreed with Jabotinsky that the Arabs would never fully accept minority status or citizenship under Zionist rule.
In the late 1940s, this proposal figured prominently in their political platforms. It faded slightly directly before the 1948 War, but was revived as the war continued and the movement began to consider Jabotinsky mistaken in believing that a large portion of the Arabs would eventually accept the Jewish state. Following the war, the prominence of the proposal again faded only to be revived again 20 years later after the Six Day War. This time though, population transfer was even more popular as members of the religious Zionist movement joined the remnant of the Radical Revisionists, even expanding the idea to include transfer of Arabs out of the occupied territories.
As a policy, forced population transfer or exchange never occupied a place of extreme importance within Zionism. It was never advocated or accepted by any except the most radical fringes of the Zionist movement. However, this is not to say that it did not have influence within the history of Zionism. It can be shown that its influence and importance have grown, as those who consider it a valid and sustainable solution to the conflict have grown from the small numbers of the LEHI and Radical Revisionists to include members of the religious Zionist movement as well as others who have come to see the conflict in similar zero-sum game terms.
The “compromise for peace” camp initially promoted the second policy proposal, bi-nationalism. In simple terms, the policy encouraged the creation of a single state built on compromise in which both Jews and Arabs would have equal say without regard for numerical superiority. The idea was advocated by many different groups, the first among them being Brit Shalom, which was then followed chronologically by Kema Mizraha, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, Ha-shomer Ha-tzair, Left Polei Zion and Ihud (or the Union Association). These groups represent the opposite side of the spectrum from the Radical Revisionists, and were also relatively small in numbers.
The ideology and policies of Brit Shalom were largely the product of the thinking of many intellectuals such as Rabbi Benjamin, Yitshak Epstein, Martin Buber, and Arthur Ruppin, among others. It was founded largely because these individuals felt that the Zionist leadership was neglecting an important issue by not cultivating relations with the Arabs. They felt that the success of the Zionist cause was dependent upon Arab good will and cooperation. Buber specifically phrased his thoughts within the framework of freedom, feeling that it was moral reprehensible for one people to oppress or dominate another. He, along with others, thus helped develop the idea that a state governed equally and cooperatively by both Arabs and Jews would both benefit all parties as well as be morally and rationally acceptable.
The other Zionist groups and individuals of the times which supported the bi-national idea did so for similar, albeit different reasons. Judah Magnes, one of the founders of the Ihud, was strongly in favor of a bi-national state (rather than a solely Jewish one) because it would allow for the greatest possible achievement of the right to self-determination for both sides (despite granting neither a full exercise thereof). Ha-shomer Ha-Tzair advocated the policy because it fit well with their socialist goals and advocacy of the common working class.
The bi-national movement never had any significant influence within the history of Zionism. This was largely because it seemed unconcerned with Jewish immigration into the area as it did not see a Jewish majority in the country as one of its preeminent goals and because it recognized that the Arabs in Palestine had an equal right and claim to the land. These ideas clashed with the larger Labor Zionist movement and the Revisionists, despite attempts to make the policy more attractive to them. The policy was also not long lasting, fading from the scene following the British abandonment of the Mandate and the establishment of Israel. This policy was neither able to rouse the interest of large numbers within the Jewish community nor garner a good response from the Arabs.
Partition, a policy proposing the establishment of two nations, one Arab and one Jewish, enjoyed the largest amount of influence and importance of the three. This was largely because the Labor Zionists who constituted the largest and most influential section within both the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization accepted it as a viable initial solution to the Jewish problem. The leadership of these institutions (David Ben Gurion and Chaim Weizmann) was much more pragmatic than the leadership of the fringe groupings. Jabotinsky and the Revisionists rejected partition on the grounds that the Jewish claim was for all of Palestine and should not be divided. The Brit Shalom tradition rejected it in favor of the bi-national state. Ben Gurion and Weizmann began to publically embrace partition around the 1937 release of the Peel Commission report that would present Partition as the proposed British policy.
It is important to note that Ben Gurion and Weizmann’s acceptance of partition was not because of any desire to reach a compromised solution with the Arabs. While they accepted it as a viable line of policy for providing all sides with justice and self-determination, they mostly sided with it because it was seen as the fastest way to attain their own self-interest in the establishment of a Jewish homeland.
While this policy was largely divisive among the Zionists initially, it gained much support as time went by and eventually was accepted by both the Jewish Zionist community and the international community.
Bibliography
Galnoor, Itzhak. The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995.
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Tessler, Mark. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994.
Explain the following policy proposals and evaluate their relative importance in the history of Zionism in relation to the conflict with the Arabs:
(a) Transfer of population
(b) Bi-nationalism
(c) Partition
The first policy proposal, transfer of population (specifically the Arabs out of Israel, however sometimes coupled with exchanging Jewish groups from Arab countries), has its roots within the Radical Revisionists. Although some scholars have suggested that Jabotinsky himself had some leanings toward or perhaps even fully accepted the idea of voluntary transfer or exchange (all are in agreement that he fully objected to forced evacuation), it is absolutely sure that initially it was only the very fringe groups of Zionism that accepted or advocated population transfer.
This policy has its base in the general ideology of the radical Revisionists whose movement was characterized by authoritarian tendencies and quasi-religious messianic rhetoric that sought to replace the regular Zionist idea of a national home for the Jews with that of malkhut Israel (“the Kingdom of Israel”), an allusion to the establishment of a Jewish imperialism. This, combined with their attempts to regain a regesh ha-adnut or sense of mastery over the land, resulted in their classification of both the British and the Arabs in Palestine as alien occupants in the land that must either accept Jewish majority rule or be forced out.
The LEHI movement under Avraham Stern expounded on this further. They claimed that the right to the land was delineated by might or conquest. As well, they relied on the argument that the Arabs in Palestine constituted only a part of the larger Arab nation. They denied that they had any sort of national character and thus allowed that it would be easy for the Arabs to accept removal to another Arab land. This paved the way for these radicals to actively pursue transfer of the Arab population out of Israel as a reasonable and long-lasting solution since they agreed with Jabotinsky that the Arabs would never fully accept minority status or citizenship under Zionist rule.
In the late 1940s, this proposal figured prominently in their political platforms. It faded slightly directly before the 1948 War, but was revived as the war continued and the movement began to consider Jabotinsky mistaken in believing that a large portion of the Arabs would eventually accept the Jewish state. Following the war, the prominence of the proposal again faded only to be revived again 20 years later after the Six Day War. This time though, population transfer was even more popular as members of the religious Zionist movement joined the remnant of the Radical Revisionists, even expanding the idea to include transfer of Arabs out of the occupied territories.
As a policy, forced population transfer or exchange never occupied a place of extreme importance within Zionism. It was never advocated or accepted by any except the most radical fringes of the Zionist movement. However, this is not to say that it did not have influence within the history of Zionism. It can be shown that its influence and importance have grown, as those who consider it a valid and sustainable solution to the conflict have grown from the small numbers of the LEHI and Radical Revisionists to include members of the religious Zionist movement as well as others who have come to see the conflict in similar zero-sum game terms.
The “compromise for peace” camp initially promoted the second policy proposal, bi-nationalism. In simple terms, the policy encouraged the creation of a single state built on compromise in which both Jews and Arabs would have equal say without regard for numerical superiority. The idea was advocated by many different groups, the first among them being Brit Shalom, which was then followed chronologically by Kema Mizraha, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, Ha-shomer Ha-tzair, Left Polei Zion and Ihud (or the Union Association). These groups represent the opposite side of the spectrum from the Radical Revisionists, and were also relatively small in numbers.
The ideology and policies of Brit Shalom were largely the product of the thinking of many intellectuals such as Rabbi Benjamin, Yitshak Epstein, Martin Buber, and Arthur Ruppin, among others. It was founded largely because these individuals felt that the Zionist leadership was neglecting an important issue by not cultivating relations with the Arabs. They felt that the success of the Zionist cause was dependent upon Arab good will and cooperation. Buber specifically phrased his thoughts within the framework of freedom, feeling that it was moral reprehensible for one people to oppress or dominate another. He, along with others, thus helped develop the idea that a state governed equally and cooperatively by both Arabs and Jews would both benefit all parties as well as be morally and rationally acceptable.
The other Zionist groups and individuals of the times which supported the bi-national idea did so for similar, albeit different reasons. Judah Magnes, one of the founders of the Ihud, was strongly in favor of a bi-national state (rather than a solely Jewish one) because it would allow for the greatest possible achievement of the right to self-determination for both sides (despite granting neither a full exercise thereof). Ha-shomer Ha-Tzair advocated the policy because it fit well with their socialist goals and advocacy of the common working class.
The bi-national movement never had any significant influence within the history of Zionism. This was largely because it seemed unconcerned with Jewish immigration into the area as it did not see a Jewish majority in the country as one of its preeminent goals and because it recognized that the Arabs in Palestine had an equal right and claim to the land. These ideas clashed with the larger Labor Zionist movement and the Revisionists, despite attempts to make the policy more attractive to them. The policy was also not long lasting, fading from the scene following the British abandonment of the Mandate and the establishment of Israel. This policy was neither able to rouse the interest of large numbers within the Jewish community nor garner a good response from the Arabs.
Partition, a policy proposing the establishment of two nations, one Arab and one Jewish, enjoyed the largest amount of influence and importance of the three. This was largely because the Labor Zionists who constituted the largest and most influential section within both the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization accepted it as a viable initial solution to the Jewish problem. The leadership of these institutions (David Ben Gurion and Chaim Weizmann) was much more pragmatic than the leadership of the fringe groupings. Jabotinsky and the Revisionists rejected partition on the grounds that the Jewish claim was for all of Palestine and should not be divided. The Brit Shalom tradition rejected it in favor of the bi-national state. Ben Gurion and Weizmann began to publically embrace partition around the 1937 release of the Peel Commission report that would present Partition as the proposed British policy.
It is important to note that Ben Gurion and Weizmann’s acceptance of partition was not because of any desire to reach a compromised solution with the Arabs. While they accepted it as a viable line of policy for providing all sides with justice and self-determination, they mostly sided with it because it was seen as the fastest way to attain their own self-interest in the establishment of a Jewish homeland.
While this policy was largely divisive among the Zionists initially, it gained much support as time went by and eventually was accepted by both the Jewish Zionist community and the international community.
Bibliography
Galnoor, Itzhak. The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995.
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Tessler, Mark. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994.
Buber vs Jabotinksy
This short essay was written as per these guidelines:
Explain the views and policies of Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky in regard to the Arab-Jewish conflict: Evaluate what they had in common and how they differed.
Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky share many things in common regarding their views and the policies that they espoused. They both believed very strongly in the Zionist ethos and cause. They both felt that the creation of a state, with specific rights and powers in the hands of the Jewish population, was vital to solving the Jewish Problem and to the existential need of the Jewish culture and people. They both stressed the point, though, that a physical state was the answer to the Jewish problem, not as a physical haven from anti-Semitism, but because there was some spiritual, or non-physical, malady caused by the Jewish lack of a homeland or lack of connection to their ancestral homeland.
Buber and Jabotinksy held very similar general views about the Arabs. They both respected in distinct ways the Arab community within Palestine and felt that their distrust and dislike of Jewish immigration and the Zionist cause were valid. They felt that a distinct and legitimate national movement or patriotism that was both strong and authentic caused this opposition. However, both Jabotinsky and Buber understood that there would be some unavoidable problems along the way though. They understood that both parties of the conflict had competing claims to the same land and that, realistically, it would be impossible for both of the claims to be fully realized.
The policies that they both adopted for the solution of this antipathy, while differing in means and methods, came to nearly the same visualized conclusion. They both envisioned the creation of a state with a largely Jewish population in which the Arabs were granted full civic, political rights and privileges. They both saw the two communities, Jewish and Arab, as growing and flourishing as well as being almost fully separate and independent from one another.
Despite these many generalized similarities, Buber and Jabotinsky differed vastly in many of the details of their thoughts, views and policies. One of the major divergences in their thoughts was the reasoning behind their claims to the land of Palestine as a homeland. Buber interpreted the claim in light of how he saw Zionism’s purpose: as a manifestation of the Jewish mission to create a divinely approved community. He never recognized any type of historical claim, based in the Bible or anywhere else, to the land, but argued that the Jewish people “spiritually” needed the land to fulfill their mission because of its integral connection with their ancient covenant with God- creating a model community that would serve the needs of all mankind. Buber phrased his arguments this way in order to actively appeal to the morality of the nations and gain the approval of the international community to accomplish the international restructuring necessary for creating the Jewish state. Attached to this, Buber also declared that the Jews had a great right and claim to the land based in their ability to use the land to the best of its creative and fertile potential better than the Arabs. This point, based on pioneering spirit and technology, also claimed that all inhabitants of the region would benefit from Jewish cultivation of the land. Jabotinsky on the other hand thought very little of the pioneering accomplishments of Jewish settlers as far as basing a claim on the land went. He strictly advocated the historical right to land.
Jabotinksy bolstered his adherence to the historical right to the land claim by his personal views about the Arabs in Palestine. While respecting the Arabs for their force of will and their strong stand for their rights and according them (in his own words) the same “courteous indifference” which he felt towards all gentiles, Jabotinsky held a very negative opinion of the Arab-Muslim culture. He felt that it was socially and politically backward and primitive. He saw the Islamic civilization as being the complete antithesis of European civilization: it was stagnant and petrified, completely doomed to forever be oppressive religiously and politically. He refused to accept as well the argument that Jewish influence could culturally uplift the natives. This complete rejection of the European romanticizing of the East led him to see negotiations with the Arabs over a solution to be futile.
Buber wholeheartedly disagreed with Jabotinksy on this. He felt that Middle Eastern culture was a beautiful expression of healthy, clean and pure living. He adhered to the philosophy that all nations are free and able to claim their own rights and privileges and that no nation or people had the right to suppress another people. His expression of Zionism was in no way an attempt to exert superiority over another nation, but simply a frank acceptance that the Jewish nation had a fate or destiny that was different from other nations. Granting the Jews a homeland in Palestine would in no way mean that the Arabs would not be able to attain and achieve their own cultural mission. In this way, Buber felt that peace and understanding between the Jews and their Arab neighbors in Palestine was of paramount importance to the Zionist cause, and, thus, he fully advocated negotiations with the Arabs to come to a suitable compromise that would be beneficial to all. For this reason, Buber supported the binational solution put forward by the compromise for peace camp (Brit Shalom). He rejected any methods of nationalistic control or domination and felt that moral ends do not justify the use of immoral means. In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the use of such tactics would negate any positive outcomes of Zionism.
Jabotinksy, on the other hand, fully accepted the use of nationalistic means of control. He fully believed that if something was necessary, coercion was acceptable even within a social context. He applied this point to the Zionist cause by advocating the erection of what he called an “Iron Wall.” Because he felt that the Arabs would never approve of the Zionist endeavor and that they would continually fight growing Jewish immigration and might in the Palestine area, he claimed that it was necessary for the Jews to protect their cause by either actual force or the threat/show of force (military or otherwise). Indeed, Jabotinksy accepted that if the Arabs refused the Jewish need then war would was not only possible but perhaps also necessary to force them to acceptance. This “iron wall” would serve to forcibly pacify and eventually coerce the local population into accepting their station as a minority within the proposed Jewish state.
The size and characteristics of the future state was another place where Buber and Jabotinksy differed. Where Buber was desirous of a binational state in the entire area of Palestine that would be dually governed by both the Arabs and the Jews regardless of their populations or majority status. Jabotinsky on the other hand envisioned the only solution to the Jewish problem to be the creation of a fully Jewish state, with an Arab minority possessing full civic and political rights, but ruled by the Jewish majority.
Bibliography:
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Heller, Joseph. “Weizmann, Jabotinsky and the Arab Question.” Jerusalem Quarterly, 26, (1983): 109-126.
Lustick, Ian. “To Build and to be Built: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall”, Israel Studies, vol. 1. No.1, Spring 1996, pp. 196-223.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Explain the views and policies of Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky in regard to the Arab-Jewish conflict: Evaluate what they had in common and how they differed.
Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky share many things in common regarding their views and the policies that they espoused. They both believed very strongly in the Zionist ethos and cause. They both felt that the creation of a state, with specific rights and powers in the hands of the Jewish population, was vital to solving the Jewish Problem and to the existential need of the Jewish culture and people. They both stressed the point, though, that a physical state was the answer to the Jewish problem, not as a physical haven from anti-Semitism, but because there was some spiritual, or non-physical, malady caused by the Jewish lack of a homeland or lack of connection to their ancestral homeland.
Buber and Jabotinksy held very similar general views about the Arabs. They both respected in distinct ways the Arab community within Palestine and felt that their distrust and dislike of Jewish immigration and the Zionist cause were valid. They felt that a distinct and legitimate national movement or patriotism that was both strong and authentic caused this opposition. However, both Jabotinsky and Buber understood that there would be some unavoidable problems along the way though. They understood that both parties of the conflict had competing claims to the same land and that, realistically, it would be impossible for both of the claims to be fully realized.
The policies that they both adopted for the solution of this antipathy, while differing in means and methods, came to nearly the same visualized conclusion. They both envisioned the creation of a state with a largely Jewish population in which the Arabs were granted full civic, political rights and privileges. They both saw the two communities, Jewish and Arab, as growing and flourishing as well as being almost fully separate and independent from one another.
Despite these many generalized similarities, Buber and Jabotinsky differed vastly in many of the details of their thoughts, views and policies. One of the major divergences in their thoughts was the reasoning behind their claims to the land of Palestine as a homeland. Buber interpreted the claim in light of how he saw Zionism’s purpose: as a manifestation of the Jewish mission to create a divinely approved community. He never recognized any type of historical claim, based in the Bible or anywhere else, to the land, but argued that the Jewish people “spiritually” needed the land to fulfill their mission because of its integral connection with their ancient covenant with God- creating a model community that would serve the needs of all mankind. Buber phrased his arguments this way in order to actively appeal to the morality of the nations and gain the approval of the international community to accomplish the international restructuring necessary for creating the Jewish state. Attached to this, Buber also declared that the Jews had a great right and claim to the land based in their ability to use the land to the best of its creative and fertile potential better than the Arabs. This point, based on pioneering spirit and technology, also claimed that all inhabitants of the region would benefit from Jewish cultivation of the land. Jabotinsky on the other hand thought very little of the pioneering accomplishments of Jewish settlers as far as basing a claim on the land went. He strictly advocated the historical right to land.
Jabotinksy bolstered his adherence to the historical right to the land claim by his personal views about the Arabs in Palestine. While respecting the Arabs for their force of will and their strong stand for their rights and according them (in his own words) the same “courteous indifference” which he felt towards all gentiles, Jabotinsky held a very negative opinion of the Arab-Muslim culture. He felt that it was socially and politically backward and primitive. He saw the Islamic civilization as being the complete antithesis of European civilization: it was stagnant and petrified, completely doomed to forever be oppressive religiously and politically. He refused to accept as well the argument that Jewish influence could culturally uplift the natives. This complete rejection of the European romanticizing of the East led him to see negotiations with the Arabs over a solution to be futile.
Buber wholeheartedly disagreed with Jabotinksy on this. He felt that Middle Eastern culture was a beautiful expression of healthy, clean and pure living. He adhered to the philosophy that all nations are free and able to claim their own rights and privileges and that no nation or people had the right to suppress another people. His expression of Zionism was in no way an attempt to exert superiority over another nation, but simply a frank acceptance that the Jewish nation had a fate or destiny that was different from other nations. Granting the Jews a homeland in Palestine would in no way mean that the Arabs would not be able to attain and achieve their own cultural mission. In this way, Buber felt that peace and understanding between the Jews and their Arab neighbors in Palestine was of paramount importance to the Zionist cause, and, thus, he fully advocated negotiations with the Arabs to come to a suitable compromise that would be beneficial to all. For this reason, Buber supported the binational solution put forward by the compromise for peace camp (Brit Shalom). He rejected any methods of nationalistic control or domination and felt that moral ends do not justify the use of immoral means. In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the use of such tactics would negate any positive outcomes of Zionism.
Jabotinksy, on the other hand, fully accepted the use of nationalistic means of control. He fully believed that if something was necessary, coercion was acceptable even within a social context. He applied this point to the Zionist cause by advocating the erection of what he called an “Iron Wall.” Because he felt that the Arabs would never approve of the Zionist endeavor and that they would continually fight growing Jewish immigration and might in the Palestine area, he claimed that it was necessary for the Jews to protect their cause by either actual force or the threat/show of force (military or otherwise). Indeed, Jabotinksy accepted that if the Arabs refused the Jewish need then war would was not only possible but perhaps also necessary to force them to acceptance. This “iron wall” would serve to forcibly pacify and eventually coerce the local population into accepting their station as a minority within the proposed Jewish state.
The size and characteristics of the future state was another place where Buber and Jabotinksy differed. Where Buber was desirous of a binational state in the entire area of Palestine that would be dually governed by both the Arabs and the Jews regardless of their populations or majority status. Jabotinsky on the other hand envisioned the only solution to the Jewish problem to be the creation of a fully Jewish state, with an Arab minority possessing full civic and political rights, but ruled by the Jewish majority.
Bibliography:
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Heller, Joseph. “Weizmann, Jabotinsky and the Arab Question.” Jerusalem Quarterly, 26, (1983): 109-126.
Lustick, Ian. “To Build and to be Built: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall”, Israel Studies, vol. 1. No.1, Spring 1996, pp. 196-223.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Colonialism Paradigm and Jewish-Arab conflict
This short essay was written to answer this question:
Evaluate the arguments for and against the colonialism paradigm as the basis for comprehending the Jewish-Arab conflict.
(from a class on Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict from Gideon Shimoni)
The arguments for using the colonialism paradigm to describe the Jewish-Arab conflict are based in the notion that the Zionist enterprise fits as a type or example of typical European colonialism, and the response by the Arab population is simply a reaction against this aggression. These claims are based in the superficial fit of Jewish immigration and Zionism with the standard discourse, means and results of colonialism.
The discourse and ideology of the Jewish settlers is said to be very similar to the ideologies of other European settlers and colonies throughout the world. Those who make this claim point to the presence of a general mission civilisatrice within the Zionist discourse. This idea of a “white man’s burden” or attempt to lift the local populations out of their inferior state was present in nearly all other colonialist attempts and was a hallmark of the colonial period. The feeling of moral and material superiority over the backward and scorned Arab population matches exactly the colonialist discourse elsewhere. Another element of the Jewish discourse that conforms to colonial practice and sensibilities is the romanticizing of the “noble savages” or indigenous populations- holding them up as paragons of upright living and simplicity. Jewish settlers and pioneers in many ways adhered to this practice by adopting local dress and customs from the Bedouin tribes, and this causes some to equate them to other colonialist endeavors.
The means of Jewish settlement and the Zionist cause tempt many to view them through the lens of colonialism. Some see the immigration of large numbers of Europeans into another territory as a means of establishing homes and settlements as the epitome of settler-, plantation- or pure settlement colonialism. The practices of land acquisition and rejection of local labor in favor of “white” labor or the exploitation of local labor are explicitly seen in the ways the Zionists approached their settlement and nation building and were common within other colonialist paradigms. The WZO founded a colonial bank, capitalist joint-stock companies and did agricultural research; all of which are paralleled within the standard models of colonialism as practiced by others. Practices of cultural repression of the local population can be seen politically and economically through the occupation and domination of the Jews in the territory. Further, some see the mandated education practices of the Zionists as an attempt to foist upon the locals Zionist or European sentiments.
The results of the Zionist work also lend to the argument to view it within the colonialist paradigm. Seeing a country based upon the displacement of a legitimate local population and legalized by the occupying force by the enactment of statutes restricting ownership of land to Jewish hands and other laws (such as the Law of the Return) leads critics to see only the practice of colonialism based on separation and supremacy. The exploitation of Arab labor or the flat rejection of it (both seen at different times in the early yishuv) fit well within the norms of pure or plantation colonialism.
The arguments against the use of the colonialism paradigm to describe the conflict rise from a more in-depth analysis of the Zionist work and agenda. Looking at the facts less superficially reveals a number of extenuating or unique circumstances as well as mitigating factors that make the colonial paradigm untenable as the best paradigm with which to view the conflict.
Firstly, these arguments rest on the supposition that there is a distinct difference between colonization and colonialism- one being the simple creation of new settlements within a new geography and the other being based in political/economic domination and exploitation of the territory for the benefit of the home state. The Zionist movement fits into the former because first, the land was chosen for its historical and religious characteristics (not its economic potential) and second, the Jewish movement retained no mother country to support. This is further supported by the fact that all monetary support for the enterprise was explicitly one-way into the territory; Baron Rothschild and others poured large amounts of money and loans into the area without reaping any benefits outside of it. Similarly, the Zionist pioneers retained very weak political connections to the European powers and no real interest in retaining a state or center of culture outside of Palestine.
Secondly, the general discourse and framework of the Zionist leadership did not fit fully into a colonial paradigm either. While within the general Jewish elite of the time there existed some colonialist ideas (such as romanticization of the Bedouin and/or superiority over the indigenous populations), they were countered by the presence of a number of anti-colonial and even post-colonial elements. The Jewish intelligentsia was decidedly anti-colonial because they felt that they themselves had been somewhat colonized or exploited by the European powers throughout the centuries. The Israeli founders hated colonialism because of its parasitic relationship with local labor and the land that did not blend well with their socialist leanings and open dislike of capitalism.
Thirdly, the framework for the means of settlement differed from the standard framework of colonialism. Jewish immigration and settlement was based upon the family and the ideas of restoration, return and reconnecting with their historical land. In this sense, the civilizing mission was aimed generally at the Jews themselves and not at the local populations. The conversion of the “heathen” indigenous populations to Christianity, which was a hallmark of European colonialism, never entered into the thoughts and desires of the Jewish nationalist endeavor, which instead aimed at promoting and preserving the culture of the settlers. And while this caused the natural separation of the Jewish population from that of the Arabs, this was not solely because of a sense of superiority nor was it for the purpose of exploitation. Employing the more expensive Jewish labor (in an effort to cause downward class mobility and the creation of a Jewish working class) to the exclusion of the cheaper Arab labor is anything but exploitation of the local economy. The two economies- Jewish and Arab- also grew in tandem, another sign that exploitation of the local economy was far from the agenda. These structural barriers between the two economies and cultures left little room for a colonizer and colonized relationship.
Bibliography:
Aaronsohn, Ran. “Settlement in Eretz Israel: A Colonial Enterprise?” Israel Studies, 1996, vol.1, no. 2: 214-229.
Penslar, Derek J. Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective, London & New York, 2007, pp. 90-111 (“Is Zionism a Colonial Movement?”).
Penslar, Derek J. “Zionism, Colonialism, and Postcolonialism,” Journal of Israeli History, vol. 20, nos. 2/3, Summer/Autumn 2001.
Shafir, Gershon. Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach,” in Barnett, Michael N. (ed.) Israel in Comparative Perspective Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, New York, 1996: 227-244.
Shimoni, Gideon. “Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism,” in Philip Carl Salzman & Donna Robinson Divine, eds. Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict, Routledge, London & New York, 2008, pp. 182-194.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Evaluate the arguments for and against the colonialism paradigm as the basis for comprehending the Jewish-Arab conflict.
(from a class on Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict from Gideon Shimoni)
The arguments for using the colonialism paradigm to describe the Jewish-Arab conflict are based in the notion that the Zionist enterprise fits as a type or example of typical European colonialism, and the response by the Arab population is simply a reaction against this aggression. These claims are based in the superficial fit of Jewish immigration and Zionism with the standard discourse, means and results of colonialism.
The discourse and ideology of the Jewish settlers is said to be very similar to the ideologies of other European settlers and colonies throughout the world. Those who make this claim point to the presence of a general mission civilisatrice within the Zionist discourse. This idea of a “white man’s burden” or attempt to lift the local populations out of their inferior state was present in nearly all other colonialist attempts and was a hallmark of the colonial period. The feeling of moral and material superiority over the backward and scorned Arab population matches exactly the colonialist discourse elsewhere. Another element of the Jewish discourse that conforms to colonial practice and sensibilities is the romanticizing of the “noble savages” or indigenous populations- holding them up as paragons of upright living and simplicity. Jewish settlers and pioneers in many ways adhered to this practice by adopting local dress and customs from the Bedouin tribes, and this causes some to equate them to other colonialist endeavors.
The means of Jewish settlement and the Zionist cause tempt many to view them through the lens of colonialism. Some see the immigration of large numbers of Europeans into another territory as a means of establishing homes and settlements as the epitome of settler-, plantation- or pure settlement colonialism. The practices of land acquisition and rejection of local labor in favor of “white” labor or the exploitation of local labor are explicitly seen in the ways the Zionists approached their settlement and nation building and were common within other colonialist paradigms. The WZO founded a colonial bank, capitalist joint-stock companies and did agricultural research; all of which are paralleled within the standard models of colonialism as practiced by others. Practices of cultural repression of the local population can be seen politically and economically through the occupation and domination of the Jews in the territory. Further, some see the mandated education practices of the Zionists as an attempt to foist upon the locals Zionist or European sentiments.
The results of the Zionist work also lend to the argument to view it within the colonialist paradigm. Seeing a country based upon the displacement of a legitimate local population and legalized by the occupying force by the enactment of statutes restricting ownership of land to Jewish hands and other laws (such as the Law of the Return) leads critics to see only the practice of colonialism based on separation and supremacy. The exploitation of Arab labor or the flat rejection of it (both seen at different times in the early yishuv) fit well within the norms of pure or plantation colonialism.
The arguments against the use of the colonialism paradigm to describe the conflict rise from a more in-depth analysis of the Zionist work and agenda. Looking at the facts less superficially reveals a number of extenuating or unique circumstances as well as mitigating factors that make the colonial paradigm untenable as the best paradigm with which to view the conflict.
Firstly, these arguments rest on the supposition that there is a distinct difference between colonization and colonialism- one being the simple creation of new settlements within a new geography and the other being based in political/economic domination and exploitation of the territory for the benefit of the home state. The Zionist movement fits into the former because first, the land was chosen for its historical and religious characteristics (not its economic potential) and second, the Jewish movement retained no mother country to support. This is further supported by the fact that all monetary support for the enterprise was explicitly one-way into the territory; Baron Rothschild and others poured large amounts of money and loans into the area without reaping any benefits outside of it. Similarly, the Zionist pioneers retained very weak political connections to the European powers and no real interest in retaining a state or center of culture outside of Palestine.
Secondly, the general discourse and framework of the Zionist leadership did not fit fully into a colonial paradigm either. While within the general Jewish elite of the time there existed some colonialist ideas (such as romanticization of the Bedouin and/or superiority over the indigenous populations), they were countered by the presence of a number of anti-colonial and even post-colonial elements. The Jewish intelligentsia was decidedly anti-colonial because they felt that they themselves had been somewhat colonized or exploited by the European powers throughout the centuries. The Israeli founders hated colonialism because of its parasitic relationship with local labor and the land that did not blend well with their socialist leanings and open dislike of capitalism.
Thirdly, the framework for the means of settlement differed from the standard framework of colonialism. Jewish immigration and settlement was based upon the family and the ideas of restoration, return and reconnecting with their historical land. In this sense, the civilizing mission was aimed generally at the Jews themselves and not at the local populations. The conversion of the “heathen” indigenous populations to Christianity, which was a hallmark of European colonialism, never entered into the thoughts and desires of the Jewish nationalist endeavor, which instead aimed at promoting and preserving the culture of the settlers. And while this caused the natural separation of the Jewish population from that of the Arabs, this was not solely because of a sense of superiority nor was it for the purpose of exploitation. Employing the more expensive Jewish labor (in an effort to cause downward class mobility and the creation of a Jewish working class) to the exclusion of the cheaper Arab labor is anything but exploitation of the local economy. The two economies- Jewish and Arab- also grew in tandem, another sign that exploitation of the local economy was far from the agenda. These structural barriers between the two economies and cultures left little room for a colonizer and colonized relationship.
Bibliography:
Aaronsohn, Ran. “Settlement in Eretz Israel: A Colonial Enterprise?” Israel Studies, 1996, vol.1, no. 2: 214-229.
Penslar, Derek J. Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective, London & New York, 2007, pp. 90-111 (“Is Zionism a Colonial Movement?”).
Penslar, Derek J. “Zionism, Colonialism, and Postcolonialism,” Journal of Israeli History, vol. 20, nos. 2/3, Summer/Autumn 2001.
Shafir, Gershon. Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach,” in Barnett, Michael N. (ed.) Israel in Comparative Perspective Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, New York, 1996: 227-244.
Shimoni, Gideon. “Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism,” in Philip Carl Salzman & Donna Robinson Divine, eds. Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict, Routledge, London & New York, 2008, pp. 182-194.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
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