This short essay answers this query:
Explain the following policy proposals and evaluate their relative importance in the history of Zionism in relation to the conflict with the Arabs:
(a) Transfer of population
(b) Bi-nationalism
(c) Partition
The first policy proposal, transfer of population (specifically the Arabs out of Israel, however sometimes coupled with exchanging Jewish groups from Arab countries), has its roots within the Radical Revisionists. Although some scholars have suggested that Jabotinsky himself had some leanings toward or perhaps even fully accepted the idea of voluntary transfer or exchange (all are in agreement that he fully objected to forced evacuation), it is absolutely sure that initially it was only the very fringe groups of Zionism that accepted or advocated population transfer.
This policy has its base in the general ideology of the radical Revisionists whose movement was characterized by authoritarian tendencies and quasi-religious messianic rhetoric that sought to replace the regular Zionist idea of a national home for the Jews with that of malkhut Israel (“the Kingdom of Israel”), an allusion to the establishment of a Jewish imperialism. This, combined with their attempts to regain a regesh ha-adnut or sense of mastery over the land, resulted in their classification of both the British and the Arabs in Palestine as alien occupants in the land that must either accept Jewish majority rule or be forced out.
The LEHI movement under Avraham Stern expounded on this further. They claimed that the right to the land was delineated by might or conquest. As well, they relied on the argument that the Arabs in Palestine constituted only a part of the larger Arab nation. They denied that they had any sort of national character and thus allowed that it would be easy for the Arabs to accept removal to another Arab land. This paved the way for these radicals to actively pursue transfer of the Arab population out of Israel as a reasonable and long-lasting solution since they agreed with Jabotinsky that the Arabs would never fully accept minority status or citizenship under Zionist rule.
In the late 1940s, this proposal figured prominently in their political platforms. It faded slightly directly before the 1948 War, but was revived as the war continued and the movement began to consider Jabotinsky mistaken in believing that a large portion of the Arabs would eventually accept the Jewish state. Following the war, the prominence of the proposal again faded only to be revived again 20 years later after the Six Day War. This time though, population transfer was even more popular as members of the religious Zionist movement joined the remnant of the Radical Revisionists, even expanding the idea to include transfer of Arabs out of the occupied territories.
As a policy, forced population transfer or exchange never occupied a place of extreme importance within Zionism. It was never advocated or accepted by any except the most radical fringes of the Zionist movement. However, this is not to say that it did not have influence within the history of Zionism. It can be shown that its influence and importance have grown, as those who consider it a valid and sustainable solution to the conflict have grown from the small numbers of the LEHI and Radical Revisionists to include members of the religious Zionist movement as well as others who have come to see the conflict in similar zero-sum game terms.
The “compromise for peace” camp initially promoted the second policy proposal, bi-nationalism. In simple terms, the policy encouraged the creation of a single state built on compromise in which both Jews and Arabs would have equal say without regard for numerical superiority. The idea was advocated by many different groups, the first among them being Brit Shalom, which was then followed chronologically by Kema Mizraha, the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, Ha-shomer Ha-tzair, Left Polei Zion and Ihud (or the Union Association). These groups represent the opposite side of the spectrum from the Radical Revisionists, and were also relatively small in numbers.
The ideology and policies of Brit Shalom were largely the product of the thinking of many intellectuals such as Rabbi Benjamin, Yitshak Epstein, Martin Buber, and Arthur Ruppin, among others. It was founded largely because these individuals felt that the Zionist leadership was neglecting an important issue by not cultivating relations with the Arabs. They felt that the success of the Zionist cause was dependent upon Arab good will and cooperation. Buber specifically phrased his thoughts within the framework of freedom, feeling that it was moral reprehensible for one people to oppress or dominate another. He, along with others, thus helped develop the idea that a state governed equally and cooperatively by both Arabs and Jews would both benefit all parties as well as be morally and rationally acceptable.
The other Zionist groups and individuals of the times which supported the bi-national idea did so for similar, albeit different reasons. Judah Magnes, one of the founders of the Ihud, was strongly in favor of a bi-national state (rather than a solely Jewish one) because it would allow for the greatest possible achievement of the right to self-determination for both sides (despite granting neither a full exercise thereof). Ha-shomer Ha-Tzair advocated the policy because it fit well with their socialist goals and advocacy of the common working class.
The bi-national movement never had any significant influence within the history of Zionism. This was largely because it seemed unconcerned with Jewish immigration into the area as it did not see a Jewish majority in the country as one of its preeminent goals and because it recognized that the Arabs in Palestine had an equal right and claim to the land. These ideas clashed with the larger Labor Zionist movement and the Revisionists, despite attempts to make the policy more attractive to them. The policy was also not long lasting, fading from the scene following the British abandonment of the Mandate and the establishment of Israel. This policy was neither able to rouse the interest of large numbers within the Jewish community nor garner a good response from the Arabs.
Partition, a policy proposing the establishment of two nations, one Arab and one Jewish, enjoyed the largest amount of influence and importance of the three. This was largely because the Labor Zionists who constituted the largest and most influential section within both the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Organization accepted it as a viable initial solution to the Jewish problem. The leadership of these institutions (David Ben Gurion and Chaim Weizmann) was much more pragmatic than the leadership of the fringe groupings. Jabotinsky and the Revisionists rejected partition on the grounds that the Jewish claim was for all of Palestine and should not be divided. The Brit Shalom tradition rejected it in favor of the bi-national state. Ben Gurion and Weizmann began to publically embrace partition around the 1937 release of the Peel Commission report that would present Partition as the proposed British policy.
It is important to note that Ben Gurion and Weizmann’s acceptance of partition was not because of any desire to reach a compromised solution with the Arabs. While they accepted it as a viable line of policy for providing all sides with justice and self-determination, they mostly sided with it because it was seen as the fastest way to attain their own self-interest in the establishment of a Jewish homeland.
While this policy was largely divisive among the Zionists initially, it gained much support as time went by and eventually was accepted by both the Jewish Zionist community and the international community.
Bibliography
Galnoor, Itzhak. The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995.
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Tessler, Mark. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994.
Showing posts with label Zionism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zionism. Show all posts
Buber vs Jabotinksy
This short essay was written as per these guidelines:
Explain the views and policies of Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky in regard to the Arab-Jewish conflict: Evaluate what they had in common and how they differed.
Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky share many things in common regarding their views and the policies that they espoused. They both believed very strongly in the Zionist ethos and cause. They both felt that the creation of a state, with specific rights and powers in the hands of the Jewish population, was vital to solving the Jewish Problem and to the existential need of the Jewish culture and people. They both stressed the point, though, that a physical state was the answer to the Jewish problem, not as a physical haven from anti-Semitism, but because there was some spiritual, or non-physical, malady caused by the Jewish lack of a homeland or lack of connection to their ancestral homeland.
Buber and Jabotinksy held very similar general views about the Arabs. They both respected in distinct ways the Arab community within Palestine and felt that their distrust and dislike of Jewish immigration and the Zionist cause were valid. They felt that a distinct and legitimate national movement or patriotism that was both strong and authentic caused this opposition. However, both Jabotinsky and Buber understood that there would be some unavoidable problems along the way though. They understood that both parties of the conflict had competing claims to the same land and that, realistically, it would be impossible for both of the claims to be fully realized.
The policies that they both adopted for the solution of this antipathy, while differing in means and methods, came to nearly the same visualized conclusion. They both envisioned the creation of a state with a largely Jewish population in which the Arabs were granted full civic, political rights and privileges. They both saw the two communities, Jewish and Arab, as growing and flourishing as well as being almost fully separate and independent from one another.
Despite these many generalized similarities, Buber and Jabotinsky differed vastly in many of the details of their thoughts, views and policies. One of the major divergences in their thoughts was the reasoning behind their claims to the land of Palestine as a homeland. Buber interpreted the claim in light of how he saw Zionism’s purpose: as a manifestation of the Jewish mission to create a divinely approved community. He never recognized any type of historical claim, based in the Bible or anywhere else, to the land, but argued that the Jewish people “spiritually” needed the land to fulfill their mission because of its integral connection with their ancient covenant with God- creating a model community that would serve the needs of all mankind. Buber phrased his arguments this way in order to actively appeal to the morality of the nations and gain the approval of the international community to accomplish the international restructuring necessary for creating the Jewish state. Attached to this, Buber also declared that the Jews had a great right and claim to the land based in their ability to use the land to the best of its creative and fertile potential better than the Arabs. This point, based on pioneering spirit and technology, also claimed that all inhabitants of the region would benefit from Jewish cultivation of the land. Jabotinsky on the other hand thought very little of the pioneering accomplishments of Jewish settlers as far as basing a claim on the land went. He strictly advocated the historical right to land.
Jabotinksy bolstered his adherence to the historical right to the land claim by his personal views about the Arabs in Palestine. While respecting the Arabs for their force of will and their strong stand for their rights and according them (in his own words) the same “courteous indifference” which he felt towards all gentiles, Jabotinsky held a very negative opinion of the Arab-Muslim culture. He felt that it was socially and politically backward and primitive. He saw the Islamic civilization as being the complete antithesis of European civilization: it was stagnant and petrified, completely doomed to forever be oppressive religiously and politically. He refused to accept as well the argument that Jewish influence could culturally uplift the natives. This complete rejection of the European romanticizing of the East led him to see negotiations with the Arabs over a solution to be futile.
Buber wholeheartedly disagreed with Jabotinksy on this. He felt that Middle Eastern culture was a beautiful expression of healthy, clean and pure living. He adhered to the philosophy that all nations are free and able to claim their own rights and privileges and that no nation or people had the right to suppress another people. His expression of Zionism was in no way an attempt to exert superiority over another nation, but simply a frank acceptance that the Jewish nation had a fate or destiny that was different from other nations. Granting the Jews a homeland in Palestine would in no way mean that the Arabs would not be able to attain and achieve their own cultural mission. In this way, Buber felt that peace and understanding between the Jews and their Arab neighbors in Palestine was of paramount importance to the Zionist cause, and, thus, he fully advocated negotiations with the Arabs to come to a suitable compromise that would be beneficial to all. For this reason, Buber supported the binational solution put forward by the compromise for peace camp (Brit Shalom). He rejected any methods of nationalistic control or domination and felt that moral ends do not justify the use of immoral means. In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the use of such tactics would negate any positive outcomes of Zionism.
Jabotinksy, on the other hand, fully accepted the use of nationalistic means of control. He fully believed that if something was necessary, coercion was acceptable even within a social context. He applied this point to the Zionist cause by advocating the erection of what he called an “Iron Wall.” Because he felt that the Arabs would never approve of the Zionist endeavor and that they would continually fight growing Jewish immigration and might in the Palestine area, he claimed that it was necessary for the Jews to protect their cause by either actual force or the threat/show of force (military or otherwise). Indeed, Jabotinksy accepted that if the Arabs refused the Jewish need then war would was not only possible but perhaps also necessary to force them to acceptance. This “iron wall” would serve to forcibly pacify and eventually coerce the local population into accepting their station as a minority within the proposed Jewish state.
The size and characteristics of the future state was another place where Buber and Jabotinksy differed. Where Buber was desirous of a binational state in the entire area of Palestine that would be dually governed by both the Arabs and the Jews regardless of their populations or majority status. Jabotinsky on the other hand envisioned the only solution to the Jewish problem to be the creation of a fully Jewish state, with an Arab minority possessing full civic and political rights, but ruled by the Jewish majority.
Bibliography:
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Heller, Joseph. “Weizmann, Jabotinsky and the Arab Question.” Jerusalem Quarterly, 26, (1983): 109-126.
Lustick, Ian. “To Build and to be Built: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall”, Israel Studies, vol. 1. No.1, Spring 1996, pp. 196-223.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Explain the views and policies of Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky in regard to the Arab-Jewish conflict: Evaluate what they had in common and how they differed.
Martin Buber and Vladimir Jabotinsky share many things in common regarding their views and the policies that they espoused. They both believed very strongly in the Zionist ethos and cause. They both felt that the creation of a state, with specific rights and powers in the hands of the Jewish population, was vital to solving the Jewish Problem and to the existential need of the Jewish culture and people. They both stressed the point, though, that a physical state was the answer to the Jewish problem, not as a physical haven from anti-Semitism, but because there was some spiritual, or non-physical, malady caused by the Jewish lack of a homeland or lack of connection to their ancestral homeland.
Buber and Jabotinksy held very similar general views about the Arabs. They both respected in distinct ways the Arab community within Palestine and felt that their distrust and dislike of Jewish immigration and the Zionist cause were valid. They felt that a distinct and legitimate national movement or patriotism that was both strong and authentic caused this opposition. However, both Jabotinsky and Buber understood that there would be some unavoidable problems along the way though. They understood that both parties of the conflict had competing claims to the same land and that, realistically, it would be impossible for both of the claims to be fully realized.
The policies that they both adopted for the solution of this antipathy, while differing in means and methods, came to nearly the same visualized conclusion. They both envisioned the creation of a state with a largely Jewish population in which the Arabs were granted full civic, political rights and privileges. They both saw the two communities, Jewish and Arab, as growing and flourishing as well as being almost fully separate and independent from one another.
Despite these many generalized similarities, Buber and Jabotinsky differed vastly in many of the details of their thoughts, views and policies. One of the major divergences in their thoughts was the reasoning behind their claims to the land of Palestine as a homeland. Buber interpreted the claim in light of how he saw Zionism’s purpose: as a manifestation of the Jewish mission to create a divinely approved community. He never recognized any type of historical claim, based in the Bible or anywhere else, to the land, but argued that the Jewish people “spiritually” needed the land to fulfill their mission because of its integral connection with their ancient covenant with God- creating a model community that would serve the needs of all mankind. Buber phrased his arguments this way in order to actively appeal to the morality of the nations and gain the approval of the international community to accomplish the international restructuring necessary for creating the Jewish state. Attached to this, Buber also declared that the Jews had a great right and claim to the land based in their ability to use the land to the best of its creative and fertile potential better than the Arabs. This point, based on pioneering spirit and technology, also claimed that all inhabitants of the region would benefit from Jewish cultivation of the land. Jabotinsky on the other hand thought very little of the pioneering accomplishments of Jewish settlers as far as basing a claim on the land went. He strictly advocated the historical right to land.
Jabotinksy bolstered his adherence to the historical right to the land claim by his personal views about the Arabs in Palestine. While respecting the Arabs for their force of will and their strong stand for their rights and according them (in his own words) the same “courteous indifference” which he felt towards all gentiles, Jabotinsky held a very negative opinion of the Arab-Muslim culture. He felt that it was socially and politically backward and primitive. He saw the Islamic civilization as being the complete antithesis of European civilization: it was stagnant and petrified, completely doomed to forever be oppressive religiously and politically. He refused to accept as well the argument that Jewish influence could culturally uplift the natives. This complete rejection of the European romanticizing of the East led him to see negotiations with the Arabs over a solution to be futile.
Buber wholeheartedly disagreed with Jabotinksy on this. He felt that Middle Eastern culture was a beautiful expression of healthy, clean and pure living. He adhered to the philosophy that all nations are free and able to claim their own rights and privileges and that no nation or people had the right to suppress another people. His expression of Zionism was in no way an attempt to exert superiority over another nation, but simply a frank acceptance that the Jewish nation had a fate or destiny that was different from other nations. Granting the Jews a homeland in Palestine would in no way mean that the Arabs would not be able to attain and achieve their own cultural mission. In this way, Buber felt that peace and understanding between the Jews and their Arab neighbors in Palestine was of paramount importance to the Zionist cause, and, thus, he fully advocated negotiations with the Arabs to come to a suitable compromise that would be beneficial to all. For this reason, Buber supported the binational solution put forward by the compromise for peace camp (Brit Shalom). He rejected any methods of nationalistic control or domination and felt that moral ends do not justify the use of immoral means. In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the use of such tactics would negate any positive outcomes of Zionism.
Jabotinksy, on the other hand, fully accepted the use of nationalistic means of control. He fully believed that if something was necessary, coercion was acceptable even within a social context. He applied this point to the Zionist cause by advocating the erection of what he called an “Iron Wall.” Because he felt that the Arabs would never approve of the Zionist endeavor and that they would continually fight growing Jewish immigration and might in the Palestine area, he claimed that it was necessary for the Jews to protect their cause by either actual force or the threat/show of force (military or otherwise). Indeed, Jabotinksy accepted that if the Arabs refused the Jewish need then war would was not only possible but perhaps also necessary to force them to acceptance. This “iron wall” would serve to forcibly pacify and eventually coerce the local population into accepting their station as a minority within the proposed Jewish state.
The size and characteristics of the future state was another place where Buber and Jabotinksy differed. Where Buber was desirous of a binational state in the entire area of Palestine that would be dually governed by both the Arabs and the Jews regardless of their populations or majority status. Jabotinsky on the other hand envisioned the only solution to the Jewish problem to be the creation of a fully Jewish state, with an Arab minority possessing full civic and political rights, but ruled by the Jewish majority.
Bibliography:
Gorny, Yosef. Zionism and the Arabs: 1882-1948, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987.
Heller, Joseph. “Weizmann, Jabotinsky and the Arab Question.” Jerusalem Quarterly, 26, (1983): 109-126.
Lustick, Ian. “To Build and to be Built: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall”, Israel Studies, vol. 1. No.1, Spring 1996, pp. 196-223.
Mendes-Flohr, Paul, ed. A land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.
Shavit, Yaakov. Jabotinksy and the Revisionist Movement: 1925-1948, Cass, London, 1988.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Colonialism Paradigm and Jewish-Arab conflict
This short essay was written to answer this question:
Evaluate the arguments for and against the colonialism paradigm as the basis for comprehending the Jewish-Arab conflict.
(from a class on Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict from Gideon Shimoni)
The arguments for using the colonialism paradigm to describe the Jewish-Arab conflict are based in the notion that the Zionist enterprise fits as a type or example of typical European colonialism, and the response by the Arab population is simply a reaction against this aggression. These claims are based in the superficial fit of Jewish immigration and Zionism with the standard discourse, means and results of colonialism.
The discourse and ideology of the Jewish settlers is said to be very similar to the ideologies of other European settlers and colonies throughout the world. Those who make this claim point to the presence of a general mission civilisatrice within the Zionist discourse. This idea of a “white man’s burden” or attempt to lift the local populations out of their inferior state was present in nearly all other colonialist attempts and was a hallmark of the colonial period. The feeling of moral and material superiority over the backward and scorned Arab population matches exactly the colonialist discourse elsewhere. Another element of the Jewish discourse that conforms to colonial practice and sensibilities is the romanticizing of the “noble savages” or indigenous populations- holding them up as paragons of upright living and simplicity. Jewish settlers and pioneers in many ways adhered to this practice by adopting local dress and customs from the Bedouin tribes, and this causes some to equate them to other colonialist endeavors.
The means of Jewish settlement and the Zionist cause tempt many to view them through the lens of colonialism. Some see the immigration of large numbers of Europeans into another territory as a means of establishing homes and settlements as the epitome of settler-, plantation- or pure settlement colonialism. The practices of land acquisition and rejection of local labor in favor of “white” labor or the exploitation of local labor are explicitly seen in the ways the Zionists approached their settlement and nation building and were common within other colonialist paradigms. The WZO founded a colonial bank, capitalist joint-stock companies and did agricultural research; all of which are paralleled within the standard models of colonialism as practiced by others. Practices of cultural repression of the local population can be seen politically and economically through the occupation and domination of the Jews in the territory. Further, some see the mandated education practices of the Zionists as an attempt to foist upon the locals Zionist or European sentiments.
The results of the Zionist work also lend to the argument to view it within the colonialist paradigm. Seeing a country based upon the displacement of a legitimate local population and legalized by the occupying force by the enactment of statutes restricting ownership of land to Jewish hands and other laws (such as the Law of the Return) leads critics to see only the practice of colonialism based on separation and supremacy. The exploitation of Arab labor or the flat rejection of it (both seen at different times in the early yishuv) fit well within the norms of pure or plantation colonialism.
The arguments against the use of the colonialism paradigm to describe the conflict rise from a more in-depth analysis of the Zionist work and agenda. Looking at the facts less superficially reveals a number of extenuating or unique circumstances as well as mitigating factors that make the colonial paradigm untenable as the best paradigm with which to view the conflict.
Firstly, these arguments rest on the supposition that there is a distinct difference between colonization and colonialism- one being the simple creation of new settlements within a new geography and the other being based in political/economic domination and exploitation of the territory for the benefit of the home state. The Zionist movement fits into the former because first, the land was chosen for its historical and religious characteristics (not its economic potential) and second, the Jewish movement retained no mother country to support. This is further supported by the fact that all monetary support for the enterprise was explicitly one-way into the territory; Baron Rothschild and others poured large amounts of money and loans into the area without reaping any benefits outside of it. Similarly, the Zionist pioneers retained very weak political connections to the European powers and no real interest in retaining a state or center of culture outside of Palestine.
Secondly, the general discourse and framework of the Zionist leadership did not fit fully into a colonial paradigm either. While within the general Jewish elite of the time there existed some colonialist ideas (such as romanticization of the Bedouin and/or superiority over the indigenous populations), they were countered by the presence of a number of anti-colonial and even post-colonial elements. The Jewish intelligentsia was decidedly anti-colonial because they felt that they themselves had been somewhat colonized or exploited by the European powers throughout the centuries. The Israeli founders hated colonialism because of its parasitic relationship with local labor and the land that did not blend well with their socialist leanings and open dislike of capitalism.
Thirdly, the framework for the means of settlement differed from the standard framework of colonialism. Jewish immigration and settlement was based upon the family and the ideas of restoration, return and reconnecting with their historical land. In this sense, the civilizing mission was aimed generally at the Jews themselves and not at the local populations. The conversion of the “heathen” indigenous populations to Christianity, which was a hallmark of European colonialism, never entered into the thoughts and desires of the Jewish nationalist endeavor, which instead aimed at promoting and preserving the culture of the settlers. And while this caused the natural separation of the Jewish population from that of the Arabs, this was not solely because of a sense of superiority nor was it for the purpose of exploitation. Employing the more expensive Jewish labor (in an effort to cause downward class mobility and the creation of a Jewish working class) to the exclusion of the cheaper Arab labor is anything but exploitation of the local economy. The two economies- Jewish and Arab- also grew in tandem, another sign that exploitation of the local economy was far from the agenda. These structural barriers between the two economies and cultures left little room for a colonizer and colonized relationship.
Bibliography:
Aaronsohn, Ran. “Settlement in Eretz Israel: A Colonial Enterprise?” Israel Studies, 1996, vol.1, no. 2: 214-229.
Penslar, Derek J. Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective, London & New York, 2007, pp. 90-111 (“Is Zionism a Colonial Movement?”).
Penslar, Derek J. “Zionism, Colonialism, and Postcolonialism,” Journal of Israeli History, vol. 20, nos. 2/3, Summer/Autumn 2001.
Shafir, Gershon. Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach,” in Barnett, Michael N. (ed.) Israel in Comparative Perspective Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, New York, 1996: 227-244.
Shimoni, Gideon. “Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism,” in Philip Carl Salzman & Donna Robinson Divine, eds. Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict, Routledge, London & New York, 2008, pp. 182-194.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Evaluate the arguments for and against the colonialism paradigm as the basis for comprehending the Jewish-Arab conflict.
(from a class on Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict from Gideon Shimoni)
The arguments for using the colonialism paradigm to describe the Jewish-Arab conflict are based in the notion that the Zionist enterprise fits as a type or example of typical European colonialism, and the response by the Arab population is simply a reaction against this aggression. These claims are based in the superficial fit of Jewish immigration and Zionism with the standard discourse, means and results of colonialism.
The discourse and ideology of the Jewish settlers is said to be very similar to the ideologies of other European settlers and colonies throughout the world. Those who make this claim point to the presence of a general mission civilisatrice within the Zionist discourse. This idea of a “white man’s burden” or attempt to lift the local populations out of their inferior state was present in nearly all other colonialist attempts and was a hallmark of the colonial period. The feeling of moral and material superiority over the backward and scorned Arab population matches exactly the colonialist discourse elsewhere. Another element of the Jewish discourse that conforms to colonial practice and sensibilities is the romanticizing of the “noble savages” or indigenous populations- holding them up as paragons of upright living and simplicity. Jewish settlers and pioneers in many ways adhered to this practice by adopting local dress and customs from the Bedouin tribes, and this causes some to equate them to other colonialist endeavors.
The means of Jewish settlement and the Zionist cause tempt many to view them through the lens of colonialism. Some see the immigration of large numbers of Europeans into another territory as a means of establishing homes and settlements as the epitome of settler-, plantation- or pure settlement colonialism. The practices of land acquisition and rejection of local labor in favor of “white” labor or the exploitation of local labor are explicitly seen in the ways the Zionists approached their settlement and nation building and were common within other colonialist paradigms. The WZO founded a colonial bank, capitalist joint-stock companies and did agricultural research; all of which are paralleled within the standard models of colonialism as practiced by others. Practices of cultural repression of the local population can be seen politically and economically through the occupation and domination of the Jews in the territory. Further, some see the mandated education practices of the Zionists as an attempt to foist upon the locals Zionist or European sentiments.
The results of the Zionist work also lend to the argument to view it within the colonialist paradigm. Seeing a country based upon the displacement of a legitimate local population and legalized by the occupying force by the enactment of statutes restricting ownership of land to Jewish hands and other laws (such as the Law of the Return) leads critics to see only the practice of colonialism based on separation and supremacy. The exploitation of Arab labor or the flat rejection of it (both seen at different times in the early yishuv) fit well within the norms of pure or plantation colonialism.
The arguments against the use of the colonialism paradigm to describe the conflict rise from a more in-depth analysis of the Zionist work and agenda. Looking at the facts less superficially reveals a number of extenuating or unique circumstances as well as mitigating factors that make the colonial paradigm untenable as the best paradigm with which to view the conflict.
Firstly, these arguments rest on the supposition that there is a distinct difference between colonization and colonialism- one being the simple creation of new settlements within a new geography and the other being based in political/economic domination and exploitation of the territory for the benefit of the home state. The Zionist movement fits into the former because first, the land was chosen for its historical and religious characteristics (not its economic potential) and second, the Jewish movement retained no mother country to support. This is further supported by the fact that all monetary support for the enterprise was explicitly one-way into the territory; Baron Rothschild and others poured large amounts of money and loans into the area without reaping any benefits outside of it. Similarly, the Zionist pioneers retained very weak political connections to the European powers and no real interest in retaining a state or center of culture outside of Palestine.
Secondly, the general discourse and framework of the Zionist leadership did not fit fully into a colonial paradigm either. While within the general Jewish elite of the time there existed some colonialist ideas (such as romanticization of the Bedouin and/or superiority over the indigenous populations), they were countered by the presence of a number of anti-colonial and even post-colonial elements. The Jewish intelligentsia was decidedly anti-colonial because they felt that they themselves had been somewhat colonized or exploited by the European powers throughout the centuries. The Israeli founders hated colonialism because of its parasitic relationship with local labor and the land that did not blend well with their socialist leanings and open dislike of capitalism.
Thirdly, the framework for the means of settlement differed from the standard framework of colonialism. Jewish immigration and settlement was based upon the family and the ideas of restoration, return and reconnecting with their historical land. In this sense, the civilizing mission was aimed generally at the Jews themselves and not at the local populations. The conversion of the “heathen” indigenous populations to Christianity, which was a hallmark of European colonialism, never entered into the thoughts and desires of the Jewish nationalist endeavor, which instead aimed at promoting and preserving the culture of the settlers. And while this caused the natural separation of the Jewish population from that of the Arabs, this was not solely because of a sense of superiority nor was it for the purpose of exploitation. Employing the more expensive Jewish labor (in an effort to cause downward class mobility and the creation of a Jewish working class) to the exclusion of the cheaper Arab labor is anything but exploitation of the local economy. The two economies- Jewish and Arab- also grew in tandem, another sign that exploitation of the local economy was far from the agenda. These structural barriers between the two economies and cultures left little room for a colonizer and colonized relationship.
Bibliography:
Aaronsohn, Ran. “Settlement in Eretz Israel: A Colonial Enterprise?” Israel Studies, 1996, vol.1, no. 2: 214-229.
Penslar, Derek J. Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective, London & New York, 2007, pp. 90-111 (“Is Zionism a Colonial Movement?”).
Penslar, Derek J. “Zionism, Colonialism, and Postcolonialism,” Journal of Israeli History, vol. 20, nos. 2/3, Summer/Autumn 2001.
Shafir, Gershon. Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach,” in Barnett, Michael N. (ed.) Israel in Comparative Perspective Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, New York, 1996: 227-244.
Shimoni, Gideon. “Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism,” in Philip Carl Salzman & Donna Robinson Divine, eds. Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict, Routledge, London & New York, 2008, pp. 182-194.
Shimoni, Gideon. The Zionist Ideology, Brandeis & University Press of New England, Hanover & London, 1995.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)