Short Essay:
Please elaborate on the relationship between the media and the state.
Political Communication in Israel
The relationship between the media and state in the Western world has becomes increasingly more complex because of the process of “medialization.” [1] This process describes how the media has changed by gaining both greater independence from and greater influence upon the political system of the time, moving from periods of greater governmental control over media to freer privatized media following their own agenda as well as shifting within theoretical research frameworks and paradigms. [2] This process has arisen because of the assumed role of the media as sole (or most important) intermediary between the state (i.e., the government, politicians, etc) and the public at large, and as the key for keeping the state under public accountability. [3] This has allowed for new tools, resources and powers for the media to wield to have greater impact on the world of politics and vice versa. It has also opened the door for some new processes that have colored both the media and politics.
The tools and resources that the media has to pull from are varied; however theoretically, they each can produce a measurable affect on the community and public at large. One of these tools is the use of framing- the process whereby the media outlet determines what will be covered as well as how it will be covered. How the media chooses to portray an event can have large influence on how it is received and perceived by the audience. [4] This brings up many concerns, such as what general frame to choose (thematic or hard vs episodic or soft with general news stories, as well as issue frames vs game frames within the political system framework). [5] This framing can be seen as a function of political bias within the media organizations. The media can use their control of media access and the valence (degree of positive and negative coverage) to in part determine how a specific event or person is considered. An example of the effect of framing can be seen in the various frames employed by differing news agencies during Operation Cast Lead: portraying Israel as an aggressor, focusing on the plight of the Gaza’s inhabitants, etc. Different frames emphasized different aspects of the conflict leading the audiences of the respective media to differing conclusions.
Another theoretical tool of the media in the political system is the use of agenda setting (“The media influence public opinion by emphasizing certain issues over others.” [6]) and priming. “The priming hypothesis states that the media agenda affects the criteria people use to evaluate the performance of political actors.” [7] This allows the media to in some ways directly affect the electoral and other political processes by introducing a saliency effect to the public [8]- by having both easily accessed media and “by emphasizing certain issues and not others, the media may thus influence electoral results, because it appears that people tend to vote for parties that ‘own’ the issues primed by the media.” [9] [10] The use of affective attributes in the coverage can add another element of influence for the media. [11] This is seen effectively by observing the compelling arguments principle (“the media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone…to objects or issues.” [12]) and/or by negativity bias in which people pay more attention to negative news items than to positive. [13][14] These effects again can be illustrated by political and media reactions during Operation Cast Lead. As public opinion was manipulated by the stories regarding the operation, one could witness changes in political action towards the issue (e.g. international calls for the denouncing of Israel, the Goldstone report, etc).
While the media’s tools and resources for interacting with and influencing the workings of the state are powerful, the state is not left without its own means of influencing the media and using the media’s tools as its own. The politicians and the state can easily take advantage of the biases and tools of the media if they understand those tools. By understanding the ideas of personal political bias and newsworthiness bias, a politician can theoretically craft their personal appeal and character to the desires of the public. As well, once a politician has reached office, he or she gains an advantage because of their position that will guarantee them greater news coverage than any opponents who are not already in the public’s eye. In election periods, those in the front of the polls can count on receiving more coverage as well because of the “horse-race bias” (the fact that the poll leaders automatically receive greater access to media). This was attempted during Operation Cast Lead, as it would seem that political leaders (e.g. Ehud Barak, Tzipi Livni, etc.) during the operation strove to use their status as leaders of the “successful” operation to enhance their political appeal in the upcoming election.
Politicians and government officials can also be aware of the Index Hypothesis and the strength that its theoretical model can lend to their political atmosphere. The index hypothesis states “mass media news professionals…tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic.” [15] Thus, governments that can tightly control the internal amount of discussion and debate about policies and actions can control the media’s influence and narrow its index. This was observed well in the Israeli media during Operation Cast Lead. With the government standing nearly unanimously in agreement about the scope and manner of the operation, there was hardly any divergence of opinion within the Israeli media and public at large.
Most of this discussion has emphasized the differing tools that the media and the state use to determine and shift their relationship. However one effect has been seen and theoretically projected to grow within both spheres: personalization. [16] Generally, this trend has been seen in three different areas: Institutional, Media and Politician Behavior. [17] Institutionally, personalization has been seen in that new modes, norms and formal institutions have emerged that emphasize the individual within the political system. Within the media, it has emerged that (according to some analysis) the media has begun to focus more on individuals. This of course follows after the decline in party politics. But as well, the media’s focus on politics as a game or “horse race” [18] with attendant game frames tends towards personalization. Similarly, other media actions, such as use of episodic/soft frames and particularly types of “infotainment,” [19] tend to push towards the personalization of politics. As well, politician behavior has tended away from party politics and toward personal activities in some countries.
[1] Stromback &Kaid, (2008), “A Framework for Comparing Election News Coverage Around the World,” in Stromback &Kaid (Eds.) Handbook of Election Coverage Around the World.
[2] See Sheufele, D. A. (1999), “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49, (1), 103-122 for an overview of the last century within communication paradigm research.
[3] Bennett, W. (1990) “Toward a Theory of Press-state Relations in the United States,” Journal of Communication, 40, 103-125.
[4] See Sheufele, D. A. (1999), “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49, (1), 103-122 for a broader theoretical discussion of differing types of frames and their effects.
[5] Sheafer, T., Weimann, G., and Tsfati, Y. (2008), “Campaigns in the Holy Land: the Content and Effects of Election News Coverage in Israel,” In Stromback, J. & L. L. Kaid (Eds.) Handbook of Election Coverage around the World. (pp. 209-225).
[6] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 217.
[7] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 218.
[8] Shamir, J. & Shamir, M. (2000) The Anatomy of Public Opinion. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). 87.
[9] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 218
[10] For info concerning this affect in election processes, see Holbrook, (1996) Do Campaigns Matter? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage).
[11] See Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: The Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of Communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[12] Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[13] It should be added that theoretically, this type of influence should be observed mainly among people lower in political information, while those with higher political information and knowledge should be less affected. See Franz & Ridout, (2007), “Does Political Advertising Persuade?” Political Behavior, 29(4), 465-492.
[14] Another interesting aspect to this is that voters can effectively be discouraged from voting by highly negative media during an election process. Se Ansolabehere, et al. (1997), “Does Attack Advertizing Demobilize the Electorate?” In Iyengar & Reeves (Eds.), Do the Media Govern? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Chap. 25, pp. 195-207.
[15] Bennet, “Press-state Relations,” 106.
[16] Although it is debatable about how well this is truly borne out by statistics in an international scale, personalization has still been observed in many nations under many differing situations. See Rahat & Sheafer (2007) “The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003,” Political Communication, 24 (1), 65-80. And Karvonen, (2007) “The Personalization of Politics: What does Research Tell us so far, and what further research is in order?” Paper for the 4th ECPR Conference, Pisa 6-8 Sept 2007.
[17] Rahat & Sheafer, “Personalization(s),” 68-69.
[18] Sheafer, et al. “Campaigns,” 209.
[19] See Baumgartner & Morris, (2006), “The Daily Show Effect,” American Political Research, 34, 341-367.
Showing posts with label media. Show all posts
Showing posts with label media. Show all posts
Affective Priming
Short Essay:
Please explain the idea of affective priming. What is its possible role in elections? Compare this concept with the framing effect.
Political Communication in Israel
Affective priming deals with the way people make judgments of their political leaders (and others) based on the issues that get prominent news coverage. Price and Tewksbury note that originally priming effects were studied in the realm of agenda setting. However, they also note that whereas agenda setting can affect what the audience find important, priming studies can “also affects public evaluations of political leaders. For example, at any particular point in time people may tend to evaluate the performance of the president based on those issues (e.g., the economy or foreign affairs) recently featured most prominently in the media.” [1] It seems that the reason this works is because people tend “to be miserly in expending cognitive effort when processing political information. Most use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics.” [2] People base their overall opinion of a political leader’s success simply on their actions/policies/activities in one area.
Sheafer takes it a little bit further by noting that once issues or events have been primed, people place an “affective attribute” on it. This is an evaluation of the issue at hand, which cannot be separated from the initial priming, thus rendering it affective priming. He says, “The media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone (i.e., positive, negative or neutral) to objects or issues. In other words, the media help people in assigning attribute to these issues.” [3] This seems to give the media a powerful tool midway between the framing effect and simple priming.
The framing effect refers to the way that the media can determine how the object or issue is to be presented. Framing presents a way that journalists and the audience alike can respectively represent and comprehend the issues at hand. [4] The way journalists frame an issue is essentially assigning to it an affective attribution, be that negative, positive or neutral. “Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented, on the ways public problems are formulated for the media audience.” [5]
Affective priming can thus be a formidable tool to be used by the media to affect politics, especially in the context of elections. By recognizing which party “owns” which issue and affectively priming accordingly, a media outlet can perhaps influence the electoral process because “such affective attributes have political consequences, probably mainly through the process of voters’ attribution of responsibility to the incumbent party.” [6] Similarly, the theory “behind agenda setting and priming is the idea that story selection affects audience evaluations by influencing the likelihood that some issues rather than others will come to mind, thus affecting audience judgments of issue importance or approval of public actors.” [7] Thus, a media outlet can attempt to sway public opinion and judgment of a public figure or party. This could be fairly (or possibly even extremely) effective during a close election.
[1]Price, V. & Tewksbury, D. (1997). “New Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical account of media priming and framing.” In Barnett, G. A. & Boster, F. J. (Eds.), Progress in Communication Sciences: Advances in Persuasion, Vol. 13. Connecticut and London: Abelx Publishing Corp. 181.
[2]IBID
[3]Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: the Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[4]See Scheufele, D. A. (1999). “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49(1), 103-122.
[5]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
[6]Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[7]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
Please explain the idea of affective priming. What is its possible role in elections? Compare this concept with the framing effect.
Political Communication in Israel
Affective priming deals with the way people make judgments of their political leaders (and others) based on the issues that get prominent news coverage. Price and Tewksbury note that originally priming effects were studied in the realm of agenda setting. However, they also note that whereas agenda setting can affect what the audience find important, priming studies can “also affects public evaluations of political leaders. For example, at any particular point in time people may tend to evaluate the performance of the president based on those issues (e.g., the economy or foreign affairs) recently featured most prominently in the media.” [1] It seems that the reason this works is because people tend “to be miserly in expending cognitive effort when processing political information. Most use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics.” [2] People base their overall opinion of a political leader’s success simply on their actions/policies/activities in one area.
Sheafer takes it a little bit further by noting that once issues or events have been primed, people place an “affective attribute” on it. This is an evaluation of the issue at hand, which cannot be separated from the initial priming, thus rendering it affective priming. He says, “The media influence affective priming through the affective compelling arguments effect, in which they attach an evaluative tone (i.e., positive, negative or neutral) to objects or issues. In other words, the media help people in assigning attribute to these issues.” [3] This seems to give the media a powerful tool midway between the framing effect and simple priming.
The framing effect refers to the way that the media can determine how the object or issue is to be presented. Framing presents a way that journalists and the audience alike can respectively represent and comprehend the issues at hand. [4] The way journalists frame an issue is essentially assigning to it an affective attribution, be that negative, positive or neutral. “Framing focuses not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented, on the ways public problems are formulated for the media audience.” [5]
Affective priming can thus be a formidable tool to be used by the media to affect politics, especially in the context of elections. By recognizing which party “owns” which issue and affectively priming accordingly, a media outlet can perhaps influence the electoral process because “such affective attributes have political consequences, probably mainly through the process of voters’ attribution of responsibility to the incumbent party.” [6] Similarly, the theory “behind agenda setting and priming is the idea that story selection affects audience evaluations by influencing the likelihood that some issues rather than others will come to mind, thus affecting audience judgments of issue importance or approval of public actors.” [7] Thus, a media outlet can attempt to sway public opinion and judgment of a public figure or party. This could be fairly (or possibly even extremely) effective during a close election.
[1]Price, V. & Tewksbury, D. (1997). “New Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical account of media priming and framing.” In Barnett, G. A. & Boster, F. J. (Eds.), Progress in Communication Sciences: Advances in Persuasion, Vol. 13. Connecticut and London: Abelx Publishing Corp. 181.
[2]IBID
[3]Sheafer, T. (2007). “How to Evaluate it: the Role of Story Evaluative Tone in Agenda Setting and Priming.” Journal of communication, 57 (1), 21-39.
[4]See Scheufele, D. A. (1999). “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication, 49(1), 103-122.
[5]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
[6]Sheafer, “Evaluate,” 26.
[7]Price and Tewksbury, “New Values,” 184.
The Israeli Political Spectrum Shift
In the last few years, particularly in the last election, Israeli voters have seen a large shift of the entire political spectrum towards the left. As well, the political parties of the Left bloc have seen a large decline in the numbers and support of their traditional voters. This is largely because of a confluence of a number of trends in political behavior and can be explained by an analysis of different models of political action. Similarly, these models can be used to explain and predict future events and political tactics.
The shift of the political spectrum towards the left has occurred because of a number of factors. The worldwide trend of decrease in levels of turnout for political participation documented by Dalton (2002) is one explanation for the decrease in the voting for the left. While this decrease has not been as drastic in Israel as it has been in other countries, it can still be seen in the volatility of election results and voters shifting from party to party, as well as in public opinion polls of declining trust in public institutions. Because of this (or perhaps causing it) is the appearance and rise of numerous other types of political participation- from political interest groups to NGOs and lobbyists- people are looking for and finding new ways of participating in society.
While the trend of declining public trust is potentially harmful in the long run for national political systems (Shamir & Arian, 2002), it also accounts for the shift in the Israeli political spectrum. Anger over government performance and politics leads some to abstention, but it can also generally lead to questioning long held political beliefs. Hetherington (2005) for example attributes the ascendency and domination of the American Right in the last 30 years to this declining political trust (which in the States resulted in an increase of conservative public policy). The emerging of “new” politics mixes in with this declining political trust with volatile results.
Yishay (1999) describes the five simultaneous elements of change to “new” politics (generally described as a moving public focus away from economic and welfare security to ideals of rights accomplished by well-educated, economically secure, self-motivated citizens) as an affluent socio-economic environment, shift in values and attitudes, changes in partisan alignment, shifts in political behavior and a slide in political agendas towards “politics of identity.” These elements are all seen in Israel and have increased focus on the rights of people and less on the socio-economic needs and security (this is not to say that security isn’t a top priority still in the Israeli state). Combined with the declining public trust, this has shifted the political spectrum to the left (opposite of what occurred in the US according to Hetheringon, 2005) as people become more interested in equality, justice and rights of all(even for Palestinians) than they are in economic security. An intriguing example of this change in political discourse is the acceptance of major parties on the political right, particularly the Likud, of the need for a two-state solution and recognition of Palestinian need of a state.
This shifting of the electorate to the left was further influenced by the individualization of politics which accounts for changes on an individual level as well. Shamir and Arian (1999) describe how issue voting has increased in importance in the last years and social cleavages have decreased in ability to explain certain electoral behaviors. Their theory of collective identity binds together other models of voter behavior, such as the sociological, psychological and the economic approach. While these models are instructive, it can be shown that the sociological model isn’t as applicable today than it has been in the past (Wattenberg, 1995). It can also be argued that the psychological model, built as it is upon psychological affiliation with one party, is becoming less influential as party alignment is declining. It still contains many other elements, such as corollary theories such as the Funnel theory, that can be shown to still be large in effect. The economic perspective and economic voting (via the responsibility hypothesis, Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000) though, as an extension of rational choice, is becoming more and more important, especially in the wake of increasingly candidate centered (or personalized) politics in political institutions, the media and politician behavior (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). Israeli voters, while slowly coming to choose candidates over parties (this was especially pertinent during the time of the direct election of the Prime Minister), have come to rely to a greater extent on specific issues, usually choosing one or two basic issues to extrapolate whether or not a candidate is a good choice. Because the main issues of importance within Israel generally revolve around security, the political left has been hampered as events such as the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, and the Gaza War have convinced large portions of the public that they are in need of strong security oriented leadership- typically not found on the left. This has caused many on the left to shift their votes to the right a bit.
Others have shifted their votes away from their first parties of choice on the left to more centrist parties such as Kadima because of a desire to have more influence in the shaping of the ruling coalition. Within the Rational choice model, there are two accepted types of voters: expressive/sincere voters and instrumental/strategic voters. The first will always choose to vote for their first choice party as an expression of their desires. The second, however, will vote strategically keeping in mind that they can influence the formation and policy of the government more if they unite with a larger consensus to prevent the opposite bloc from gaining power in the coalition bargaining. For instance, many on the left would choose to vote for Kadima because they felt that that party had a good chance of defeating the Likud numerically and thus be asked to form the coalition (which would then probably include their party of first choice). Within the PR multiparty coalition governance system of Israel, this is not a negligible possibility (Aldrich, et al, 2005). However, in the last election it seems that this possibility backfired, as Kadima did manage to garner more votes and MKs than the Likud, but failed to have the backing from enough other parties to form a workable coalition.
Other models for political behavior can be useful in discussing how the Israeli voters are moving away from the perceived left (I say perceived, because it is likely that many of the voters have stayed in the same place ideologically, but because of the spectrum shift, they now find themselves more centrist than leftist) and can assist in the prediction of what will occur in the future. For example, the median model, which describes the candidate need to maximize their potential voters by placing themselves centrally, is related to the proximity model, wherein voters, unable to find an exact ideological fit in the parties, will choose that party which is in closest proximity to them on certain issues. The candidates though must take into account in addition to simple spatial proximity, also directional aspects and characteristics of intensity among voters (Merrill & Grofman, 1999). This will play out in the next elections, as the parties, specifically those on the left, will be forced to reinvent themselves in light of the changed political spectrum and place themselves strategically with new platforms and policies to attract the largest amount of voters. It can already be seen how this has played into Kadima’s hands, as they received so many votes from the left side, despite being a centrist party.
Perhaps the best way for the Left to revive itself though is to pay attention to the principles of the Affective Intelligence model and the Prospect theory. The affective intelligence theory (Marcus, et al, 2000) posits that people, in order to make sense of the various domains and demands of life, operate via two distinct emotional systems: a dispositional and a surveillance system. The first monitors every day interactions assessing successes and failures, while the second looks for novelty or threats in the environment. People will only act out when by means of this system they feel anxious or threatened by new information- in the political behavior arena, they will only act (vote) to change the status quo when they feel that there is a threat or problem with it. For example, in or after periods of high terror, the public shifts to support the right wing’s strict policies on security, as they feel anxious about new developments (Berrebi & Klor, 2006).
Prospect theory is a reaction to certain limitations on rational choice. Put forward by Quatrone & Tversky (1988), the theory predicts that people will exhibit risk aversion in domains of possible gains, but risk seeking behavior in domains of possible losses. Thus, combining these facts with the Affective Intelligence model, the Left must work to convince the public that the risk of shifting to Leftist parties and leadership is less than that of staying with a rightist coalition by raising public anxiety on issues, such as economics, candidate performance, or even security. They can effectively do this by playing on peoples’ emotions with regard to decreasing levels of terror or using recent events (such as the Flotilla attack) to discredit the Right’s near “ownership” of the issue of security. Worrying the public that the right cannot bring full security nor peace and publishing their failures could revive the efforts of the left and the peace camp by increasing voting behavior in their favor.
Bibliography:
Aldrich, J. H., Blais, A., Ideridason, I. H., & Levine, R. (2005). Coalition Consideration and the Vote. In Arain, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel, 2003.
Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2006). On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 899-925.
Dalton, R.J. (2002). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies (Third Edition). New York: Chatham House Publishers.
Hetherington, M.J. (2005). Why Trust Matters” Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Paldam, M. (2000). Economic Voting: An Introduction. Electoral Studies, 19 (2&3), 113-121.
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Merrill, S. III, & Grofman, B. (1999). A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quatrone, G. A. & Tversky, A. (1988). Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. American Political Science Review, 82(3), 719-736.
Rahat, G. & Sheafer, T. (2007). The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003. Political Communication, 24, 65-80.
Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (1999). Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in Israel. American Political Science Review, 93(2), 265-277.
Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (2002). Abstaining and Voting in 2001. In Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel 2001. Jerusalem: The Democracy Library.
Yishay, Y. (1999). “Old” versus “New” Politics in the 1996 Elections. In Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (Eds.) The Elections in Israel, 1996. SUNY Press and the Israel Democracy Institute.
The shift of the political spectrum towards the left has occurred because of a number of factors. The worldwide trend of decrease in levels of turnout for political participation documented by Dalton (2002) is one explanation for the decrease in the voting for the left. While this decrease has not been as drastic in Israel as it has been in other countries, it can still be seen in the volatility of election results and voters shifting from party to party, as well as in public opinion polls of declining trust in public institutions. Because of this (or perhaps causing it) is the appearance and rise of numerous other types of political participation- from political interest groups to NGOs and lobbyists- people are looking for and finding new ways of participating in society.
While the trend of declining public trust is potentially harmful in the long run for national political systems (Shamir & Arian, 2002), it also accounts for the shift in the Israeli political spectrum. Anger over government performance and politics leads some to abstention, but it can also generally lead to questioning long held political beliefs. Hetherington (2005) for example attributes the ascendency and domination of the American Right in the last 30 years to this declining political trust (which in the States resulted in an increase of conservative public policy). The emerging of “new” politics mixes in with this declining political trust with volatile results.
Yishay (1999) describes the five simultaneous elements of change to “new” politics (generally described as a moving public focus away from economic and welfare security to ideals of rights accomplished by well-educated, economically secure, self-motivated citizens) as an affluent socio-economic environment, shift in values and attitudes, changes in partisan alignment, shifts in political behavior and a slide in political agendas towards “politics of identity.” These elements are all seen in Israel and have increased focus on the rights of people and less on the socio-economic needs and security (this is not to say that security isn’t a top priority still in the Israeli state). Combined with the declining public trust, this has shifted the political spectrum to the left (opposite of what occurred in the US according to Hetheringon, 2005) as people become more interested in equality, justice and rights of all(even for Palestinians) than they are in economic security. An intriguing example of this change in political discourse is the acceptance of major parties on the political right, particularly the Likud, of the need for a two-state solution and recognition of Palestinian need of a state.
This shifting of the electorate to the left was further influenced by the individualization of politics which accounts for changes on an individual level as well. Shamir and Arian (1999) describe how issue voting has increased in importance in the last years and social cleavages have decreased in ability to explain certain electoral behaviors. Their theory of collective identity binds together other models of voter behavior, such as the sociological, psychological and the economic approach. While these models are instructive, it can be shown that the sociological model isn’t as applicable today than it has been in the past (Wattenberg, 1995). It can also be argued that the psychological model, built as it is upon psychological affiliation with one party, is becoming less influential as party alignment is declining. It still contains many other elements, such as corollary theories such as the Funnel theory, that can be shown to still be large in effect. The economic perspective and economic voting (via the responsibility hypothesis, Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000) though, as an extension of rational choice, is becoming more and more important, especially in the wake of increasingly candidate centered (or personalized) politics in political institutions, the media and politician behavior (Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). Israeli voters, while slowly coming to choose candidates over parties (this was especially pertinent during the time of the direct election of the Prime Minister), have come to rely to a greater extent on specific issues, usually choosing one or two basic issues to extrapolate whether or not a candidate is a good choice. Because the main issues of importance within Israel generally revolve around security, the political left has been hampered as events such as the Second Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, and the Gaza War have convinced large portions of the public that they are in need of strong security oriented leadership- typically not found on the left. This has caused many on the left to shift their votes to the right a bit.
Others have shifted their votes away from their first parties of choice on the left to more centrist parties such as Kadima because of a desire to have more influence in the shaping of the ruling coalition. Within the Rational choice model, there are two accepted types of voters: expressive/sincere voters and instrumental/strategic voters. The first will always choose to vote for their first choice party as an expression of their desires. The second, however, will vote strategically keeping in mind that they can influence the formation and policy of the government more if they unite with a larger consensus to prevent the opposite bloc from gaining power in the coalition bargaining. For instance, many on the left would choose to vote for Kadima because they felt that that party had a good chance of defeating the Likud numerically and thus be asked to form the coalition (which would then probably include their party of first choice). Within the PR multiparty coalition governance system of Israel, this is not a negligible possibility (Aldrich, et al, 2005). However, in the last election it seems that this possibility backfired, as Kadima did manage to garner more votes and MKs than the Likud, but failed to have the backing from enough other parties to form a workable coalition.
Other models for political behavior can be useful in discussing how the Israeli voters are moving away from the perceived left (I say perceived, because it is likely that many of the voters have stayed in the same place ideologically, but because of the spectrum shift, they now find themselves more centrist than leftist) and can assist in the prediction of what will occur in the future. For example, the median model, which describes the candidate need to maximize their potential voters by placing themselves centrally, is related to the proximity model, wherein voters, unable to find an exact ideological fit in the parties, will choose that party which is in closest proximity to them on certain issues. The candidates though must take into account in addition to simple spatial proximity, also directional aspects and characteristics of intensity among voters (Merrill & Grofman, 1999). This will play out in the next elections, as the parties, specifically those on the left, will be forced to reinvent themselves in light of the changed political spectrum and place themselves strategically with new platforms and policies to attract the largest amount of voters. It can already be seen how this has played into Kadima’s hands, as they received so many votes from the left side, despite being a centrist party.
Perhaps the best way for the Left to revive itself though is to pay attention to the principles of the Affective Intelligence model and the Prospect theory. The affective intelligence theory (Marcus, et al, 2000) posits that people, in order to make sense of the various domains and demands of life, operate via two distinct emotional systems: a dispositional and a surveillance system. The first monitors every day interactions assessing successes and failures, while the second looks for novelty or threats in the environment. People will only act out when by means of this system they feel anxious or threatened by new information- in the political behavior arena, they will only act (vote) to change the status quo when they feel that there is a threat or problem with it. For example, in or after periods of high terror, the public shifts to support the right wing’s strict policies on security, as they feel anxious about new developments (Berrebi & Klor, 2006).
Prospect theory is a reaction to certain limitations on rational choice. Put forward by Quatrone & Tversky (1988), the theory predicts that people will exhibit risk aversion in domains of possible gains, but risk seeking behavior in domains of possible losses. Thus, combining these facts with the Affective Intelligence model, the Left must work to convince the public that the risk of shifting to Leftist parties and leadership is less than that of staying with a rightist coalition by raising public anxiety on issues, such as economics, candidate performance, or even security. They can effectively do this by playing on peoples’ emotions with regard to decreasing levels of terror or using recent events (such as the Flotilla attack) to discredit the Right’s near “ownership” of the issue of security. Worrying the public that the right cannot bring full security nor peace and publishing their failures could revive the efforts of the left and the peace camp by increasing voting behavior in their favor.
Bibliography:
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Berrebi, C., & Klor, E. F. (2006). On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(6), 899-925.
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