Americanization of the Israeli Defense and Weapons Industry
Andrew Smith
For:
Israeli Society Between Colonization, Americanization and Globalization
Michal Frenkel
Hebrew University
Rothberg International School
Weapons development and industry has been part of the Israeli consciousness since before their state was born. Beginning in the 1920s, the Jewish settlers in the yishuv began creating handmade arms. The business has blossomed from those early days to a multibillion-dollar industry that stands as a large pillar of much of the Israeli economy. Over time, from where and how the Israeli state has armed itself has changed along with the global trends and increasing conflicts that arose during the last half of the twentieth century.
As changes emerged in the global political atmosphere following WWII and the Cold War began to emerge and develop, Israel found itself in an interesting position. Placing itself in the Western sphere of influence with regard to arms began a slow process of Americanization that was bolstered significantly in the late 1960s through the ‘70s. This trend has continued after the end of the Cold War through to the present with Israel following the lead of the United States in many respects while at the same time bucking many of the other globalization trends that emerged. This paper will illustrate the continuing trend of Americanization within the Israeli defense industry with two case studies (one during the height of the Cold War, the other after the Soviet collapse): the Lavi aircraft project and the development of the Arrow missile defense system.
Background and History
Before continuing with the case studies, it is necessary to have a quick overview of the generalities involving the Israeli defense and weapons industry. While the 1920s saw the beginning of the weapons industry, until the late sixties it mainly focused on small arms. “The major catalyst for Israel’s metamorphosis from a small-arms manufacturer to a producer of sophisticated military systems came after the 1967 Six-Day War. During the war, France imposed an embargo on arms sales to Israel.” [1] This embargo included a number of Mirage fighter jets that had already been ordered and paid for, putting undue stress on the IDF during the conflict. This problem resulted in two major decisions. First, Israel looked elsewhere for weapons and military technology, coming under the wing of the United States as its primary arms supplier. Second, Israel determined to embark on its own sophisticated weapons and military equipment development and production to ensure that it was never in such a position again.
Since that point, Israel has emerged as one of the more serious developers and producers, as well as sellers, of weapons on the global market. Today, “there are approximately 150 defense firms in Israel, with combined revenues of an estimated $3.5 billion.” [2] The majority of those firms are private, however the biggest (in size, revenue, production and research) three are all government owned.
The military-industrial complex is a hotly debated subject around the world. Generally, it is considered “a coalition of powerful groups or bodies that share economic, institutional, or political interests in intensifying defense expenditure.” [3] With regard to the case of Israel, Mintz (1985) points out that there are a number of mitigating factors that must be taken into a account in this discussion that tend to push the weapons industry in different directions than in the rest of the world. He discusses three distinct characteristics in the categories of economics, politics and security. Within economics, the major difference within the Israeli economy is the low degree of private ownership of weapons and defense industries. This means “private capital has only marginal influence in guiding industrial production in the defense sphere.” [4] For many years, this was the norm within Western industrialized countries- “Even in the West, therefore, arms production was usually placed outside the bounds of free-market economics…Even in many capitalist countries, defense companies were state-owned, or heavily state-controlled.”[5] However the end of the Cold war has brought changes and global trends that have not applied as yet to Israel because of the political and security characteristics.
The Israeli political system differs from the American system in that it is based in parliamentary political parties within a single district PR electoral system. Thus, unlike in America, “no politician may be singled out as representing a specific geographic area seeking to protect defense industries in its own region” and the defense industry acts mainly as a powerful interest group which “is granted priority over all other lobbies in the country and above all other public policies as a direct consequence of life in the shadow of war in Israel.” [6] Security issues and concerns hold a much more central place in the public discourse than in other countries. These characteristics combine to ensure that Israel will retain a highly governmentally owned or controlled defense and weapons industry.
Despite these unique characteristics, the Israeli and the American military-industrial complexes share much in common and perhaps because of them the two countries have grown closer throughout their years of interaction. The necessity of a technologically superior military caused Israel to fall wholeheartedly into the US camp during the Cold War, reaping the benefits of its patronage during the years of competition with the Soviet Union for regional influence. This patronage in turn caused an impressive Americanization, or increase of American influence, upon the Israeli arms industry, as is illustrated by the case of the development of the Lavi.
Case Study: The Lavi
The Lavi program began as an initiative to upgrade the Israeli Air Force’s aging aircrafts. After the French withdrew from supplying Israel with aircraft in 1967, the Israelis had developed a small multi-role fighter called the Kfir. Thirteen years later, the Israelis wanted to replace these with a new, more technologically advanced aircraft. Thus, in 1980, the Lavi program was introduced.
The Lavi was intended primarily for the close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) mission with a secondary air-defense mission… As originally conceived, the Lavi was to have been a light attack aircraft to replace the elderly McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II and the IAI Kfir, remaining in service with the IDF/AF. [7]
The proposed plan was very popular in Israel- the plan would create jobs, increase technology and advancements, prepare products for export and would bring in other revenues. “The United States supported the project in principle and was willing to allow Israel to use its foreign military sales (FMS) credits to buy US components for the Lavi. In 1982, however, the concept of the Lavi as a replacement for the A-4 abruptly changed.” [8] The change that occurred was that the development plan morphed into a bigger, more expensive plane, with a heavy and more powerful engine and better fighting capabilities- “an alternative engine was chosen, the much more powerful Pratt & Whitney PW1120. With the extra power came demands for greater capability, until the Lavi began to rival the F-16, which was already in service with the IDF/AF.” [9] With the increased capabilities came increased cost as well as increased need of greater technology. However, “Israel possessed neither the technology nor the capital required for such a project” because of an economic downturn. [10]
The US was not pleased with this turn of events for a number of reasons. The costs of the project were spiraling out of control, with the US picking up the tab for over 90% of the project. On top of that, the US was concerned over the precedents being set by the extensive licensing of technology and the use of FMS linked with the perpetuation of an image of pro-Israel bias within the US (which was a very important consideration in the time of the Cold War when the US needed to reach out to other Middle Eastern nations to limit Communist expansion). The project was involving roughly 730 US firms, and there was a major concern over problems of technology transfer as well. But perhaps the greatest problem from the US’s view was the creation of a fighter jet that would then compete with the US’s own F-16 on the international markets, potentially hurting US jobs, it’s economy and exports. [11] Connected with this was the worry that these planes would make their way into the Communist influence sphere and compete with the F-16 in a more literal fashion. A final dispute about the cost of each unit was the final straw: “the US Congress withdrew financial support for the Lavi program. The Israeli government could not finance the project without US support and canceled the Lavi program on 30 August 1987.” [12]
This example illustrates the extent to which the Israeli weapons and defense industry had become largely dependent upon American support. Without US backing, the Israeli state was unable to continue to produce its own fighter jets. Instead, the US offered to sell them, via FMS credits, additional F-16s and other aircraft. This dependence was to increase though as the Cold War was to come to an end. The Americanization of the Israeli military-industrial complex continued with the production of new technology and weapons systems, such as the Arrow missile system.
Case Study: The Arrow
The Arrow missile system project was developed jointly by Israel and the United States as a system for protecting against surface-to-surface missile attacks. Following the 1991 Gulf War, in which Saddam Hussein sent a number of Scud missiles against her, Israel felt the need to develop a better warning system as well as a system for combating the combined strategic and tactical threats that a missile strike on Israeli territory present.
The missile used within this system was created earlier, but also by joint cooperation between the US and Israel. “In 1988, a commercial contract was signed between Israel Aircraft Industries and the [U.S.] Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to develop an experimental missile, not a system, and to try to hit a target in the upper reaches of the atmosphere.” [13] This missile successfully accomplished what it was meant to and was then incorporated into the later design of the entire Arrow missile defense system that bears its name coupled with a newly developed radar system for incoming missile detection.
The system was initially tested in 1995, and subsequent tests came through the years until the entire system was installed and became functional in 2000. [14] “In 2000 the first battery was delivered, and today two batteries are deployed – one in the south and one in the north” of the country. [15] The system works on the basic premise that any incoming missile (whether nuclear, chemical, or other) must be detected and destroyed before it can be in a position to harm the country.
The range and speed of Arrow – capable of reaching a height of 30 miles at nine times the speed of sound – will allow hostile missiles to be intercepted high enough so that any weapons of mass destruction they carry will not detonate or be dispersed over Israel…. The system is designed to intercept as many as 14 incoming missiles. [16]
The system was developed by both the US and Israel, however the joint cooperation process was different than was previously seen with the Lavi. “The Arrow program used practically no U.S. technology, just U.S. money. It was almost entirely based on Israeli technology, though we bought some components in the U.S. because they were cheaper.” [17] This is a significant change from previous decade when Israel was dependent upon the US for both funding and technology. The change though still reflects the amount of Americanization within the Israeli weapons industry which is still very much dependent upon US money for research and development, and construction. This has also benefited the US because “the Arrow program has provided the United States with a wide range of technical and operational data and experience that benefit similar American weapons development projects.” [18]
Conclusion
While the Israeli weapons and defense industry has grown up considerably within the last few decades, it has also seen a large amount of Americanization. From 1967 onward, the United States has been heavily involved financially and technologically with Israeli development and deployment of military technologies and apparatuses.
The failure of the Lavi project indicates the amount of influence the US had upon the Israeli industry during the Cold War, while the cooperation with the Arrow missile system illustrates the ongoing post-Cold War relationship between the two. These projects demonstrate the three general goals that dictate US pre- and post-Cold War interactions within international cooperation: 1) to strengthen friends and allies through limited weapons and technology transfer, 2) increasing “rationalization, standardization and interoperability (RSI)” with allies to better facilitate cooperation, and 3) opening additional markets and technologies to better develop and provide technologies to be used in the US defense industry. [19]
However, the changes in the relationship of the US and Israel (shifting away from tech transfer to solely financial aid) indicates the shifting relationships between the nations due to increased globalization. Continuous breakdown of barriers has led to a lot of technology transfer, which has allowed many developing countries to begin their own weapons manufacturing and sale industries. This “may lead to the progressive erosion of the military-technological advantages of the West, and particularly the United States.” [20] Thus, while Israel has bucked some globalization trends (such as privatization of weapons industries), it has become fully involved with Americanization of its weapons and defense industry along with following the US’s lead in other global trends (such as tech transfer and financing).
Bibliography
Bitzinger, Richard, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994), 170-198.
DeLoughry, Lt Col James P. USAF, “The United States and the LAVI,” Airpower Journal, Vol. IV, No. 3, (1990), 34-44.
Deurenberg, Ruud, “Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Lavi,” taken from Jewish Virtual Library, Internet: taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/lavi.html, accessed 24 June 2010.
Jewish Virtual Library, “The Arrow Missile Program,” Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Arrow.html, accessed 5 July 2010.
Jewish Virtual Library, “Arrow Anti-missile Shield is Operational,” Oct 2000. Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/arrowop.html, accessed 5 July 2010.
Jewish Virtual Library, “The Israeli Defense Industry (2002),” Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Economy/eco1.html, accessed 24 June 2010.
Mintz, Alex, “The Military-Industrial Complex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1985). 623-639.
Rubin, Uzi, “Beyond Iraq: Missile Proliferation in the Middle East,” in Jerusalem Letter: Viewpoints, 2 March 2003. Internet, taken from http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp493.htm. Accessed 5 July 2010.
[1] Jewish Virtual Library, “The Israeli Defense Industry (2002),” Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Economy/eco1.html, accessed 24 June 2010.
[2] Jewish Virtual Library, “The Israeli Defense Industry (2002)”
[3] Mintz, Alex, “The Military-Industrial Complex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1985), 624.
[4] Mintz, “Military-Industrial Complex,” 626.
[5] Bitzinger, Richard, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994), 172.
[6] Mintz, “Military-Industrial Complex,” 627.
[7] Deurenberg, Ruud, “Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Lavi,” taken from Jewish Virtual Library, Internet: taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/lavi.html, accessed 24 June 2010.
[8] Lt Col James P. DeLoughry, USAF, “The United States and the LAVI,” Airpower Journal, Vol. IV, No. 3, (1990), 34.
[9] Deurenberg, Ruud, “Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Lavi,” taken from Jewish Virtual Library, Internet: taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/lavi.html, accessed 24 June 2010.
[10] DeLoughry, “The LAVI,” 34.
[11] DeLoughry, “The LAVI,” 34-44.
[12] Deurenberg, Ruud, “Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Lavi,” taken from Jewish Virtual Library, Internet: taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/lavi.html, accessed 24 June 2010.
[13] Rubin, Uzi, “Beyond Iraq: Missile Proliferation in the Middle East,” in Jerusalem Letter: Viewpoints, 2 March 2003. Internet, taken from http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp493.htm. Accessed 5 July 2010. Italics in original.
[14] Jewish Virtual Library, “Arrow Anti-missile Shield is Operational,” Oct 2000. Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/arrowop.html, accessed 5 July 2010.
[15] Rubin, “Beyond Iraq.”
[16] Jewish Virtual Library, “The Arrow Missile Program,” Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Arrow.html, accessed 5 July 2010.
[17] Rubin, “Beyond Iraq.”
[18] Jewish Virtual Library, “The Arrow Missile Program,” Internet, taken from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/Arrow.html, accessed 5 July 2010.
[19] Bitzinger, “Globalization,” 189-190.
[20] Bitzinger, “Globalization,” 191.